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ABSTRACT
Translingual Rhetoric
by
Lucas Corcoran
Advisor: Ira Shor

This project looks to understand the linguistic and rhetorical concepts grouped under the labels
of “translingualism” and “translanguaging” by situating these ideas within debates within the
philosophy of language and social performativity. The goal is to understand what the theoretical
implications are of the claim that named national languages do not exist linguistically, and, in
turn, to conceptualize how uses of language that exceed—or go beyond—the borders of named
national languages function within social and institutional settings. I suggest that linguistic
practices that are meaningful and do not cohere to the conventions of named national languages
are best understood within their highly contextualized conditions of production and reception. I
finally outline a pedagogical theory that aims to ground composition and rhetoric education
within a rhetorical framework premised on the development of students’ metacognitive skills.

! iv!

Table of Contents
Chapter I: Speech Act Theory and Rhetoric ....................................................................................1
Chapter II: Types, Tokens, and Performatives ..............................................................................40
Chapter III: Duplication and Incommensurability .........................................................................77
Chapter IV: Rules Rhetoric Language .........................................................................................111
Chapter V: Translingual Pedagogy ..............................................................................................148
Reference List ..............................................................................................................................183
!
!

1!
Chapter I: Speech Act Theory and Rhetoric

1 Introduction
This chapter moves in two parts. First, I seek to rehearse the analytical roots of Speech
Act Theory (SAT). I do this by beginning with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus and moving on to his work in the Philosophical Investigations. Then, I read J.L.
Austin and John Searle as primarily responding to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. This move
establishes what I take as the baseline commitments of analytical versions of SAT: how the later
Wittgenstein networks linguistic meaning throughout the total of web of its performative
enactment and the ways in which analytical philosophy thereafter attempts to codify this step
into a “logics” of performativity.
Although I will contend that a logics of performativity in a strict sense is ultimately
misguided, I situate Austin and Searle’s respective philosophies as providing a prospective
vocabulary for talking about performativity that critical theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu and
Judith Butler take up in order to articulate a thoroughly existential reading of performativity and
social reality. Second, I will be at pains to develop a working definition of rhetoric, which I
believe departs notably the rhetorical tradition. I use SAT as a tool to read Lloyd Bitzer’s
definition of the rhetorical situation as offering a novel and, perhaps, overlooked possibility for
rhetoric. Like SAT, Bitzer defines rhetorical discourse as essentially networked throughout its
site of performative enactment. Based on this premise, I argue that rhetoric is always situated and
productive discourse: rhetoric is born out of material conditions and it returns to material
conditions in order to bring about a concrete change in them. In doing this, I will propose a
definitional argument that will carry the burden of my take on rhetoric. This argument will
consist of distinguishing between what I call “conventional” exigencies and “rhetorical”
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exigencies. As I hope to make clear, it is precisely this difference between these two different
types of exigencies that marks, at least provisionally, the boundaries between SAT and rhetorical
theory.
SAT and the translingual turn in composition/rhetoric studies and in linguistics run on
parallel tracks, since the translingual turn has tacitly traded on the status of linguistics norms and
rules. A monolingual approach would have it that the rules are “in” the language itself:
conventionalized grammar yields meaning through its logical soundness. On this account,
language tout court is simply that which is intelligible without its contextual envelope either
pitching in or detracting from its basic meaningful content. As an example, think about the
grammar exercises in the back of a Latin textbook: these sentences show the “rules” of Latin
insofar that they demonstrate a token of the logical types taught in the preceding chapters. To
parse a textbook Latin sentence means to resolve its parts as the sum of some connecting set of
pre-given rules.
Turning things on their heads, the translingual turn reverses the paradigm: the linguistic
content of language is minimalized and its contextual envelope is maximized. As will be made
plain below, this translingual premise readily aligns with SAT’s basic methodological
commitment, which routinely argues that linguistic content alone always underdetermines an
utterance’s understood significance. Like SAT, translingual language and literacy practices
demonstrate how speakers need not follow the “rules” putatively internal to named languages in
order to pull off a variety of complexly nuanced speech acts. To affirm the translingual
doxology: language isn’t what speakers know about language. It’s what they know how to do
with it (Lu & Horner, 2016).
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However, I believe that this translingualism starting-point tends to kick the
methodological can further down the road. To claim--and rightly so--that language is not, at rock
bottom, a knowledge but a practice means that, instead of owing us a theory of knowledge, the
translingual paradigm owes us a theory of practice. And, thus, the translingual paradigm hops out
of the linguistic frying pan and into the theoretical fire, since theorists across disciplines-sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and economists, to name a few--still hotly argue over
what we mean when we talk about practice. But the situation is even worse for the translingual
paradigm: to note that language is a practice does not obviate the theoretical commitment of
demonstrating whether language is still fundamentally rule-bound or not. To say language is
what we do and not what we know does not ipso facto mean that “rules” do not still govern
linguistic behavior. In fact, it might very well turn out to be the case that the “language-ispractice” claim endorsed by the translingual paradigm situates language as even more rule-bound
than the monolingual account has told the story. As I show below, SAT teaches just how rulebound ordinary language is by showing how much unremarkable practices such as promising and
betting follow highly routinized conventions and scripts. In a word: to take the translingual turn
should not imply giving up on rules. It only means that we should locate the rules differently.
Taken in isolation, the translingual belief that language is not a knowledge but a practice
does not present a novel methodological advance. Austin titled his series of William James
Lectures at Harvard in 1955, later published in 1966, as How to Do Things with Words. Lots of
folk have known for a long time that linguistic knowledge does not necessarily cash out as
linguistic competence. This, as far as I can tell, is the founding principle of linguistic pragmatics.
However, the translingual turn is perhaps unique in its desire to understand the relationship
between linguistic features and the “rules” that govern the effective performative within a speech
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act. The relationship between linguistic features and speech acts is a central concern of this
project, and I hope to show the the translingual paradigm as uniquely equipped to understand this
relationship both in terms of of methodology and in terms of pedagogy. Furthermore, the
translingual turn presents an attempt to understand the role that the agency of speakers play in
understanding how linguistic features circulate synchronically and how they modify
diachronically (cf. Lu & Horner, 2013). From a translingual perspective, language is not
bestowed from above but generated from below: speakers do not enact language in the act, but
rather, in the act, they create it. Thinking in a translingual key redistributes linguistic authority to
all speakers, instead of maintaining within the confines of a centralized linguistic authority.
For my argument, rhetoric is the load bearing bridge that connects up translingual speaker
agency with SAT. Understanding the role agency places in language requires understanding
speakers as, fundamentally, rhetors. This is one of the main claims of my project. In its
analytical iteration, SAT cannot see speakers as agentive rhetors, because it maps the
performative as utterly synchronic, both temporally and spatially speaking. Wittgenstein, Austin,
and Searle snapshot speech acts and attempt to understand them in terms of this freeze frame.
They implicitly deny the diachronic, as de Saussure fatefully did in his inauguration of structural
linguistics (1916), and, in so doing, they suffer from the same theoretical consequences. On the
one hand, to look at a speech act in slow motion will teach you a lot about the tacit and
constitutive norms of the performative. On the other hand, it will not teach you much about how
speaker performances actually construct--instead of merely respond to--the necessary and
sufficient conditions that dictate the intelligibility of their utterances. My job in this first chapter
is to show that rhetoric holds the key to understanding this relationship. Linguistic institutions-both in terms of linguistic content and contextual envelope--persist or change as speakers
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respond to a variety of exigencies, some conventional others rhetorical. Understanding these
exigencies using SAT and rhetorical theory comprises the majority of my first chapter.
In Chapter II, however, this distinction between conventional and rhetorical exigencies
will turn out to be a trapdoor argument. Below, I will initially go to great lengths draw a bright
red line between these two exigencies, so that in the subsequent chapter I can claim that this line
is chimerical: all speech acts will begin to fit my definition of rhetoric when sufficient pressure is
applied to what properly counts as “conventional.” Allow me to foreshadow: I count as rhetorical
any situated and practical discourse that reaches out beyond its immediate conventions of
intelligible realization in order to pull off a yet-to-be-realized possibility in the world in
unpredictable ways. Rhetoric here satisfies conventional protocols in order to achieve
unconventional ends. Clearly, this formula trades on how one defines “convention.” Below, I
tour early SAT in order to establish some of the key terms of debate around concepts such as
“rules,” “conventions,” and “institutions,” so that the translingual turn--both as theory and
praxis--can be seen initially in light of SAT and, ultimately, in light of rhetoric.
2 Wittgenstein
2.1 Preliminary Remarks
Early Wittgenstein’s work could be seen as the as the epitome of “monolingualism.” In
the Tractatus, what makes language tick is locked into a logical grid that is completely removed
from this or that practice. The logic of language works, on this account precisely because
speakers do not have access to it; this logic is an immutable, monolithic system that is there
before speakers arrive on the scene. The monolingual paradigm appears to take a similar view of
named languages. “English” and “French,” say, are closed-off systems whose systems extend
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beyond this or that speaker or this or that linguistic practice; “English” and “French,” for
example, are there before any speaker arrives on the scene.
The Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations, as I describe in detail below, firmly
rejects this “monolingual” picture of language, epitomized in the Tractatus. The “logic” of
language is no longer internal to it, but rather external to it. The social rituals and cultural
activities that were once thought to be ancillary to the logic of language now constitute said
logic. This, I take, as the philosophical mirror of the translingual paradigm: that the “rules” are
not taken up by speakers in practice, instead they are generated by speakers through practice is a
baseline belief of the translingual paradigm. Although it seems that later Wittgenstein does not
endorse explicitly such a lucid picture of speaker agency, he does locate the “rules” of language
“in” the linguistic activity itself. Thus, my rehearsal of the progression of Wittgenstein’s thought
aims to illustrate the two ways of looking at language contained in monolingualism on the one
hand and translingualism on the other.
2.2 Early Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s (1922) first major philosophical work, the Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus, epitomizes his idiosyncratic and often enigmatic perspective on “logical
atomism,” a philosophical movement spearheaded by his mentor at Cambridge, Bertrand Russell.
As a founding philosophical doctrine of 20th Anglo-American analytical philosophy, logical
atomism aimed to dissolve traditional problems in metaphysics by showing that such problems
stem from being couched in faulty and misleading linguistic structures.
For the logical atomist, types of questions that have needled the Western philosophical
tradition for millennia—such as “How do I know if this table is real?” Or: “Am I merely just a
brain in a vat?”—actually comprise nonsensical logical formulations speciously articulated in
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seemingly sensical propositions. Such head-scratching questions regarding the reality of tables
and pickled brains have no truth value, because their referents relate to no real objects. Although
some utterances wear their nonsense upon their sleeves for philosophical daws to peck at—
imagine the refrains in children's nursery rhymes, tongue twisters, or the magic words of
vaudeville magicians—others, according to early Wittgenstein, belong to a more obscure class
that do manifest their logical errors in compliment extern.
To illustrate this point, I borrow from Russell’s (1919) example. The sentence, “The
present king of France is bald” has no truth value. That is, it has no relation to the world. To
assert that it is false would imply that its negation, “The present king of France is not bald,” must
be true. Yet this is clearly absurd. Rather, this sentence belongs to a species of grammatical
nonsense, masquerading as a proposition with a possible truth value. This example indeed jumps
out to most who have taken a European history course as a clear-cut logical imposter. However,
other forms of disguised nonsense go largely undetected according to the Wittgenstein of the
Tractatus.
Written in Euclidean proofs a la Spinoza, the Tractatus intends to demonstrate that the
“world” and the “language” that represents it reduces down to logically perfected forms in which
utterly unique facts are comprised of utterly unique nominal objects and singular linguistic
utterances mirror these facts correctly or falsely. As the legend goes, Wittgenstein began
thinking about language this way after reading about a court case in Paris, where model cars
depicted the scene of an accident. Wittgenstein believed that the models could picture the actual
accident because their spatial relations in some sense mirrored the actual spatial relations of the
car crash (Stern, 1995). In clarifying early Wittgenstein’s position, Pears (1987) describes early
Wittgenstein’s viewpoint here as essentially realistic: “Any factual sentence can be completely
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analyzed into elementary sentences which are logically independent of one another because they
name simple objects. At that basic level all languages have the same structure, dictated by the
structure of reality” (p. 89). Different languages have different semantics and syntaxes. However,
these structures--no matter how they connect up intra se--gain their significant potential from
their structural capacity to mirror the constitutive structures that underpin logical reality. And,
according to early Wittgenstein, average everyday language often deviates very badly from this
logically perfected linguistic substratum.
Following out from this basic Wittgenstein premise, one could say that the subsequent
goal of British and American philosophy in the 20th century became one of linguistic analysis.
The successful philosopher discovers the logical ground floor of a given vocabulary, what Quine
(1948) would describe as its ontological commitment, and then works to locate how all
propositions that purport to form a part of this vocabulary follow or violate the rules set out by
the vocabulary’s basic concepts (cf. Carnap, 1950). Early Wittgenstein, however, assigns himself
a project more radical in scope. The Tractatus wants to discover the ground floor of all language,
not just particular vocabularies. Wittgenstein's work follows the format of a Kantian analytic: he
aims to discover the necessary pre-conditions for a language to be intelligible.
To use a metaphor: from an analytical perspective the linguistically-minded philosopher
converts into a baseball umpire, calling balls and strikes on what can be meaningfully said with
any given theory’s logical strike-zone. Through his work in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein
inaugurates a brand of linguistic philosophy dedicated to the search for linguistic structures from
which utterances, ranging from those of specialized disciplines such as the natural sciences to
average everyday talk gain their significant content. Early in his career, Wittgenstein locates
these structures as metaphysical logical sub-structures, buried deeply within, so to speak,
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language. Although Wittgenstein in his later work will ferociously attack his former beliefs in
the Tractatus, his project remains the same throughout his career: the search for and the
elucidation of the grounds which make language possible.
2.3 Later Wittgenstein
Later, in ferociously attacking his early work, Wittgenstein lays out an approach In the
Philosophical Investigations to thinking about language that precipitates what has become
known as “ordinary language” philosophy (Laugier, 2013). Ordinary language philosophy
assumes primarily a pragmatic claim: language takes root in the most mundane of circumstances-ordering coffee in a deli, making mindless chit-chat in an elevator--in which speakers perform
utterances unthinkingly, without any obvious deliberation or selection regarding the forms of
their speech.
In these rather dull everyday encounters, speakers do not trouble themselves over what they
really mean when they announce: “I believe that the F train will be late,” or when they ask: “Do
you know if there is a shoe repair shop on 5th avenue?” In both of these examples, no doubt
appears to come on the scene concerning the exact valence of the enactive verbs “to believe” or
“to know.” In common-talk, it would appear that most words and utterances never pass through a
filter of deliberate thematic attention. The verbal situation at hand seems to elicit speech in the
same way a pen about to roll off the table elicits a hand to reach out and grab it.
However, unlike unreflective actors in highly normalized situations, philosophers in their
armchairs begin to worry about what does it really mean “to believe” or “to know.” The fact
suddenly becomes shocking that, although most speakers use language routinely and
successfully, most folk could not give explicit account of what they “mean” by asserting that
they believe something to be true or that they know such-and-such to be the case. Underneath
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ordinary usage there seems to lie a vertigo-inducing abyss: speakers use all types of words for
which we should desire a concrete and fully theorized definition ( “love,” “truth,” “progress,”
“evil,” to name a few candidates) yet for which we have zilch.
To paint with very broad strokes: philosophy prior to Wittgenstein’s turn in the mid 20th
century preoccupied itself with designing theories that would underpin and prop up such words
as naming universal concepts. One could productively view the Socratic dialogues just as this
type of endeavor: theory’s attempt to ground ordinary language in a conceptual and moral terrain
beyond the everyday roles it plays. As a metalanguage, philosophy fills in the potholes of
quotidian linguistic usage through building out the requisite theoretical infrastructure. Early
Wittgenstein thought very much in this vein. The Tractatus elucidates what the infrastructure of
this metalanguage should look like and how it should be built, without making any claims about
any particular domain of knowledge or school of philosophical inquiry.
However, the Philosophical Investigations in rejecting the logical requisites of the
Tractatus marks what one might call the beginnings of Wittgenstein's existential period. In his
later work, Wittgenstein vigorously denounces his earlier demand for grounding language in a
logically secured metalanguage. The most banal of circumstances now in fact ground linguistic
meaning instead of obscuring it. It is only from the vantage point of traditional philosophy that
language seems to float dangerously, unanchored from any steadfast logical mooring. Taken
with a hearty grain of salt, I label the argumentative procedure of the Philosophical
Investigations as one of “linguistic phenomenology,” a term that Austin (1979) would later use
to describe his own methodology largely derived from Wittgenstein’s later work. Writing in
aphorisms, Wittgenstein in this work painstakingly observes the vagaries of a variety of
hypothetical languages and their social and practical contexts, calling his reader’s attention to
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just how well language can run without the need for any rationally articulable rules that might
“guide” such linguistic performance before the fact. Wittgenstein situates the web of amorphous
yet constitutive operations in which language takes place as the proper level of phenomenal
linguistic analysis. Whereas past philosophers, early Wittgenstein included, only looked to the
logic embedded in utterances’ semantics and syntax as the sole bearers of significance, later
Wittgenstein, and the linguistic philosophy to follow in his wake, connects up utterances’
possible meaning with the lived pragmatic background of its use.
2.3.1 The Sprachspiel
Wittgenstein nominates the entirety of this linguistic phenomenon as ‘“Sprachspiel” or a
“language-game,” writing: “I shall call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into
which it is woven the Sprachspiel” (1953, §7). And, elsewhere, he contends: “Here, the term
Sprachspiel is meant to bring into prominence the fact that speaking of the language is part of an
activity and a form of life” (1953, §23). The English translation of Sprachspiel as “languagegame” has had the extremely unfortunate impact of connoting something frivolous and trivial
that can be productively contrasted with the real and the serious (Gellner, 2005, p. 59). However,
this precisely is what Wittgenstein does not mean. Sprachspiele do not distract from the serious
business of language, in the same way a game diverts people from the serious business of work.
Sprachspiele are constitutive of a language’s entire range of significant possibility, and,
therefore, can not be productively contrasted with a realm of linguistic significance “beyond” or
“below” or “above” them. Language is Sprachspiele all the way down. Instead, Wittgenstein’s
use of a conceptual field invoked by the term “game” emphasizes how speakers perform in a
field of action without the need to keep the rules of the game explicitly in front of them, in the

12!
same way that a tennis player can play a match on a tennis-court without having to remind
herself constantly that the ball cannot bounce more than once before she can return it.
The concept of Sprachspiele is not intended to obviate the possibility of studying
language in terms of its structural and lexical elements. Language, it goes almost without saying,
can be isolated as phonemes, morphemes, syntax, etcetera. The argument here is that language is
not primarily given as such. The utterances that can be parsed into phonological and
morphosyntactic elements are first made available through their original disclosure in
Sprachspiele. In order to find the ultimate grounds of language, Wittgenstein hypothesizes the
Sprachspiel as the phenomenon that comes an ontological step before the entities traditionally
studied by theoretical linguistics.
The Sprachspiel is essential to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, so it is worth the time to
pause and flesh it out. Imagine a fantastic scenario: while traveling far off from home, you
stumble upon the locals doing something, which, at first blush, looks a lot like playing a game.
You can’t discern it right away, but the player’s action feels like it has a certain sense and
directedness to it. It strikes you as intentional instead of random. You pause for a moment,
observing the hypothetical game as it unfolds. Two players face each other with hands
outstretched. Maintaining eye contact, they recite different sounds in vocal unison. While in sync
with the sounds that their mouths make, they clench a fist with the right hand and slap it against
the open palm of the left. After three motions, each player’s right hand takes on a different shape.
You take account of three moves: the fist remains clenched or the palm opens up into a flat hand
or the the index and middle fingers jut out--into something that looks a lot like a peace sign.
When the players make one of these hand motions, they, at one and the same time, make a new
vocal sound. With more painstaking observation, you learn that the clenched fist is always
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associated with the sound “rock” and it always beats the flat palm known as “paper.” However,
the peace-sign looking gesture, which the players call “scissors,” vanquishes “paper,” and
“rock”—you finally realize—has the upper hand against “scissors.” The mouth-sounds and the
body-moves clearly operate on the same plane of significance and are of a piece: they both
comprise conventional moves in a sense related to the rules and the still-unbeknownst-to-you
overarching telos of the game.
Looking at rock-paper-scissors as a Sprachspiel gives us a chance to see how verbal
utterances can occupy the same “linguistic” space as gestures. For an observer unfamiliar with
the game, rock-paper-scissor language must include the body as much as the voice as well as an
inkling of the game’s implicit rules and goals. Without understanding these elements—that
which logic and theoretical linguistics would precisely leave out--the game cannot be interpreted
in its existential fullness, nor fully understood.
When Wittgenstein coins the term Sprachspiel, one of its payoffs is to plant the following
question: What would our alien observer of rock paper scissors already have to understand in
order for her to isolate only the mouth-sounds as language? In other words, what corporeal and
material and telic realties would have to become transparent, so to speak, so that the mouthsounds appear as that which solely arrays the activity’s significant content? These lines of
inquiry point out one of the later Wittgenstein’s central theses: that observers can individuate
language as what has been traditionally taken as language only against an often invisible
background of shared non-linguistic cultural practices. These practices, at least in the basic
example above, necessarily include the body, implicit or explicit teloi, and other folk. The alien
observer of the above Sprachspiel of rock-paper-scissors, for instance, would have to relate
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propositionally the corporeal gestures of the game to its mouth-sounds in one-and-the-same
grammar in hopes of mapping overtly the game’s rules and goals.
On the other hand, according to the later Wittgenstein, linguists and logicians, who
already have incorporated the rules of Sprachspiele, cannot “see” how language relates
essentially to the other non-linguistic moves in the game, because they have become so familiar
with the Sprachspiele they play in their respective cultures that certain “rules” are naturalized
into oblivion. In order to demonstrate the background of language practices, Wittgenstein’s
Sprachspiele and the often bizarre examples that he gives throughout the Philosophical
Investigations operate hermeneutically by incessantly questioning when and where and by what
means we can locate “meaning” solely in what we have come to call “language.” The rhetorical
strategy of Wittgenstein here is to dumbfound his readers so that they might catch a glimmer of
the whole web of cultural practices that essentially confer on language its meaning, but through
endless acculturation, have become, in effect, completely inconspicuous.
The Sprachspiel is important, so I want to try it out once again: take translation as another
possible way to understand the Sprachspiel. The utterances “It’s raining” or “Está lloviendo” or
“Il pleut” ostensibly denote the same basic fact: wet stuff is currently splashing about on the
pavement. But just as much as one could announce this fact in “English” or “Spanish” or
“French,” one could readily imagine a whole set of hypothetical languages that articulate this
fact with distinct structural and lexical features. For example: picture a language in which the
fact of “rain” or “not-rain” is expressed through flashing a certain sequence of colors on a lightmachine that speakers carry around with them (e.g., red-orange-green means “it’s raining” and
red-orange-purple means “it’s not raining”) or a language in which this fact is expressed when
speakers touch certain parts of their body with their hands (e.g., hand-on-head means “it’s
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raining” hand-on-shoulder means “it’s not raining”). And the list of possible “languages” goes
on. Generally, it could be said that the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus accounts for the possibility
of different utterances in different languages to state what amounts to the same fact by positing a
logical substructure that subtends all languages. On this account, the “English,” “Spanish,” and
“French” utterances along with the hypothetical color and body utterances mirror the logical fact
that P is the case. In a minimally Platonic framework, the ideal logical fact that P is real and the
natural and constructed languages that manifest that P are worldly derivatives. The distinct
semantics and syntaxes in which the proposition is couched dress up, so to speak, the substantial
that P in superficial and interchangeable linguistic costumes.
Painting with broad strokes, I see early Wittgenstein as providing one way into thinking
about how interlinguistic translation is possible. The logical fact of that P is the ontological
ground floor upon which all utterances that pronounce it are built. When I say “It’s raining” in
New York or “Está lloviendo” in Madrid or “Il pleut” in Paris, on this account, I see through the
linguistic utterance towards the logical fact itself. In this manner as well, I could teach a friend a
hypothetical language by showing her how the semantics and syntax of that language relate
essentially to the facts at hand. Utterances therefore are inter-translatable between languages
insofar that they can be located as matching up to the same logical fact. And here comes the
crucial step to this argument: the logical existence of that P takes ontological priority over any
particular form of its utterance in any given language. The fact that P is the most basic entity that
funds all subsequent linguistic meanings that aim to represent it. I do not mean the phrase
“ontological priority” here to suggest a relationship of causality but rather one of figure and
ground. The above example utterances make sense in light of their relation to the logical fact that
P. Without this “in-light-of-which” relation to that P, utterances might make linguistic sense in
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terms of their respective semantics and syntaxes, but, at a more fundamental logical level, for
early Wittgenstein, utterances that lack this relation are literally nonsense. From this point of
view, translation begins to look like cashing out the ideal and real proposition in language after
language just as a traveler touring different countries can transfer the real value of her money
from one currency to another.
Later Wittgenstein’s use of Sprachspiele in the Philosophical Investigations intends to
undo dramatically this paradigm and reverse completely the ontological priority between logic
and language. In taking up once again the trio of examples “It’s raining,” “Está lloviendo,” and
“Il pleut,” it is certainly justified to argue that, in a certain sense, the three represent the same
logical fact. However, following the tracks set out by later Wittgenstein, their possibility of
representing the same logical fact is ontologically predicated in a much more fundamental sense
on the role that these utterances play in a particular Sprachspiel. On this account: the Sprachspiel
is the most basic entity that gives significant possibility to the utterances that are performed
within them. It is not because all three utterances mirror the same fact that they can be seen as
significantly equivalent and thus inter-translatable. Instead, it is because of the fact that speakers
in New York, Madrid, and Paris all seem to play a similar Sprachspiel that one could call
“making statements” and that these Sprachspiele are close enough that a New Yorker can sit in
on weather-talk in Madrid or Paris without having to re-learn the rules of the game, even if she
has to learn new linguistic features to play the game.
In the making-statements Sprachspiel speakers tell each other how things are in the
world. Some iterations of this game have highly codified and explicit rules, like the makingstatements Sprachspiele that natural scientists play. In other versions, the rules are loose and
implicit, like weather-reporting Sprachspiele where speakers tell each other what is happening
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outside their windows. Following from this premise, the ontological ground floor that supports,
so to speak, the interrelationship between the utterances “It’s raining,” “Está lloviendo,” and “Il
pleut,” is not a “in-light-of-which” relationship of different linguistic conventions to the singular
fact of that P. Rather, it is the “family resemblances’” that relate the Sprachspiele of New York,
Paris, and Madrid as an amalgam of “complicated network of similarities overlapping and
crisscrossing” (1953, §66) and traversing them.
2.3.2 Linguistic Networking
A big takeaway of later Wittgenstein’s work is this: whereas the significant content of a
language was once taken as primarily an “intra”-linguistic fact, after the Philosophical
Investigations a language’s meaning is now seen as fundamentally networked throughout
“extra”-linguistic circumstances. Or, better yet, the Sprachspiel shows that one cannot easily jot
down the boundaries between “intra” and “extra” linguistic phenomena. To understand language
ipso facto means to understand the cultural activities into which it has been interwoven, and the
dark clouds of profundity, what many would simply call philosophy, arise only when “language
goes on holiday” (1953, §38)--when words and phrases take a coffee break from their average
everyday jobs and routines.
This move to “existentialize” language is essential for all speech act theories to follow
because it establishes the routinized rituals of cultural life as playing a constitutive role in the
performance of any and all utterances. The capacity to hail a taxi or to bet twenty bucks comes
from one’s tacit socialization into these types of normative social performances and not from any
type of ability to master objectively or to articulate theoretically the rules of the game.
Elsewhere, Wittgenstein (1967), describing this practical holism, writes: “What determines our
judgements, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man [sic] is doing now, an individual
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action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any
action” (§567). Wittgenstein, however, does little to explicate this “hurly-burly” and mostly only
gestures at its necessity in order to deflate the arguments of the analytical philosophy with which
his later work almost always tacitly locks horns. This is the part of the story where Austin (1962)
and Searle (1969), and, down the road, Bourdieu (1990) and Butler (1997) come into the scene,
and, subsequently, lay the groundwork for understanding the theory and practice of
translingualism. Taking their cue from where later Wittgenstein’s work trails off, each one of
these theorists can be seen as attempting to understand explicitly the very background that
breathes significant life into an utterance as contextualized performance from their own
theoretical purviews.
3 The Sprachspiele and Analytical Philosophy
3.1 J.L. Austin
Picture this: one day, instead of going to teach my course, I head down to the Intrepid, a
retired aircraft carrier-cum-air and space museum, docked on 12th Avenue and 49th Street in
Manhattan. Along the way, I pick up a bottle of champagne for good measure, and, in a moment
of exuberance, I crack it against the hull of the ship while proclaiming: “I christen thee the
Queen Mary!” Although I might have very well risked arrest for lunatic vandalism and startled a
few unexpecting tourists, what I certainly have not done is christen the ship.
For starters, the Queen Mary already names a famous ocean liner that haunts the
waterways of the New York Harbor. But, more importantly, I do not have the vested authority to
christen ships, nor is the requisite ceremony, replete with bunting, band, dignitaries and
pageantry, in place in order to establish the ritualized conditions in which ship-christening
becomes a legitimate meaningful activity. In How to Do Things with Words, Austin (1962)
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elucidates through such tactile examples the implications of Wittgenstein’s Sprachspiel, by
analyzing how utterances perform a role in highly routinized cultural conventions, like marriage
ceremonies, placing bets at the horse track, or, like the above example, christening a ship.
As Wittgenstein before him sought to do, Austin wants to collapse long-standing
metaphysical debates by calling attention to how many “constatives” (statements with a truth
value) are actually “performatives”: instead of depicting a state-of-affairs veridically or falsely
(“The cat is on the mat” or “The cat is not on the mat”), a species of utterances function as the
culminating act of highly scripted public rituals--even if they often go unrecognized as such.
When a judge at the end of a hypothetical trial pronounces the verdict “guilty,” she would be
finalizing the ritual performance of a trial inasmuch as much as she would be reporting upon a
newly-discovered fact about the world.
Departing from Wittgenstein, Austin begins to lay out some of the necessary and
sufficient conditions for Sprachspiele or what he would label as “performative” situations. In the
same vein as Wittgenstein, Austin’s initial description of how the performative conditions of
rituals, ceremonies, and institutions contribute essentially to an utterance significant content sets
out a rudimentary vocabulary that later analytical philosophy would develop into the “logics” of
SAT (Searle, 1969) and critical theory would “existentialize” (Butler, 1990, 1997) into a
language of corporeal performativity.
The first move Austin makes in defining the performative remains the most important:
“There (i) must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect,
that procedure [is] to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain
circumstances, and further (ii), the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked” (p. 15). A certain set of
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customs must already be established before the utterance is spoken and the speaker speaking the
utterance must have prior authorization to do so in order for a performative to come off as an
utterance of that variety at all. A guilty verdict means little outside of a courtroom where a judge
and jury are backed up by court officers, just as as a promise to buy my friend dinner means little
without enough cash in my pocket to back it up.
3.2 John Searle
Searle’s (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language builds off
of Austin’s work on the performative in order to discover the logic of what Searle calls “speech
acts.” Searle’s argument trades on this idea of “logic” insofar that Searle believes himself
capable of stating the conventional procedures that organize speech acts, such as making
promises, as a species of propositional knowledge, that is, as field of knowledge amenable to
explicit schematization and codification.
Ryle (2009) labels such propositional knowledge “knowledge-that” and contrasts it with
“knowledge-how.” Statements in the key of knowledge-that are preceded by a “that” in their
articulation. For instance, “I know that the earth is spherical” and “I know that John Wilkes
Booth shot Lincoln” are both knowledge-that statements because they can in effect be
catalogued as explicit records of the facts particular to their respective object domains. In this
example, the knowledges of earth science or American history are the sum total of such
knowledge-that statements. On the other hand, the concept of knowledge-how highlights a skill
domain. Skills like riding a bicycle or executing the duties of a short-order cook never can get
fully cashed out as a series of propositions representing the facts constitutive of such activities.
Although one can begin to explain bike-riding or frying an egg in instructional language (“First,
you apply downward force to the pedal” or “Make sure the griddle is good and hot”), it feels like
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this type of vocabulary fails to express such skills in toto. At a certain point, language qua
depiction of the-way-things-are backfires and misdescribes how engaged actors cope within the
shifting contours of the situations at hand.
The Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations would deny the desire to shift
Sprachspiele into a form of knowledge-that. As noted, this Wittgenstein permits the tracking of
the “family resemblances” (1953, §66) of Sprachspiele as a method of examining the overlaps
and divergences between how words are used in different contexts. However, he would
adamantly reject the possibility of discovering a propositionalizable logic inherent to the
Sprachspiel: one can play the game but one cannot write the rulebook while playing it. Searle in
line with Austin co-opts Wittgenstein’s later work and brings it back into the fold of analytical
philosophy. Sprachspiele give way to a “logics” of the performative that Searle in particular sets
out in painstaking detail. In a different work, Searle (1979) explicitly discounts Wittgenstein’s
broadly existential claim that Sprachspiele or what we do with language are both limitless and
largely undefinable. Speech acts are now subject to a taxonomy: “There are not, as Wittgenstein
(on one possible interpretation) and many others have claimed an infinite or indefinite number of
language games or uses of language [...] There are a rather limited number of basic things we do
with language: we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we express our
feeling and attitudes and we bring about changes through our utterances” (p. 29). While
somewhat reductive, Searle’s move aspires to sharpen the lens of SAT. This hard-headed,
borderline schoolmaster, approach deflates some of the linguistic mysticism latent in late
Wittgenstein’s work through the development of granular vocabularies. Although I would argue
contra Searle that a full-blown logics of the speech act is in some respects merely an analytical
fantasy, I would at the same time grant that productive distinctions regarding linguistic
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performativity can be made. In a word: we cannot, pace Searle, explain completely what we do
with words, but we can, pace Wittgenstein, certainty talk about it.
3.2.1 F(p)
In Speech Acts, Searle builds upon Austin’s vocabulary. He contends that speech acts can
be individuated in terms of their linguistic, propositional, illocutionary content (Searle, 1969, p.
24). The speech act, “I bet twenty bucks that she gets the job,” can be analyzed in linguistic
terms of semantics and syntax, in propositional terms of predication and reference, and in
illocutionary terms of conventional bet-making.
Searle claims that the linguistic and propositional content of a speech act most often
underdetermines its illocutionary force. Saying, “I’ll be there tomorrow!” can equally function as
a statement or a promise or a threat. One of Searle’s more important contributions to SAT, the
idea boils down to the following logical formula: F(p). F here stands for the invoked
performative protocol and p for the linguistic and propositional characteristics of the act (p. 31).
The two variables must operate in tandem for the speech act to come off as well-performed. A
speech act needs to be legible in light of both some linguistic and propositional criteria and
illocutionary conventions in order for it to be understood. Searle’s logical expression evokes
strong parallels with Wittgenstein’s original use of the Sprachspiel in order to highlight how
linguistic meaning is essentially distributed throughout its conventionalized circumstances of
use.
Although it is clearly possible and profitable to study only the linguistic features of
speech acts, a la de Saussure and Chomsky, or their logical possibilities, a la early Wittgenstein,
such approaches remain inadequate for understanding the entire language phenomenon. As
Searle reminds us: “A great deal can be said in the study of language without studying speech
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acts, but any such purely formal theory is necessarily incomplete. It would be as if baseball were
studied only as a formal system of rules and not as a game” (Searle, 1969, p. 17). Understanding
language as a game requires understanding how it is played. And this means understanding its
rules as well. In the story I’m telling, SAT after Searle largely centers the status of such rules: Do
speakers “know” the rules of the game? Do speakers write the rules or solely respond to them?
Are there different rules for different speakers? Later critical theorists such as Bourdieu (1982)
and Butler (1997) will offer radically different answers to these questions than Searle. However,
they remain largely within this initial field of inquiry.
3.2.2 Regulative Rules and Constitutive Rules
Much of the subsequent debate regarding the “rules” can be productively viewed through
the lens that Searle sharpens in Speech Acts. How the “rules of the game” are to be viewed will
play an important role throughout this chapter, especially the Searlean differentiation between
“regulative” and “constitutive” rules (Cf. Chapter IV). Thus, I define them in detail.
In a preliminary definitional move: Searle defines rules as either regulative or
constitutive. Regulative rules “regulate independently or independently existing forms of
behavior.” Constitutive rules, on the other hand, “do not merely regulate, they create or define
new forms of behavior” (Searle, 1969, p. 33). Take escalator etiquette, for example, in a subway
station as an example of a regulative rule: the “rule” enjoins those who want to ride the escalator
to move to the right and those who want to walk the escalator to move to the left. However, the
rule here only constrains the choice of action. I am still playing the escalator-game (although
impolitely) if I walk on the right and stand on the left.
Regulative rules tack protocols onto already established possible fields of action. One
could say that regulative rules clean up post hoc the behaviors that constitutive rules bring into
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existence. They operate from a modal perspective of “could.” I could make a right turn on red in
Manhattan. I could play baseball with a corked bat. Both of these actions illustrate how certain
behaviors relate to regulative rules by having success conditions external to the rule itself. In the
right-turn and corked bats examples, I complete the goals of the game without following certain
rules of that game, and both are cases of “cheating” in a certain sense. To illustrate this point
one last time: Jean Valjean’s theft of a loaf of bread in Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables satisfies a
success condition and at the same time breaks a regulative rule external to that success condition.
He both provides food for his family and commits a crime in so doing.
To use this same “external”/ “internal” nomenclature, constitutive rules, in contrast,
establish behaviors wherein the success conditions of those behaviors are internal to the rules
themselves. Take chess as an illustrative example of a game in which all the rules are
constitutive: the rules that define how rooks move as opposed to bishops or that define check as
opposed to the free movement of the king create the very possibility of chess play itself rather
than solely limiting it. Since chess has no regulative rules and only constitutive rules, chess
players can in no way satisfy a success condition while playing the game external to the sum
total of the rules of the game itself. If regulative rules are predicated on a modal “could,” then
constitutive rules are predicated on a modal “could not.” I could not move a rook diagonally in
order to satisfy the goal of capturing my opponent’s queen nor could I pass my king through
check in order to castle and still be playing conventional chess. In other words, unlike driving in
New York or baseball, chess does not admit cheaters.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
Let’s take a brief interlude here. I’ve spent a lot time talking about what I take as analytical
philosophy’s attempt to dissolve metaphysics by turning to linguistics: once we carve up
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language into constatives and performatives lots of bitterly-fought philosophical battles, so the
story goes, turn out to be little more than cases of linguistic shadowboxing. If we understand the
pragmatic conditions under which an utterance is intelligibly understood, then the requirement to
obtain theoretical conditions for such understanding is obviated. Because it strikes me as the axis
around which SAT, rhetorical theory and translingual paradigm rotate, I articulate it as a thesis:
Once the conditions for pragmatic understanding of an utterance or any type of social
performative are sufficiently given in order to describe the action at hand without implying
correlative theoretical understanding on the part of the actor, then the requirement to give
conditions for theoretical or propositional understanding of utterances or social performativity
are greatly diminished if not obviated entirely. Insisting on theoretical knowledge begins to seem
tautological under the auspices of this thesis. In a word, it seems that the rejoinder to this thesis
boils down to: there must be a theoretical component to social action because social action must
include a theoretical component. For the moment, let’s call the above “Practical Intelligibility
Thesis” and position it as the nodal point of contact that organizes all subsequent relationships
between these three discourse.
4 Rhetoric
4.1 Bitzer’s Rhetorical Situation
Bitzer's (1968) “The Rhetorical Situation” constitutes an essential link between SAT and
rhetorical studies. Like the speech act theories of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Searle, Bitzer argues
that rhetorical discourse’s seemingly “intra”-linguistic meaning is essentially networked
throughout its “extra”-linguistic circumstances. The rhetoricity of any given discourse can only
be judged against the circumstances in which it takes place. By shifting the level of rhetorical
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analysis away from discourse and towards situation, Bitzer establishes the production of
rhetorical discourse as a speech act, without using the term “speech act” explicitly.
Like ship-christening, a rhetorical act has to take place in a situation that is recognizable
as a rhetorical situation. In line with the descriptive work of Austin and Searle, the rhetorician’s
task becomes one of accounting for the “rules” of performing a rhetorical act. In other words, in
the same manner that Austin and Searle’s work attempts to account for the necessary and
sufficient conditions of the speech act, Bitzer’s essay articulates what should count as the
necessary and sufficient situational criteria for defining a speech act as rhetorical.
On Bitzer’s account, rhetoric is first and foremost situated practical discourse. Unlike
poetic discourse, for example, rhetoric requires a material complex of exigence, audience, and
constraint in order for it to count as properly rhetorical. Whereas a poet can write a poem without
ever publishing it--as many poets do--a rhetor must “publish” her discourse. She cannot create a
rhetorical discourse outside of a set of publicly available material conditions that elicit the
rhetorical discourse. To spin this metaphor a different way: a novelist who pens a novel and
leaves it in her desk drawer has still written a novel. On the other hand, a political activist who
composes and prints a batch of pamphlets but still awaits to distribute them on a street corner has
yet to perform a rhetorical act.
Yet to define rhetoric only as situational and practical would cast too wide a net. If this
were rhetoric’s sole criterion, rhetoric would include all pragmatic speech acts, such as ordering
cups of coffee or saying “excuse me” after sneezing in a crowded elevator. The material
situations in which both of these mundane examples occur certainly call forth their utterance in
the same way that the rhetorical situation calls forth its. Like any other speech act, I cannot order
a cup of coffee or excuse myself without the right circumstances in some sense being secured in
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advance. However, my project wants to make it explicit that if the sole payoff of Bitzer’s
introduction of the term “rhetorical situation” into the field of rhetorical theory is to use rhetoric
to name a class of discourse that is both situated and practical in the above senses, then rhetoric,
as an independent field of study, cannot produce any claims of substantial interest beyond the
claims already made by SAT. Rhetoric needs to study something beyond a discursive
situatedness, if it hopes to champion for itself an independent disciplinary methodology beyond
that which speech act has already articulated with logical precision.
4.1.1 Conventional Exigencies and Rhetorical Exigencies
This is where exigency comes to play because, as I will argue, the difference between
conventional and rhetorical exigency is the very thing that makes rhetoric its own field of study.
If rhetoric merely names a species of speech acts, it, however, names a vital one: rhetoric is the
particular brand of discourse that comes from material conditions in order to act upon material
conditions. In contrast to how some utterances participate in the a priori articulated conventions
of illocutionary speech acts, a rhetorical performance intends to induce a yet-to-be-realized
modification to the world that looks beyond the already-agreed upon conventions.
Bitzer (1968) defines this world-instituting capacity as the discursive response to any
exigency that comprises “an imperfection marked by urgency.” An exigency, in this sense, is “a
defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” (p. 6).
Rhetorical discourse and exigency have a dialectical relationship: the latter always triggers the
former and the former is rhetorical insofar that it adequately responds to the latter. Exigency, it
might seem, as the clinching characteristic of rhetoric perhaps still remains underdetermined. It
could be readily argued that even the most mundane speech acts come about by responding to the
felt solicitation of the situation, i.e., its exigency . Is it not the case that my mundane lunch order
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at the deli counter is precipitated by the situation at hand as much as the intuitively rhetorical ad
campaign against climate change is precipitated by its?
Momentarily, this objection can be deflated by pointing out that it conflates two distinct
types of exigency. The exigency of the deli counter in a minimal sense might very well
constraint in advance my range of possible utterances that are understandable in that scenario.
However, the exigency here is completely self-contained. It begins and ends at the deli counter.
It merely culminates an already established ritual. In contrast, the ad campaign against climate
change responds to a different type of exigency. To speak metaphorically: this type of exigency
always outruns itself. That is, it does not begin and end with the situation that prompts it. Rather,
it induces a discourse that aims to have an effect on the material conditions beyond those of its
immediate production and reception. Thus qualified, rhetorical exigencies denote exigencies of
the second variety. Clearly, all sorts of situations elicit or prompt or constrict all sorts of actions.
An itchy nose is the exigency that causes my scratching of it. But rhetorical exigencies are the
ones that affect the world by exceeding their immediate conditions of satisfaction.
To define this point perhaps paradoxically, this account of rhetoric would argue that,
despite common sense thinking, a lawyer’s average everyday discourse produced in the
courtroom is not properly rhetorical. Although it might be artfully composed, its exigency begins
and ends within the pre-established confines of routinized judicial conventions. No matter the
outcome of that case, no matter how invested that lawyer remains in her particular plea, the
exigencies generated by a standard and unremarkable trial produce discourses that have no effect
beyond that trial.
However, to further the example, notable court cases such as Brown vs. the Board of
Education are in fact, under this definition, rhetorical. The exigencies generated and discourses

29!
produced in response to those exigencies transcended their immediate conditions of enunciation
and reception. Or, better said, the exigency in this particular case was world-instituting instead of
merely conventional. The verdict of Brown vs. the Board of Education not only conformed to
the judicial illocutionary conventions that produced its legibility (what one might call its
conventional exigency), it also responded to and induced a change in material conditions
beyond its immediate discursive confines (what one might call its rhetorical exigency).
4.2 Rhetoric and the Illocution / Perlocution Distinction
My interpretation of rhetoric in light of Bitzer follows a distinction laid out originally by
Austin (1962). Beyond just verbalizing words in any old locution, Austin draws a distinction
between illocutionary and perlocutionary performatives. Illocutionary performatives (“in” +
locution) accomplish something in the speech act itself. Perlocutionary performatives (“per” as
in “through or “by means of” + locution) accomplish something through or by means of the
speech act itself (cf. Austin, 1962, p. 83-164).
Let’s return to some running examples in order to understand this point: the shipchristening with all its pomp and circumstance counts as an in-locutionary act. With the proper
conventions and etiquettes secured in advance, once the champagne bottle cracks against the hull
and the right words are announced, the ceremony is, in effect, terminated. The utterance “I
hereby christen thee the Queen Mary!” culminates the act “in” its performance just as the
proclamation “Checkmate!” ends the chess game under appropriate conditions “in” its issuance.
I stress that, on my reading of the illocutionary, conventions both call performative
utterances forward and are completely exhausted in their issuance. Highly normalized
conventions create internal exigencies that are resolved by the issuance of appropriate speech
acts in the same manner that the tensions internal to a melody are ultimately resolved through the
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return to the tonic of its key signature. Conversely, perlocutionary acts fulfill illocutionary
conventions in order to produce an effect beyond the possibilities a priori mapped out by those
selfsame illocutionary conventions. For example, I cannot successfully persuade you to help me
move into my new apartment this Saturday by merely uttering “I hereby persuade you to help me
move!” Clearly, this funky sounding performative does not work in the same way as a “normal,”
illocutionary performative, like how a teacher can end a class by merely pronouncing that “Class
is hereby dismissed,” for instance.
On the other hand, I can hypothetically persuade you by invoking the illocutionary
conventions of promise-making. In saying “I promise to buy you lunch Saturday” I could
possibly bring about an effect potent enough that you indeed end up helping me move. In much
the same way that an affective sensation is the unpredictable result of a melody’s ultimate
resolution, the perlocutionary possibility of persuasion in this example is an unconventional
effect pulled off “through” or “by means of” the adequate realization of the illocutionary
performative of promising.
The use of “unconventional” here disavows the connotations of something rare or
uncommon. Certainly, it might indeed be the case that some folk are routinely persuaded to do
things by the promise of free lunch. “Unconventional” here means that there is no necessary link
between the intended perlocutionary outcome and that of the rehearsed illocutionary convention.
B flat has been and always will be the tonic of its respective key signature under the conventions
of Western harmony. In contrast, the speech acts that will bring about the perlocutionary “inorder-to” of persuasion in this example negate the possibility of similar conventionalization.
Yet this distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary performatives after a while
begins to look like a flimsy one. What about cases where the realization highly-ritualized
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performative conventions are in place for the precise reason of bringing about an effect that
seems to outlast the bounds of the performative itself? Speaking my lunch selection to a server at
a café at one and the same time culminates one performance while initiating an effect both
external to it—the arrival of my lunch—yet at one and the same time essentially associated with
it. Austin resolves this dilemma with yet another taxonomical move. Perlocutionary
performatives subdivide into the realization of “perlocutionary objects” and the production of
“perlocutionary sequels” (Sbisà, 2013, p. 36).
A command, for instance, works with a perlocutionary object in its sights. No doubt a
command, like any illocutionary performative, must secure ahead of time the right conditions:
institutional backing, feasible conditions of realization, implicit threats related to failures to
comply--to name a few. However, at least unlike ship-christening and checkmate, the command
is both conventional and beyond itself. If it can be said that chess and ship-christenings exhaust
themselves in their performative realization, then an illocutionary performative like a command
seen in conjunction with its perlocutionary object vitalize a distinct effect in virtue of its
performative fulfillment. In comparison, perlocutionary sequels classify speech acts like
persuasion wherein the task of defining the necessary conventions of performative realization
becomes so often murky. A promise or a threat or a bet can cause the effect of persuasion. But to
extrapolate a class of abstract rules that depict how these performatives essentially relate to such
a perlocutionary effect , at least from the aspect of a philosophical sub specie aeternitatis, seems
fruitless.
4.2.1 Conventional and Rhetorical Exigencies and the Illocution / Perlocution Distinction
4.2.1.1 Perlocutionary objects and Conventional Exigencies
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Using the distinction between in-illocution and per-locution, I want to re-map out the
initial distinction I drew between conventional and rhetorical exigencies. I made the perhaps
bizarre claim that under this working definition of rhetoric a lawyer’s discourse in the courtroom
would not count as rhetorical. The lawyer’s discourse is savvy. The lawyer’s discourse is
tactical. But, without, an effect that stretches beyond the conventions that generate it, it has yet to
become rhetorical.
Let’s examine this claim in light of Austin’s distinction between perlocutionary objects
and perlocutionary sequels. A typical day-to-day court case, I assume, is completely
conventional: unless its particular ruling has some impact on legal precedent and jurisprudence
in general, the case operates within highly ritualized conventions in the same way that shipchristenings, marriage ceremonies, and promise-making do.
That is to say that effects of such conventions are explicitly established before the fact:
there are necessary and codified relations between the ritual of the act and the consequences that
the act brings about. This idea is clear when lawyers, and the general public by extension, talk
about an “open and shut” case. This metaphor signifies that a token is of such a procedural type
that its resolution begins and ends completely within the bounds of already secured protocols.
Hypothetically, the case is initiated and terminated without creating any effects beyond basic
standardized conventions.
However, it is clearly granted that verdicts have very concrete material impacts, such as
penal sentences or damages awarded. Yet, to talk like Austin, these would count as
perlocutionary objects because the performative effects are so closely related to the illocutionary
conventions that they essentially form a part of the conventions themselves. Like commands or
requests, the culminating illocutionary utterance of “guilty” or “not guilty” along with the

33!
illocutionary pronouncement of sentencing and adjudication of damages is so closely tied with
the concrete result that it instantiates that, although the material result perhaps technically goes
beyond the verbal realization of the convention, it is the convention itself which generates it.
It would follow that if a lawyer’s artful and eloquent speech, which under a different
account would be considered as the paradigm case of rhetorical discourse, only operates to
realize one of the binary options of “guilty” or “not guilty,” then the lawyer has only played the
language game according to its pre-established “rules.” Perhaps she has done so artfully and
eloquently. Perhaps it has required dexterous skill in argumentation and oratory. But as long as
the discourse triggers conventional outcomes it has yet to become properly rhetorical.
Rhetoric, as I want to make clear, always exceeds the rules of the game. It is intended
discourse because it, by my definition, runs outside the bounds of illocutionary procedure. To
try out the court case example one last time: this is to say that if it is permissible to claim that the
effects, no matter how material and real, of an “open and shut” case constitute a perlocutionary
object of highly-routinized illocutionary acts, then the lawyer’s discourse has only answered to a
conventional exigency and, therefore, under this definition, is not, in fact, rhetorical.
4.2.1.2 Perlocutionary Sequels and Rhetorical Exigencies
Rhetorical exigencies, conversely, count as a class of perlocutionary sequels. in contrast
with practical ones, I have argued that rhetorical exigencies are always beyond themselves. They
bring about an effect exterior to that which is initiated and fulfilled completely by particular
conventions. Austin’s toy case to illustrate a perlocutionary sequel is just that of persuasion:
despite my most ardent wishes, I cannot persuade someone by reciting the utterance “I hereby
persuade you to…” Such a performance strikes the ear as strange precisely because it is at least
implicitly understood that one cannot secure in advance the requisite conventions for persuasion
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in the same manner that one can for the illocutionary acts of ship-christenings, marriage
ceremonies, and promise-making.
In fact, the baseline semantics of “persuasion” suggest the impossibility of the
beforehand attainment of such conventions. If such conventions could be pre-established so that
an utterance might cash out directly and always in another’s requisite and corresponding
performance, this prima facie would count as any number of institutionally vouchsafed
commands: jury duty, directives from your boss, a cop’s capacity to pull you over. Rhetoric,
conversely, if it is to stand for anything within the discursive field of SAT, names the possible
realm of strategic ends to which illocutionary conventions can be put to work but for which
speech communities have yet to codify sure-fire conventions.
Rhetoric delineates the borders of what Mason (1994) calls the “perlocutionary field,” the
space where speakers must guess and calibrate the effects of their discourse based on inferences
instead of institutionalized conventions. The Aristotelian rhetorical maximum can shed light on
the difference I am making here. As the discovery of the available means of persuasion on a case
by case basis, rhetoric bridges the chasm between the conventional illocutionary performance
and the unconventional perlocutionary effect.
Here is where a rhetorical exigency differs from a conventional one. On the one hand, a
conventional exigency names the class of exigencies that exist within routinized and highly
scripted behaviors. I have used the term in order to show that the context in all types of
performatives elicits the a propos utterance: court proceedings call forth the verdict, just as
marriage ceremonies call forth the exchange of vows, just as the appearance of the server calls
forth one’s lunch order. The conventions of the performative circumscribe in advance all
possible outcomes that a conventional exigency can bring about. A play at home plate is the
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conventional exigency for the baseball umpire to call “safe” or “out.” In this example, the effect
of her performative here is, so to speak, pre-packaged by the basic conventions of the game of
baseball.
On the other hand, rhetorical exigency is always beyond itself. By saying this, I mean that a
rhetorical exigency, by definition, intends an effect that is not circumscribed before the fact by
the conventions of the realized performative itself. Take persuasion once again as a case in point:
I might perform the illocutionary act of promising you lunch in order to persuade you to help me
move this Saturday. In this example, my intended effect is, by definition, beyond the conventions
of the illocutionary performative of promise-making.
A rhetorical exigency names precisely the class of exigencies that cannot be satisfied by
the invocation of highly ritualized illocutionary conventions. The conventional exigency of a
drafty open window waiting-to-be-closed in a library reading room can be readily dispatched by
the illocutionary performative of favor-asking. You turn to your neighbor and say, “Excuse me,
would you mind...” However, the constitutive criterion of rhetorical exigency, thus defined,
excludes the possibility of conventional satisfaction of that exigency. A rhetorical exigency is
precisely that for which no a priori conventions of realization exist. Thus, while risking being
overly formulaic, I claim the following thesis: Rhetoric constitutes the class of discourse that
performs any number of illocutionary acts and, in doing so, both satisfies the conventional
exigency of the illocutionary performative and intends to answer to an exigency that is
simultaneously material and beyond the performatively realized illocutionary acts themselves.
Rhetoric accordingly operates from a “by which” and in light of a discursive “ the goal
of” and towards an ultimate “for the sake of.” By the act of promising you lunch the goal of
persuasion is realized for the sake of getting you to help me move. By the act of stating the
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amount of student debt in the United States, the goal of forewarning is realized for the sake of
getting more public funding for universities.
Allow me to take up chess once more as an example: the game itself presents an array of
conventional exigencies that chess players must answer to satisfy the conditions of an “open and
shut,” so to speak, chess game. To play chess requires an incredible amount of know-how and
strategic thinking in order to satisfy the exigencies engendered by the constitutive rules of the
game. There are pawns-to-be-captured, positions-to-be-fortified, pins-to-be-avoided. Responding
intelligently to these conventional exigencies comprises the game of chess itself. However, if I
intend to beat you in the game of chess in order to impress you or if I intend to throw the game
in order to build your spirits, then chess in these instances includes a rhetorical dimension: I
intend to dispatch a conventional exigency internal to the game in response to a rhetorical one
external to the rules of the game itself.
The definition of rhetoric that I forward aligns with Rickert’s (2013) detailed account of
“ambient rhetoric.” Drawing on diverse sources, Rickert situates rhetoric as that which exceeds
the confines of both the linguistic and the human. Broadly speaking, this account uses the notion
of “ambience” in order to create rhetoric as a hermeneutic tool for understanding how discourse
and language are diffusely networked throughout material and affective ecologies that exist
before the emergence of any particular subjective epistemological or linguistic articulation.
The rhetor, far from creating ad hoc significance and transmitting it--hereby deploying
the same metaphorics of how one writes a letter and then mails it--responds to and channels from
before-the-fact meanings and affects laden in the world in order to redirect, so to speak, an
audience to yet-to-be-noticed possibilities of existence. Ricket’s formula runs like this:
“Rhetoric is a responsive way of revealing the world for others, responding to and put forth
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through the affective, symbolic, and material means, so as to (at least potentially) re- attune or
otherwise transform how others inhabit the word to an extent that calls for some action” (p. 162).
This account hinges on the prefix “re” tacked on the verb “attune.” Rhetoric’s capacity lies it in
its potential to re-present, re-veal, re-place, re-frame, re-make and, also, re-tain the world.
Sympathetic with Kennedy’s (1992) account of rhetoric as energy, the “re-ness” of rhetoric
shows that it is generative and directive discourse.
Looking at things with a wide-angle lens, rhetoric does not mirror the world. It makes it.
This, however, does not signal that rhetoric is the sum total of statements made by great rhetors-those who have been historically appointed to exert their wills upon the world. Rhetoric
responds, reshapes, and redeploys the communally held affective forces always already present:
“Rather, rhetoric rests in the fact that persuasion is prior to rhetoric. Worldly affect, modulated in
persuasion, itself hollowed out the space for rhetoric’s emergence; it is rhetoric’s condition of
possibility” (p. 164).
4.3 Rhetorical Temporality
This account helps support my claim that rhetoric is always beyond itself. To wax
poetically: rhetoric is transcendental. It pushes out from the singular realization of compositional
or illocutionary conventions into a yet-to-be-realized field of possibilities just over the horizon of
those conventions. If this holds true, then the study of rhetoric transforms into the study of how
rhetoric projects a world, or, better yet, the study of rhetoric becomes a study of possible
institutions yet to be conventionalized into the day-to-day performatives that analytic SAT, at
least, takes as fundamental and primary.
To understand rhetoric means to understand how conventional tools relate to
unconventional purposes—how what has worked in the past might become fitted in the present

38!
to bring about the future. And, in this sense, rhetoric is best understood temporally as the
realization of codified histories as the basis of new exigencies aimed at intended but uncertain
prospects. Discourse analysis that only picks out one of these temporal elements has yet to
become rhetorical. Rhetorical theory in contrast names the unique form of analysis that maintains
the given phenomenal integrity of this uniquely rhetorical temporality.
I emphasize this uniquely temporal nature of rhetoric to illustrate another productive
distinction between SAT and rhetorical theory. SAT is atemporal. The logic that it assumes
underpins speech acts also assumes a static construction. SAT interprets the rules of its toy cases,
the marriage ceremonies and promise makings and ship christenings I have kept rehearsing in
these pages, as if they existed outside of time. To borrow language from linguistics, SAT in its
early analytic iteration is utterly synchronic. It freeze frames a performative and its rituals so as
to explicate its generative conventions as rules amenable to propositional realization. In the same
manner that Saussure isolated “langue” by hypothesizing what a language might linguistically
look like suspended from the progress of time, so goes SAT: it snapshots a performative in order
to individuate a phenomenon that can be studied scientifically. On the other hand, rhetorical
theory is utterly diachronic. And, in this sense, it assumes discourse to have an essential ecstatic
character. Rhetoric is best understood as how discourse intends to pull off an effect in light of
present affordances made available through historically built out conventions. This is a broad
claim and the lion share of my work in the next chapter centers on bearing it out.
5 Conclusion
This chapter began by reviewing some of the basic tenets of SAT. I tracked what I take as
the paradigm shift between early and late Wittgenstein’s thinking in order to illustrate how SAT
in its analytical iterations shifts away from logical substructures and towards the performative as
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the preliminary unit of linguistic analysis. By contextualizing and distributing linguistic content,
SAT performs a methodological move that runs parallel to the Bitzer’s mid 20th century account
of the rhetorical situation. Bitzer’s theory, like SAT, sees rhetoric as the result of certain
pragmatic and real conditions. By establishing a methodological link between SAT and
rhetorical theory, I intended to show that rhetoric can be effectively re-described within SAT’s
vocabulary. Rhetoric is, by definition, perlocutionary because it seeks to constitute the world in a
certain way that cannot be wholly predicted in advance. Rhetoric is, thus, unconventional in the
light of the valence that SAT gives to “conventional,” since effects, upon my account, always run
beyond the confines its immediate performative articulation. In this light, rhetoric expresses a
particular temporality. As properly perlocutionary, rhetoric pushes forward into the future in a
way that strictly illocutionary acts do not. In the remaining chapters of this project, rhetoric’s
futurity will come into clearer focus, and, as I promised in the introduction to this chapter, I also
hope to show that the futurity that prima facie seems be a unique property of rhetoric is, in fact, a
property of all speech acts.
!
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Chapter II: Types, Tokens, and Performatives
1 Introduction
This chapter begins with a detour. Instead of immediately working through the
implications of differentiating between conventional and rhetorical exigencies, I begin by
discussing the role that the type / token ontological distinction plays in theoretical linguistics.
In Chapter I, I borrowed heavily from Searle’s (1969) formulation in Speech Acts, that a
speech act can be understood in terms of the formula F(p), with the variable F standing for the
illocutionary form of the speech and the variable p standing for the propositional content of the
utterance. Again, in Searle’s take on things, any speech act can be individuated in in terms of its
reference and predication, its linguistic structures, or its illocutionary force. Furthermore, the
formula hopes to show that the linguistic and propositional “content” of a speech act always
underdetermines its performative force. What a speech act does--whether it threatens or rumors
or promises--cannot be outright adjudicated through an examination to what the speech acts
refers nor by examination of its linguistic structures. What we do with words, viz., their
illocutionary force, is the investigative field of SAT, and, as has been shown in Chapter I, this
study involves the inclusion of social rituals and institutions that are neither necessarily logically
propositional, nor necessarily linguistic in the most normalized sense of the term “linguistic.”
Rather, they are what one might label “socially positional,” in that they invoke a game
differentiated by roles, legal moves, strategies, plans, and goals.
In a certain light, Searle’s formulation sidesteps the “linguistic” question all together.
This more analytical iteration of SAT has little to say regarding language qua linguistics, since it
assumes that whatever linguistics says about linguistic structures still holds good: it is just the
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case that linguistic structure, once again, underdetermines the intelligible effects of speech acts.
Effects of speech acts are always context bound, even if their words do bears some relationship
with their linguistic structures (one can’t promise in the past tense, for example).
However, a radicalized iteration of SAT, something like what Wittgenstein was after in
the Investigations, I believe does more than just bypass linguistic questions by solely focusing on
the F side of Searle’s F(p) formula. My reading of the Sprachspiel in Chapter I intended to show
that the propositional and linguistic “content” cannot be unproblematically disambiguated from
the contextualized envelope in which it is delivered. To repeat a catchphrase: language is
Sprachspiele all the way down. I hope to follow this view of Wittgenstein by arguing that the
contents that can be “extracted” from the performative contextualized envelope, at the very least,
are ontologically derivative of a holistically unified Sprachspiel.
The translingual turn is, in many ways, an attempt to re-think the basic concepts that
make up the scientific paradigm of linguistics. Linguistics in all stripes and forms are continually
confronted with language practices that seemingly do not fit neatly into theoretical models. As a
result, disciplines that study what might be called “communication,” are witnessing a
proliferation of methodological vocabularies and descriptions that aim to capture with some
accuracy the empirically verified practices of translanguaging.
Below, I use Quine’s (1961a & 1961b) criterion of ontological commitment to
understand what things the translingual turn takes as real and as entities in the world. The
attempt to understand translingual practices, I believe, has ushered in a much needed selfreflexivity into the study of language. As will be shown below, talk of translingual practices
forces those who study them to articulate with some degree of explicitness precisely what they
think that language is and what it is not. This ontological investigation of language is requisite
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for arguments against the reality of named languages. Whatever else the translingual turn might
turn out to be, it has guaranteed the field at least one clear-cut premise: named languages do not
exist, or, at the very least, they have no linguistic validity. This the case that the translingual
paradigm makes against monolingualism, and, as far as I can tell, it can make no other
arguments without first securing this premise of named languages’ non-existence, at least
linguistically speaking.
Hence, the first part of my work below is to review the translingual turn’s arguments
regarding linguistic ontology, and then contribute to it. The second part of my work is to show
how my theory of rhetoric developed in Chapter I offers a novel and productive way for
understanding translingual practices. My goal, then, is to show that the translingual paradigm, a
la Otheguy et al. (2015) & Otheguy et al. (2018), performs a type of ontological reduction in
order to rid their theory of any reference to named languages. I explicate this reduction qua
reduction and propose that it be it carried out one step further.
In an attempt to to carry out this reduction, I present an in depth of reading of Butler’s
(1988) theory of gender performativity. Butler’s use of the performative as a way to deflate the
sex / gender division offers a model to problematize the division in SAT between illocution and
perlocution and the type / token division in normalized linguistics. I argue that Butler’s use of
performativity, in one sense, describes all illocutionary performative acts as, in fact,
perlocutionary. Butler’s work hinges on the assumption that “conventional” performative tokens
do not merely instantiate an abstract institutional type, but rather each preceding performative
token sets the conditions of intelligibility for the subsequent performative tokens that follow it.
Performatives, in this sense, are future-tensed projections of their institutions as much as they are

43!
instances of them. The pronouncement “I do!” in a marriage ceremony is culpable for extending
and maintaining the ritual as much as it terminates, so to speak, one particular instance of it.
This projection of future conditions of intelligibility within the conventional issuance of
performatives must be unconventional in order to account for how rituals and institutions
diachronically modify, on the one hand, and in order to account for performative agency, on the
other. If it turns out that the manner in which putatively conventional performatives set the stage
for the subsequent performatives is unpredictable, then, according to the nomenclature of SAT, it
would also be the case, a la Butler, that all illocutionary performatives are, at rock bottom,
perlocutionary: they have effects that cannot be cashed out as a logics prior to their enunciation.
Finally, in this chapter I will suggest that the type of social-institutional temporality that
Butler articulates for understanding gender performativity is the same discursive temporality that
I described for rhetoric in Chapter I. My hunch is that this view of temporality holds the key for
understanding many translingual practices (Cf. Lu & Horner, 2013).
2 The Translingual Paradigm: The Type / Token Distinction & Ontological Commitment
2.1 Types and Tokens
Type-token talk marks an ontological distinction. Types are general classes of things.
Tokens are particular instances of those classes. In the two sentences: “All cars have four
wheels” and “This car is red,” the former sentence makes a claim about a general car-type,
whereas the latter makes a claim about a particular car-token. This way of carving up the world is
further evinced, when language is considered. When Hamlet goads Polonius by responding that
he is merely reading “words words words,” is the prince of Denmark muttering three words or
one? This, clearly, depends on whether you are talking about types or tokens. In terms of wordtypes, Hamlet has said but one word; in terms of tokens, three (Cf. Wetzel, 2018).
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Distinguishing types and tokens plays a crucial role in establishing linguistics as a
science. Using this difference, de Saussure's separation of the langue from the parole can be redescribed as separating out linguistics types (langue) from linguistic tokens (parole). From the
structuralist perspective that de Saussure inaugurated, the science of linguistics is simply the
study of types. Or as Lyons (1977) tells us: “Utterances are unique physical events; as such they
can be referred to in terms of the observational metalanguage of linguistics. The linguist,
however, is not generally concerned with utterances as unique observational entities. He [sic] is
interested in types, not tokens” (p. 28). In this version of linguistics, then, types are the durable
structures that can be extracted out, so to speak, from the contextualized envelope in which
actual speakers deliver them.
As the phraseology “type and tokens” makes clear, type / token linguistics assumes a
two-tiered ontology, made up of two distinct kinds of entities. From this ontological premise, a
methodological antinomy arises. If the structural paradigm assumes both tokens and types as
valid candidates for the descriptor “real,” then these entities must be real in different sorts of
ways or must form a part of two different realities. As Lyon’s claim shows, utterances (tokens)
are constituted by a spatial and temporal extension that, ex hypothesi, does not constitute
linguistic structures (types). Paradoxically, it would seem that if theoretical linguistics is to
sustain its two-tiered ontology, it is forced to designate utterances as real because they are, in
fact, spatial and temporal, while, at the same time, designating linguistic structures as real
precisely because they are neither spatial nor temporal. Structuralist linguistics seems to operate
with two pictures of reality--the material world here, the ideal world there--that are equal parts
incommensurable with one another and yet equal parts necessary for its methodology: without
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the reality of types, linguistics is not quite a science, and, without the reality of tokens, there
exists no language to study.
2.2 Quine’s Criterion of Ontological Commitment
My above description of theoretical linguistics is founded on what Quine would call
ontological commitment (1961a & 1961b). Ontological commitment analyzes the entities that
must be taken as real so that the statements generated by a particular theory might be true. Rayo
(2007) writes: “To describe a sentence’s ontological commitment is to describe some of the
demands that the sentence’s truth imposes on the world--those demands that concern ontology.
Accordingly, for a sentence to carry commitment to Fs is for the sentence’s truth to demand of
the world that it contain Fs” (p. 428). For example, the above two example sentences “all cars
have four wheels” and “this car is red” are both committed to the belief that the world is
populated by a certain class of entities called “cars.”
Quine (1961b) originally codified the criterion for ontological commitment in the
formula: “Entities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if some of them must be
counted among the values of the variables in order that the statements affirmed in the theory be
true” (p. 103). Thus, the analysis of the ontological commitments of a theory is a sort of
inventory-taking of all the things the theory assumes as real in the course of implementing its
methodology and in making statements about the world. In this sense, one can also talk about the
“ontological costs” of theory: certain theories assume the reality of more entities, and, thus, are
ontologically more expensive. Others assume fewer entities, and, thus, are ontologically cheaper.
From a Quinean perspective, ontological commitment is like theory bargain-hunting: it ferrets
out those theories that yield the most explanatory returns at minimal ontological investment.
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Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment can be used, on the one hand, as a method
to decide between theories. On the other hand, the criterion of ontological commitment can also
be used to downsize a theory, by paraphrasing a theory’s sentences so that they no longer contain
unnecessary ontological commitments. According to Quine (1961b), a theorist relieves herself
from certain ontological commitments when “he [sic] shows how some particular use which he
makes of quantification, involving a prima facie commitment to certain objects can be expanded
into an idiom innocent of such commitment” (p. 103). And one page over: “In this event the
seemingly presupposed objects may justly be said to be been explained away as convenient
fictions, manners of speaking” (p. 104).
For Wetzel (2009), Quine would use this method of paraphrasing as an argument against
the existence of types all together. From a maximal nominalist position, all talk of types is
nothing more than a façon de parler that can be explained out of the picture through successive
paraphrasings. By sharpening Occam’s razor, the criterion of ontological commitment parses a
theory’s sentences into other, more precise sentences that are not committed to the existence of
particular types as a condition so that what they say about the world might be true (p. 28).
2.2.1 The Ontological Costs of Monolingualism and the Translingual Response
I would like to bypass entirely the realist-nominalist debate. Instead, I solely aim to
utilize the above discussion of the type-token distinction and the criterion of ontological
commitment as a lens to understand the translingual turn in linguistics in a new light. As I
outlined above, theoretical linguistics is prima facie ontologically committed to the two-tiered
ontology of types and tokens. However, as also noted, such a commitment, it seems, quickly
gives rise to theoretical-methodological antinomy: if both types and tokens are real, then they
cannot be real in the same way, and theoretical linguistics must ex hypothesis also assume two
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different realities: one that is constituted in the here-and-now, and another that is constituted in
abstract “mental” or “ideal” realm. Below, I begin delineating what I take as the ontological
commitments of “monolingualism” and how translingual theory seeks to paraphrase away such
commitments.
Stated in a preliminary fashion, monolingualism talks as if named languages (plural)
were real. It makes such statements as “French includes the subjunctive tense” or “Spanish is
spoken in Spain, but not in Italy.” It is, therefore, at least for the moment, committed to the belief
that “French” and “Spanish” refer to real entities, if the above statements are also to be true.
However, the rider “for the moment” is important here. Monolingualism is only properly
monolingual, if and only if those who profess it are prepared to defend their statements as
referring to real entities that are not merely façons de parler, which could, hypothetically, be
paraphrased away.
I reprise the type-token ontological distinction as a way to take stock of monolingualism
ontological commitments. It would seem that monolingualism, at least in certain statements, is
committed to the belief that named languages (plural) are also types of which particular
utterances are tokens. Statements of linguistic adjudication like “This is an English utterance” or
“This is a Spanish utterance” or “This utterance mixes English and Spanish” are committed to
the reality of “English” and “Spanish” types in at least some sense, if these example sentences
that describe utterances could turn out to be true.
In a monolingual take on things, “English” and “Spanish” in these sentences have to refer
to an entity of some sort, if such statements are to be other than literal nonsense or fiction. If
theoretical linguistics in general is committed to the two-tiered ontology of types and tokens,
then monolingualism, it would seem, is committed to some sort of three-tiered ontology:
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linguistic tokens not only manifest types, but, on a monolingual account, abstract types are also
tagged with a certain essential language-ness, “English-ness” or “Spanish-ness,” say. Once
again: This “English-ness” or “Spanish-ness” has to be, in some sense, real for monolingualism,
if the statements that refer to “English” or “Spanish” are not merely a short-hand descriptor of
some other entity or set of entities that, upon re-description, can be paraphrased away.
The translingual turn, however, is grounded in the belief that “English” and “Spanish”
are, in fact, nothing more than façons de parler that should be reduced out of linguistics. Otheguy
et al. (2015) make the most forceful case for this premise. For these authors, named languages
have no ontological validity because they “cannot be defined linguistically [...], that is, in
grammatical (lexical or structural) terms” (p. 286). If the science of linguistics is dedicated to the
study of types and types alone ( cf. the cited premise of Lyons [1977] above), then not only are
tokens to be bracketed out of the picture (as already noted) but languages (plural) or “languageness” should be bracketed out as well.
Otheguy et al.’s argument against monolingualism is a reminder that theoretical
linguistics ought to be methodologically consistent: if it brackets out entities from down-top
(tokens), it should also bracket out entities from top-down ( named languages) as well in order to
isolate fully types and types alone as the inquired-after linguistic phenomena. On the Otheguyean
et al. account (2015), then, named-language referents like “English” or “Spanish” do not pick out
a real linguistic entity, but instead pick out a real socio-political entity that has nothing to do with
the study and theorization of linguistic types (p. 286). I understand this line of argumentation as
basically tracking the difference between descriptive and prescriptive approaches to grammar:
philologists (translingualists) aim to describe and explain the linguistic phenomena that are
encountered. Schoolmasters (monolingualists) try impose how things ought to be linguistically.
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However, named languages must refer to something if we can make statements about
them and be understood. If in everyday talk a statement like “Sofia doesn’t speak French” is
clearly understood and is either true or false, this is because it refers to a social construct that has
a particular reality, but not to a linguistic one. The translingual turn is committed to the
assumption that the entity “French” in the statement “Sofia doesn’t speak French” is
paraphrased—linguistically speaking—out of the picture by the sentence: “Sofia has yet to
incorporate many of the linguistic features socially and historically associated under the umbrella
term ‘French’.” In the light of Quine’s criterion, then, the translingual paradigm for theoretical
linguistics can be seen as unburdening itself from a cumbersome ontological commitment. At the
level of structural linguistic analysis—that is, the analysis of linguistic types—named languages
serve no explanatory purpose, and are, hence, ontologically-speaking, quite expensive.
At this point in the translingual argument, it seems that a curious shift in semantics comes
about. The translingual paradigm, as I have depicted it, is a methodologically consistent
approach to theoretical linguistics: it brackets tokens from below and named languages from
above. It is ontologically committed to linguistic types and types alone. That is, in the study of
linguistic structure qua linguistic structure, the boundaries between named languages simply
cannot be found. To sloganize this belief, one could say: languages (plural) do not exist, but
language (singular) does. This means that, for the purposes of the translingual paradigm, the
linguistic cosmos is only truly populated by linguistic types as that which can be subject to
description and analysis. Now, here comes the semantic shift: what is often called
monolingualism in the research literature, paradoxically, turns out to be a belief in languages
(plural), and, thus, would be more accurately denominated as plurilingualism or multilingualism,
and what has been called translingualism turns out to be the belief in language (singular) and
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language (singular) alone, and, thus, would be more accurately denominated as monolingualism.
Weird, no?
To come full circle, the translingual paradigm is, in fact, a more methodically honest
version of theoretical linguistics: it brackets out all things that are not lexical or structural types.
The “trans” prefix seems to carry weight when the basic insights of theoretical linguistics need to
be translated into the same discursive plane in which the folk belief in named languages is still
operative, like pedagogical practices and institutional language policies, for example. However, I
repeat for clarity: theoretical linguistics is not now and has never been and, I assume, never will
be ontologically committed to named languages or languages in the plural. Like a note on the
door to pay the gas bill, the translingual paradigm, from the perspectives of linguistics, serves as
a reminder of this fact.
3 The Translingual Reduction 1.0 & 2.0
I want to emphasize this “bracketing” move on the part of the translingual paradigm, by
calling in a sort of methodological reduction. This label deliberately borrows from the
phenomenological tradition, since I see study of types alone as a suspension of the folk of belief
in named languages as operating in a way methodological analogous with phenomenological
suspension of the belief in “direct access” to things in order to study phenomena from a so-called
first person view. As already stated the translingual paradigm brackets out from above and below
in order to i) unburden itself from unnecessary ontological commitments; and ii) to make a
polemical argument against the tenacity of the folk belief in named languages to interfere with
linguistic inquiry. Let’s call this: the “Translingual Reduction 1.0,” since, as will be shown
shortly, I will propose an updated version of this reduction.
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Even if the translingual paradigm successfully undermines the folk belief in named
languages, it still seems to suffer from the methodological antinomies embedded in the twotiered ontology of token and type. The translingual paradigm teaches that we can live without
talk of named languages, and that, in fact, one is better off only using words like “English” or
“Spanish” begrudgingly as shorthand or to refer to social realities, but not linguistic ones.
However, it does not appear that the translingual paradigm has forwarded a method of theorizing
without talking about tokens. The translingual paradigm as such gives ontological pride of place
to types without being able to bracket tokens out of the picture fully. For a methodologically
consistent version of theoretical linguistics and the translingual paradigm in its current iteration,
tokens still populate the linguistic cosmos, however, they do so from a marginal position. Much
like a dull guest at a dinner party, the translingual paradigm knows that tokens are there, but
have nothing to say to them. Named languages, on the other hand, never got the invitation to the
party.
I take the main point of translingual paradigm as this: linguistics can generate lots of true
statements regarding language, without ever referencing named languages. This ontological noncommitment to named languages does not suggest that this brand of linguistics only chooses to
methodologically prioritize one phenomenon over another, in the same way that a cardiologist,
say, prioritizes the study of the heart over brains and hearts and lungs, while still remaining (I
assume!) ontologically committed to the fact that these organs are real. Instead, it stresses that,
for methodologically consistent version of theoretical linguistics, named languages are nowhere
to be found. It is not merely a question of giving pride of place to types over named languages.
For theoretical linguistics, as the translingual paradigm would suggest, languages do not exist.
End of story.
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I see the complete non-existence of named languages and theoretical-methodological
privileging of types over tokens as a move that I have called the “Translingual Reduction 1.0.” It
strikes me as the through-line that ties together most if not all of the translingual paradigm from
the perspective of theoretical linguistics. This reduction is generative however implicit in García
& Li Wei, (2014). These authors are at pains to stress that within a speaker’s linguistic
repertories there are no divisions between languages. Instead, a repertoire is composed of
linguistics features syncretically differentiated within unitary linguistic capacity. Or, as,
elsewhere, García & Otheguy (2015) put it, a speaker has “a single array of disaggregated
[linguistic] features that is always activated” (p. 644). The case of bilingualism illustrates this
point. From the perspective of a linguistic theory, which has full ontological commitment to
named languages, a bilingual operates with and toggles between two distinct linguistic systems.
From a translingual perspective, which has zero ontological commitment to named languages, a
bilingual operates with and selects from one distinct language system, populated by linguistic
features traditionally associated with certain geographies and peoples (García & Li Wei, 2014, p.
14). I label this translingual position as “reductive,” in a sense fully restricted to the criterion of
ontological commitment: the translingual paradigm markedly downsizes the number of entities
in its ontological inventory. Languages—such as “English” or “Spanish”—are permanently
bracketed out, and, as a result, the only entities that remain as real in the translingual picture are
heteroglossic “linguistic features” and, I assume, the particular idiolects that idiosyncratically
organize these linguistic features.
The term “reduction” also looks to stress the kind of theoretical-methodological
symmetry that the translingual paradigm brings to the table. By admitting linguistic features and
linguistic features alone into its ontological inventory, translingual talk, with one cut of Occam’s
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razor, gets rid of all talk of languages, dialectics, registers, (in)correct usages, discursive
conventions, slangs, genres, lexicons, idioms, and the like. Within the translingual cosmos, all of
these things are off-loaded to the social-institutional realm. For the translingual paradigm the
word shines forth as the word. All there is is language.
This theoretical-methodological reduction is also what generates the most consistent
critique against the translingual paradigm: such an austere ontological commitment to linguistic
features and linguistic features alone means that translingual talk ex hypothesi cannot include
within its statements any statements that regard language as a social or political construct.
Clearly, such a criticism is justified: the translingual paradigm cannot “see” language qua
cultural artefact, because language qua cultural artefact explicitly is not counted in its ontological
inventory. However, this critique does little to catch the translingual paradigm off guard. The
lead proponents of this view that I here explicate (Cf. Otheguy et al., 2018) routinely
acknowledge this difference: languages (plural) have a social-institutional reality, but such a
reality has nothing to do with the sorts of linguistics structures (types) that linguistics have
habitually studied.
Let’s bring this back a step towards Quine’s use of the criterion of ontological
commitment as a methodology of adjudication between theories. The translingual paradigm has a
very low ontological buy-in with high descriptive returns: it only assumes the reality of types
linguistic features syncretically grouped by idiolects, and, in doing so, it yields a theory with a
powerful descriptive capacity that also side-steps lots of inherited methodological antinomies
around whether a “code-meshed” sentence includes one “language” or two. Holding fast to the
level of types of linguistic features allows researchers and educators to understand linguistic
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structure on its own terms without the cumbersome prerequisite of having to resolve structure
into categories set out by the methodological a prior of named language.
This, for my money, is no small methodological-theoretical feat. However, as noted, the
translingual paradigm can only reach this level of analysis through a perhaps rather severe
methodological reduction: it has to bracket pretty much all things that folk off-the-cuff refer to
as language in order to derive its singular plane of theoretical symmetry, wherein in all that is
accounted for are abstract types of linguistic features and and abstract types of linguistic types
alone.
The drive towards symmetry is what I count as the premise fundamental to the
translingual paradigm, and it is what has produced what I see as the “Translingual Reduction
1.0.” By postulating total symmetry between any and all linguistic features, named languages are
fully bracketed out and are not missed. Instead of a linguistic cosmos populated by discrete
languages, we now have a linguistic cosmos populated by discrete features that can circulate
freely between all linguistic repertoires. Conceptualizing language thus performs what amounts
to a form of methodological symmetry called for both by assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006)
and Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Latour, 2005).
4.1 The Translingual Paradigm and Assemblages
Extrapolating out from Deleuze & Guattari's ontology (1987), assemblage theory enacts a
methodological symmetry through conceiving of entities as constituted by external relationships
instead of internal ones. This means that an entity has some sort of durable quality that can be
separated out from one assemblage in which it takes root currently in order to re-associate with a
different one. This way of looking at things stands in sharp contrast with defining things in terms
of internal relationships, which sees entities as wholly determined by how a relatively fixed
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system defines them (Cf. Chapter III Section 3.2). A thing, internally defined, cannot be
separated out from set of relationships and join up with another (cf. Delanda, 2006, p. 10).
Superficially, the translingual paradigm appears to track the same ontology of assemblage
theory: “linguistic features” are not wholly defined by internal relationships, and, instead, they
can break off, so to speak, and reform in any linguistic repertoire at any given time.
Describing his own take on Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology, Latour (1996)
conceptualizes this type of methodological symmetry as: “a background / foreground reversal:
instead of starting from universal laws--social or natural--and to take local contingencies as so
many queer particularities that should be either eliminated or protected, [this method] starts from
irreducible, incommensurable, unconnected localities, which then, at a great price, sometimes
end into provisionally commensurable connections” (p. 3). Speaking broadly, the goal here is to
level the phenomena under review down to a singular ontological plane: instead of starting with
“structure,” on the one hand, and “instances” of structure, on the other, this move brackets out all
talk of structures and instances of structures and assumes but one class of entities--what Latour
would call “actants.”
As Spinuzzi (2014) notes, this methodological starting point can seem radical and
austere. If assemblage / ANT talk is ontologically committed to solely one class of entity, then
all that which we might call structure--languages, institutions, societies, for example--have be
reassembled as assemblages of actants (Latour, 2005). In a maximal version of ANT, there is no
ontological difference made between human and non-human actants as a method to avoid
embedded antinomies in social theory “by applying the same concepts and vocabularies across
the entire actor-network” (Spinuzzi, 2008, p. 41).
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I have argued that the translingual paradigm can be understood in two related senses: i) a
move to unburden linguistics from any ontological commitment to named languages; and ii) as a
result of this motive, a drive towards methodological symmetry, which can be closely associated
with the ontologies of assemblage theory and ANT in the above paragraph. However, if one
takes complete methodological symmetry as an end goal, then the translingual paradigm could be
updated.
That is, although it has reduced down its ontological inventory to that of linguistic
features and the idiolects that assemble them, say, it still assumes the two-tiered ontology of
token and type. This observation regarding the translingual paradigm imputes that when
translingual talk uses the descriptive “linguistic” it, in fact, refers to types and not tokens. This
must be the case, if statements like the following from Otheguy et al. (2018) are to be taken at
face value: “We[...]use linguistic system to refer to the individual’s practice-based stock of
lexical and structural features that in part make possible linguistic communication, and human
interaction more broadly” (p. 5). If a speaker’s “linguistic system” is her “stock of lexical and
structural features,” this then implies that such a stock is comprised of durable entities that
subtends the speaker’s actual utterances, in other words, a collection of linguistic types made
manifest daily in actual linguistic tokens. However, I suggest that the translingual paradigm can
ontologically downsize one step further. The “Translingual Reduction 2.0,” is as follows: a
hypothetical linguistic ontology that brackets out all talk of named languages and types. It does
away with languages (plural) qua the reality of named languages and language (singular) qua
abstract types of linguistic features. As I explain below, it is wholly focused on the performative,
and, hypothetically, only assumes the performative as real.
5 Revisiting Rhetoric
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SAT makes two enduring theoretical-methodological contributions that I want to
highlight as two distinct theses. The first I will call the “ linguistic leveling” thesis. Linguistic
leveling sharply blurs the boundaries between text and context. With ANT in mind, I call this
leveling because it contends that what is linguistic and what is non-linguistic can not be
adjudicated before the fact. I also take this as the essential insight of Wittgenstein’s use of the
Sprachspiel. The coinage of this term assumes that verbal semantic content is of a piece with any
other actant involved in the situatedness of the performative, even if verbal content can be
isolated and described within the vocabularies of theoretical linguistics.
Methodologically, the Sprachspiel “levels” every bit of of the speech act to a self same
plane of significance: gestures, mouth sounds, and ceremonial ritual all constitute a singularized
“grammatical” field: context is a constitutive and essential part of the productive complex of
discourse. This thesis represents one of the main takeaways of Chapter I: what has most often
been taken as language’s internal significant content is ontologically equalized with and made of
a piece with the pragmatic conditions of language’s average everyday use. This thesis is
indicative of Wittgenstein’s now notorious imperative in the Philosophical Investigations: to
discover the meaning of a phrase or a concept or a word, a philosopher need not theoretically
hang it out to dry, but rather look towards its success conditions embedded in mundane and
highly routinized instances of its issuance (1953, §59). In many ways, this very “looking,” by
definition, levels out linguistics by assuming no methodological distinction between langue and
parole, as in Saussurean linguistics (1919).
I by no means deny that the linguistic object that theoretical linguistics studies can in fact
be individuated as a field of productive theoretical inquiry. I only suggest that this linguistic
object, following out from the premise of linguistic leveling, could be productively viewed as
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ontologically derived from a lived webbing of average everyday usages. I, thus, view SAT as
holding the key to understanding what are the theoretical-methodological possibilities that
remain underexplored for the translingual paradigm. SAT provides a way to think through a
hypothetical linguistic ontology that would ground translingual talk as a methodologicaltheoretical reduction fully centered on the performative. The translingual paradigm as it stands
denies utterly the existence of named languages by postulating a linguistic ontology that only
admits “linguistics features” and their idiosyncratic groupings. However, in this stage of
methodological-theoretical reduction, the translingual paradigm still assumes the rather static
picture of theoretical linguistics: atemporal types and temporal tokens. The reduction that I will
suggest, by solely assuming the reality of performatives, brackets out the atemporality of types in
order to depict with greater accuracy the temporal repetition of language and in order to develop
a fuller picture of speaker agency.
In Chapter I, I made the case that rhetoric, in a certain sense, is just the study of
perlocutionary performatives, because rhetoric is a performative that has a practical but yet-tobe-conventionalized intention sighted. It would seem, then, that a complete reduction of the
translingual paradigm would need to look towards perlocutionary performatives as the most
promising candidate for as a single entity to describe linguistic practice. I say this because it is
only in perlocution that a model of performativity can be found that does not ex hypothesi rely
on some sort of type / token distinction in order to theorize the conditions of performatives’
intelligibility. As I develop below, perlocutionary or rhetorical performatives can be understood
within a singularized plane of temporality. Before articulating this argument, I explore some of
the methodological implications generated by linguistic levelling.
5.1 Leveling out
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Building out from SAT, I propose a hypothetical linguistic ontology that flattens out the
type / token ontological distinction described in the first part of this chapter. Instead of having
types and tokens, there is now only “tokens” in a flattened-out linguistic paradigm. However,
this preceding formulation is misleading on at least two counts: i) talk of tokens without its
ontological partner is misleading; and ii) “tokens” still point solely to verbal language. In
working through the implications of a second translingual reduction, I postulate a new
methodological move for the translingual paradigm that holds fast to the performative as the
primary unit of phenomenal analysis, and only arrives at abstract types of linguistic features,
much later on in the game.
By and large, I count this as a reversal. The standard picture of the relationship between
language and context imagines abstract types of linguistic features as the engine of the car, and
speech acts as the trips that the car makes. Theoretical linguists study the engine. The rest of us
study the trips. Clearly, this metaphor gives pride of place to abstract types. A car needs an
engine to be a car, but it does not need to make any particular trip. Abstract types are the
essential attributes of this entity called language, while speech acts are accidental attributes of it.
Such pride of ontological place that theoretical linguistic gives to abstract types over
speech acts is consistent with its methodological reduction and the ontological commitments of
its scientific paradigm. To impute that the theories of the Chomskys and the Sausures of the
world are insufficient because they exclude pragmatic conditions of speech is to lose sight of the
fact that such linguists never claimed to be studying such conditions; as theorists they arrived at
their object of study through a series of lucid methodological decisions in order to isolate a
particular entity for investigation and a particular metalanguage that describes the attributes of
this entity.
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However, such linguistics are open to the charge of smuggling in an entity
methodologically derived from linguistic phenomena as generative or constitutive of this
phenomena. Bourdieu consistently argues this point: those who discourse over sociolinguistic
phenomena are in the habit of mistaking the vocabularies of description that are opposed topdown by a theorist as the structures that generate the phenomena down-top. To correct for this
tendency, Bourdieu (1990) proposes that “it would be a considerable step forward if all would-be
scientific discourse on the social word were preceded by a sign meaning ‘everything takes place
as if…’ which, functioning in the same as quantifiers in logic, would constantly recall the
epistemological status of such discourse” (p. 29). Such a sign would show structural
vocabularies generated through the description of the social word always depends on a
hypothetical a priori chosen by the observer in the development of this or that methodology.
Thus, I continue to call my description of a one-tiered linguistic ontology hypothetical. I look to
challenge the ontological pride of place of abstract types, without reifying my postulated
methodological a priori as generative of phenomena I describe.
As opposed to types and tokens, I want to accent that this is a one-tiered ontology that
has been completely singularized. To talk only about performatives is not merely to prioritize
methodically them over linguistic structure or types. Such a move seemingly would do no little
more than redefine the field of linguistic pragmatics. Instead a hypothetical one-tiered linguistic
ontology would only admit one class of entities. Accordingly, It would account for all linguistic
phenomena without recourse to hypothesizing another class of entities. Leveling, hence, is
paradoxically extremely austere and flexible at one and the same time. It is austere because it
only allows for one kind of entity, and it is flexible because the reality of this entity expands and
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contracts so that its existential criteria can fully cover the diversity of the phenomena under
investigation.
For example, type-token linguistics is apt to capture the durability of linguistic structure
because it posits as real the separate entity of type which, by methodological definition, is
durable across sites of enunciation in ways that tokens are not. As a methodological move, this
entails the creation of new a methodological-semantic category within a theory’s vocabulary,
which thereby expands its ontology to include as real the entity referred to by said category. This
way of doing things, however, is lamentably hydra-headed: soon, the world, at least
methodologically speaking, is populated by as many things as there are possible descriptions of
them.
This work of levelling is already underway. For instance, Agha’s (2003) concept of
linguistic “indexicality” suggests that, in place of viewing semantic content as a fixed value
“internal” to linguistic features, meaning gravitates to linguistic features by virtue of speakers
enacting similar linguistic features in similar performative contexts. The meaning of a linguistic
feature is not an abstract and isomorphic type metaphysically tied to so many actual tokens.
Instead, what we off-the-cuff call the meaning of linguistic features indexes how structurally
similar performatives circulate in overlapping contexts. In his own way, Freire (2000) epitomizes
this position when he reminds us that reading the word is always reading the world and vice
versa. Agha’s indexing claim understands semantics in a way that runs parallel to what I mean
by linguistic levelling. And these concepts in turn run parallel to central tenet of Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy: that what is often taken as languages stabilized and isomorphic semantic
content turns out to be something more like a highlight reel of its daily commute through “a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing” (1953, §66).
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Linguistic leveling does not merely reverse Saussure’s favoring of langue over parole by
championing the putatively accidental over the putatively essential. Instead, linguistic leveling
claims that what is accidental and what is essential cannot be adjudicated outright before the fact.
Such arbitration--language goes here, context goes there--is funded by rather obvious tautologies
that surreptitiously project arbitrary--“arbitrary” in the sense that definitional lines could be
drawn otherwise--methodological assumptions regarding language as the generative principle of
the theoretical object of study itself. Becker (1991) summarizes this idea well: “Structuralism
[...] seems to confuse [...] the map and the territory, to assume that because you can describe
something as a structure, that structure is somehow ‘in’ the phenomenon, innate, apart from the
observer or the observer’s language” (p, 34). By virtue of these lines of critique, theoretical
linguistics might owe us an argument as to why we should prima facie think that language is,
well, “language,” in other words, why we should assume that language ex vi termini is abstract
types of linguistic features.
Conversely, linguistic leveling mines into the uncritical linguistic / non-linguistic sorting
by flattening out all discernible variables of speech acts down into a single semantic and
syntactic plane. Provisionally, within this frame, mouth-sounds and jotted-marks are not only of
a piece with gesture and and corporeal expression, but they are also of a piece with “concrete”
material objects--chairs, chalk boards, the Empire State Building—and with immaterial
institutional roles and scripts—teachers and students, doctors and patients, pedestrians and
drivers, politicians and citizens.
It could be said that theoretical linguists are minimalists when it comes to what to include
under the theoretical umbrella concept that we call “language”: they want to isolate out a system
of meaningful types seen as a linguistic species of a more fundamental genius of logic. Taking
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up the obverse position, those who profess linguistic levelling are maximalists: they want to deprivilege the concept “language” by distributing it across an axis of practical actions and
ideological orientations and socio-political institutions until what folk call “language” dissipates
utterly in the network of these terms. However, both the minimalists and the maximalists have to
face down a methodological problem inherent in the side of the coin they take up. Structuralism
not only has to justify its exclusions but it also must check itself from arriving an abstracted
linguistic object completely removed from practical use, just as linguistic levelling not only has
to justify its inclusions, but also must check itself from including the entirety of the cosmos as
actively impinging on the intelligibility of a singular speech act. In a word: each camp bears its
own unique burden of proof as to why their frame of analysis is justified.
In this hypothetical one-tiered linguistic ontology, the a priori theoretical work remains of
defining the parameters of this entity, and what exactly statements that talk about performatives
are ontologically committed to. A definitional argument for the performative started up in
Chapter I in the process of developing a definitional argument for rhetoric. In describing classes
of exigencies, I concluded that rhetorical performatives are future-looking in the way that
conventional performatives are not, with the rider that such a demarcation will turn out to be a
trap door. In pulling the level on this trap door in the next section, the goal is to show that
temporality and temporality alone can not make the difference between rhetoric and nonrhetoric. In fact, the definition of rhetoric articulated in Chapter I will end up fitting all
performatives, and, thus, I hope, delivering a definition of the performative that is completely
singular and, hence, one-tiered.
5.2 One Tiered Ontology and Performatives
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To start up this work, I begin by reading Butler’s (1988) early work on the sex / gender
binary part through the lens forwarded in Chapter I regarding conventional and rhetorical
exigencies. In the introduction to this chapter, I wrote that the initial distinction proposed
between conventional and rhetorical exigencies will turn out to be a trap door argument once
sufficient pressure is applied to the term “conventional.” What I meant by this is that analytical
SAT assumes that a logics of speech acts is attainable because it also assumes methodologically
that “conventional” denotes a type. Or, at the very least, in order to theorize the conventions of
speech acts, SAT takes a synchronic snapshot of them: a move that methodologically talks as if
conventions were abstract types. In this sense, the illocutionary performative could be said to be
a token that instantiates its standardized conventions in a manner analogous to how the inscribed
word-token “in” instantiates the word-type in at the beginning of this sentence.
Although analytical SAT shifts focus to the performative it often brings along with it the
same methodological ontologies of linguistics. If one is after an illocutionary logics ( cf. Searle
& Vanderveken, 1985), then it would appear to follow that one is to study types or something
that is ontologically type-like. Analytical SAT is clearly ontologically committed to types of
speech acts, because it constantly quantifies over them. For instance, Searle’s (1969) meticulous
analysis of promise-making, I assume, is theorizing over a type of speech act and not any old
token, just as Austin’s (1962) analysis of marriage ceremonies and ship christenings, I assume,
account for types and tokens. In chapter I, I, too, am at least provisionally committed to types of
speech acts, as the analysis of this chapter continually quantifies over types of exigencies and
performatives and not tokens of them.
Hence, a shift to performatives does not necessarily involve the methodologicalontological reduction that my argument calls for. One can talk about performatives as if they
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were types with particular tokens that instantiate them, and this is often exactly what analytical
SAT does. However, such a two-tiered ontology in the social realm of performativity can present
jarring antinomies, since to theorize social conventions as if they were abstract types is,
effectively, to erase all consideration of agency from one’s theoretical-methodological
vocabulary.
Once again, how the term “conventional” is defined set the stage for dividing up
illocution and perlocution, and, in turn, helped to establish in my argument the difference
between rhetorical and non-rhetorical performatives. An illocutionary performative terminates or
exhausts fully a conventionalized speech act in which the ritualized conditions that establish the
speech act success conditions can be wholly and completely secured in advance. On the other
hand, a perlocutionary speech act attempts to pull off an effect for which there are no a priori
guaranteed success conditions. For example, the speech act of “checkmate!” has explicitly
articulated rules--the opponent's king is check and cannot move out of it—that determines the
speaker’s pronouncement of “checkmate!” as intelligible. The perlocutionary speech act of “Hey,
I’ll buy you lunch!” performed with the intention of getting a friend to help you move this
Saturday has no set of before-the-fact codified “rules” that approach the level of explicit
articulation that the rules of chess do. To summarize: checkmate is conventional and persuading
your friend to help you move is unconventional. However, these examples are clearly cherrypicked: the task is now to question whether the line between the conventional and the
unconventional, the illocutionary and the perlocutionary, is really so bright.
Rhetoric, I have argued, is a uniquely temporalized performative: it makes use of already
established conventions for the sake of presently articulated affordances in the light of future
goals. Rhetorical performatives thus map onto familiar linguistic tense patterns by virtue of

66!
analogy: rhetoric makes use of what has been (perfect tense) for the sake of what is now
available (present tense) in light of what is to come (future tense). In a word: rhetoric is a tensed
performative.
Allow for one more cartographical move: rhetoric’s tensed temporality also maps onto
how the conventional-illocutionary and unconventional-perlocutionary pairings are divided. So
far, the difference between rhetoric and non-rhetoric hinges on how many of the tripartite tenses-perfect / present / future--a given performative makes manifest. A conventional-illocutionary
performative, viz., non-rhetoric for the nonce, only needs to fulfill the perfect and present tense
criteria in order to be considered performatively successful. “Check mate!” relies on the perfecttensed rules of chess to answer to a set of present-tense affordances. However, without any
future-tensed “in-light-of-which” the proclamation “checkmate!” has yet to become rhetorical.
On the other hand, an unconventional-perlocutionary performative, viz., rhetoric, is out to pull
off the temporal hat-trick: it needs to fulfill the past, present, and future tensed criteria in order to
be considered performatively successful. “Hey, I’ll buy you lunch!” qua persuasion is made
possible by perfect-tensed conventions in light for present-tense affordances and a future-tensed
“in-light-of-which” projection of teloi. This definition establishes a premise from which a
definitional conclusion follows: rhetoric is essentially marked out by its futurity. This, so far, is
its clenching characteristic and what sets it apart from all other species of possible performatives.
Or, to reprise a slogan from the previous chapter, rhetoric is transcendental since it is always
runs ahead of itself.
I have claimed that the conventional-illocutionary performative lacks futurity, because, in
a certain sense, this brand of speech act prima facie terminates or exhausts the ritualized
conventions that establish the speech act as significant. Fulfilling this criteria is what makes it
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illocutionary: once it is said, it is done. With no ulterior motive, a game of chess is totally
terminated once one player performs the speech act of “checkmate!” within the appropriate
circumstances.
Here comes the kicker: it may readily be objected that such a view of the conventionalillocutionary presupposes that the conventions that lend illocutionary speech acts their force exist
outside of any sort of temporality. To draw the line between the conventional and the
unconventional on the basis of futurity is to assume, and I shall soon argue erroneously, that
illocutionary speech act conventions are a species of abstract types upon which tokens of actual
illocutionary acts are patterned.
Let’s take a step back. I claimed that the difference between rhetoric and non-rhetoric is
the presence of a future-tensed “in-light-of-which” projection of teloi. On this account, all
performatives share the perfect-tense and present-tense aspects. I tried to argue that it is only
when a performative can be said to have non-codifiable future-looking effect sighted can it also
be said to be properly rhetorical. However, this definitional argument smuggles in the
assumption that the successful invocation of convention is not, at one and the same time, the
successful re-invocation of past performatives. The belief that normalized convention lacks
futurity posits the idea that the conventional type and actual token have no causal-dialectical
relationship with each other.
However, In reading Rickert’s (2013) notion of “ambient” rhetoric, I claimed that
rhetoric’s futurity is based on its power to re-present, re-direct, re-veal, re-move etcetera.
Rhetoric is defined by its capacity to “re” the world around us; rhetoric is the “re-ness” of
discourse. However, what happens if invocation is always already re-invocation? Hard upon the
heels of this premise does it not follow that all speech acts turn out to be, in fact, rhetorical?

68!
I began my argument by tacitly implying that burden of proof lies upon illocutionary acts
to show if and when their effects supercede the conventional. Now, I want to take up the
opposing horn of the argument and claim the obverse: if conventional invocation is always
already re-invocation, then the burden of proof also shifts: now it is essential that an
illocutionary act does not exceed itself, that its issuance is not always re-instating its
conventional possibilities for future realizations. This reversal of methodological emphasis
suggests different way to temporize illocutionary speech acts so that they include a future-tense
aspect even within performances that merely seem to terminate a priori established conventions.
5. 3 Butler’s Performative
Here, I am still operating on large-scale theoretical level. To drill down into the
substratum of the point I aim to get across, let’s now finally turn to Butler. Butler’s articles (1986
& 1988) on Simone de Beauvoir and phenomenology demonstrate a clear but perhaps tacit
affinity with SAT and its use of the performative as a way into understanding social ritual and
convention.
Butler’s work on performativity, I also claim, evinces within a different discourse what
the one-tiered ontology of linguistic leveling might begin to look like. This is the case because
Butler’s work on gender performativity needs to prove that i) that the token of gender
performativity is not and never was a manifestation of an abstract gender type; that ii) tokens of
gender performatives can reproduce sufficiently durability in order to produce the impression of
an abstract gender type; and iii) since no abstract gender type, in fact, exists, gender
performatives can always be re-directed and re-appropriated. Hence, I read Butler as a gesture
towards a singuarized ontological field of performatives, that can both account for durability and
rapid fire change.
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Let’s begin with the opening lines of Butler’s (1988) argument. In the strawman account,
“biological” sex (note the scare quotes here) is pre-figured as the brute fact upon which the
cultural institution of gender is built: the factical body remains outside of the temporal plane of
actual performatives, waiting to be taken up, as it were, by interpretations that run across an axis
of differentiation in accordance with particular historical epochs and cultures. Thus, sex,
putatively, patterns gender in the same way that the “English” word-type gender, putatively,
patterns English word-token “gender,” herein inscribed in this sentence.
The grammar of the transitive verb “to pattern” is instructive here. If “to pattern” is taken
to signify the process by which something is organized and made intelligible, then the
assumptions of the uncritical belief that sex patterns gender come into brighter light. Once again
in the strawman account, sex patterns gender because as an a priori epistemological category
funded by a factive-biological ontology of the body, sex—and not gender—establishes the prediscursive criteria for the discursively intelligible articulation of genders. In a word, sex is a
concrete datum “outside” of language. Gender is what culture makes out of it.
The above account is the thesis. The following account is the antithesis. Butler (1988)
challenges the belief that sex patterns gender by reversing it: gender, as it turns out, now patterns
sex. There are a lot of implications here, so I want to move through this antithesis step by step.
To zoom out a level, I take Butler to be arguing that types do not pattern tokens. Instead, tokens
pattern types. This idea, I hope, rings familiar with Agha’s (2003) “semantic indexicality” and
Wittgenstein’s (1959) “family resemblances,” both of which claim that what is often taken as the
isomorphic semantic content of the word is, in fact, the effect of its diverse pragmatic
deployments (and not the cause of it).

70!
To perform this reversal of patterning is also to make an ontological claim about abstract
types that evokes a hypothetical one-tiered ontology akin to the concept of linguistic levelling.
The premise that “tokens pattern types” (and not vice versa) de-privileges abstract types qua an a
priori epistemological category existent prior to the performative by leveling types down to the
selfsame ontological plane as actual tokens. Returning back to Butler’ s schema, “biological” sex
(scare quotes still operative here) qua type is reduced to the selfsame ontological plane that the
performative token gender has always occupied.
From this premise, there lies a yet-to-be-fleshed-out temporal element of this discussion.
Types, if they are to be given ontological pride of place, also receive a temporal privilege. Types
are exempted from temporality (and spatiality) in a way that tokens are not. Still thinking along
with Butler, the putative type of sex along with the putative word-type “sex”—as brute datum
and abstract object respectively—are ontologically designated as entities beyond the immediate
confines of diachronic revision. To level down types into the same ontological plane as tokens is
ipso facto to situate them within the same temporal sequence: it is to suggest that what is off-thecuff understood as the immutable substance identity of types is the stabilized mimetic effect
yielded through repeated temporal performance of tokens.
Butler (1988) markedly suggests this conception of temporality, when she writes:
“Gender is instituted through the stylization of the body, and, hence, must be understood as the
mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute
the illusion of an abiding gendered self. This formulation moves the conception of gender off the
ground of a substantial model of identity to one that requires a conception of a constituted social
temporality” (p. 519). In the standard type-token two-tiered ontology, along with the strawman
account of sex and gender, one would understand what Butler calls here “bodily gestures,”
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“movements,” and “enactments of various kinds” as token manifestations patterned after or
patterned by a prototypical sex or naturalized gender.
Going back to linguistics briefly helps to illustrate this point. In the two-tiered ontology
of type and token, a word-token can be pronounced or inscribed in a multitude of ways—just
imagine the amount of linguistic accents and written fonts that exist--but in order to be
intelligible as a valid token of a particular type, the token must invoke a certain degree of
structural similarity, whether by virtue of homology or analogy, that matches up with the
supposed structural integrity of the abstract type.
Butler’s main argumentative line aims to level the type down to the same ontological and
temporal plane as the token, a move, by virtue of Occam’s razor, would eliminate, seemingly,
talk of types altogether. It would also unburden Butler from including types in her ontological
inventory. In this seemingly one-tiered ontology, instead of temporal tokens invoking atemporal
types, tokens re-invoke the memory—for lack of a better word—of past performances and set
out the expectations for future ones. Butler (1988) once again:
Significantly, if gender is instituted through acts, which are internally discontinuous, then
the appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative
accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves,
come to belief and perform in the mode of belief. If the ground of gender identity is the
stylized repetition of acts through time, and not a seemingly seamless identity, then the
possibilities of gender transformation are to be found at the arbitrary relation between
such acts, in the possibility of a different sort of repeating, in the breaking or subversive
repetition of that style. (p. 520)
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If the two-tiered ontology of types and tokens maintains that the type is the static ontological
ground that underpins the enactment of temporalized types, then Butler’s one-tiered ontology
problematizes this relationship. For Butler, performative tokens do not signify in relation to
types. Types do not set the conditions of intelligibility for the performance of tokens. Instead,
performative tokens only mean in relation to another in a temporalized sequence. The
performatives that come before, no matter how conventional, pushes forward in order to
establish the conventions for the performatives that come after. Hence, instead of a performative
token’s temporalized structure in some sense mirroring the atemporal structure of the abstract
type, a performative token only gains its significance by mirroring the structure of the
temporalized structure of the performative token that came at the time step before it. Each
preceding token’s structure sets the conditions of intelligibility for the next. And so on.
This is what I take Butler to mean when she talks about the “possibility of a different sort
of repeating.” If a performatives token’s significant structure is only significant in light of the
expectations set out by structure of the token that came before it, then the composition of said
structure is inherently open to temporal modification and contestation, both by the processes of
aleatoric iteration and deliberate “mis”-invocations.
5.3.1 Rhetorical Temporality and One-Tiered Ontology
I have suggested that rhetoric is tensed discourse that is primarily defined by its futurity.
In stage-one of my argument in Chapter I, I drew the line between convention-illocution and
unconvention-perluction based on the criterion of futurity. Still in stage-one, conventionillucition, viz., non-rhetoric, maps onto only the perfect and present tense aspects: the realization
of the appropriate utterance terminates or exhausts the normalized conditions that fund its
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intelligibility. I also depicted that unconvention-perlocution, viz., rhetoric proper, includes the
future-tense aspect that non-rhetoric, by definition, excludes.
However, in reading Butler through the lens of type and token, I hope now to illustrate
what Butler’s theory of performativity contributes to my working theory of rhetoric, and how,
my theory of rhetoric, in turn, can develop further a hypothetical levelled-out linguistic ontology.
As noted above, analytical SAT is open to the critique that it naturalizes social convention by
offloading its roles and scripts to the realm of the synchronic (Cf. Bourdieu, 1990 & Butler,
1997). SAT gains a logics of the speech act qua a knowledge-that (Ryle, 2009) by performing a
temporal bifurcation of the speech act into a conventional type and a performance token of that
self same type. In order words, to derive the logical schemas for performatives, one must assume
two different yet parallel temporal planes: the static, logically-bound plane of the type and the
temporal plane of manifest performative token.
Here comes stage-two of the argument: If, a la Butler, the structure of a performative
token does not bear any structural relation to a universal type, but rather only bears a structural
similitude to the implied expectations of the structure of the performative token that temporarily
preceded it, then all performative tokens, by the same hand, include a future-tense aspect as well,
no matter if they are conventional-illocutionary or unconventional-perlocutionary. If
performative tokens, and not abstract types, are that which pattern the conditions that mark out
the conditions of intelligibility for other performative tokens, then all performatives, even if they
are in their stage-one guise are classed as conventional-illocutionary or unconventionalperlocutionary, are, in fact, properly rhetorical.
Hence, stage-two of this argument is where the trap door lets out. In Chapter I, I was at
pains to show that a meaningful distinction should be made between what I called conventional
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and rhetorical exigencies. To rehearse: i) a conventional exigency is the class of exigencies that
is precipitated by and is wholly exhausted within its conventional (viz., illocutionary) conditions
of use; and ii) a rhetorical exigency is the class of exigencies that is precipitated by a need that is
both exterior to and is not wholly exhausted by conventional conditions of use. Moves of chess
that are properly strategic answer to the internal exigencies constituted by its conventions,
whereas my motives for winning (or throwing) a game of chess answer to an exigency that is not
a priori contained by the game’s conventions. Prima facie, the point of this definitional argument
was to carve disciplinary space for the study of rhetoric. I wanted to argue that if “rhetoric” were
solely to stand for the study of situated, pragmatic speech, then SAT already described this field
of study. However, if rhetoric is to stand a particular class of speech acts that are temporalized in
way that I claim is unique to rhetoric, then the term, in turn, also cordons off a unique area of
study.
By pulling the lever on the trap door, I double back and now seek to reclaim for rhetoric
the ground that I originally ceded to SAT. By virtue of the type-token argument that is starting
up above what is at first-blush seen as a brand of conventional-illocutionary collapses into the
unconventional-perlocutionary. SAT in its analytical iteration fails to account for the
unconventionality of conventionality, and, in doing so, mistakenly privileges the illocution as the
paradigmatic speech act over perloction.
Perhaps all speech acts are rhetorical. This would not be due the fact that all speech acts
are always situated. Instead, this would be due to the fact that all speech acts, even those that
seem rigidly conventional, fulfill the temporal hat trick—perfect, present, future—which I have
claimed as the constitutive criterion of a rhetorical performative. if the abstract type is levelled
down to the temporal plane of the temporal token, then all performatives make use of already
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established conventions for the sake of present affordances in the light of future goals. All
performatives are future-tensed, not just rhetorical ones, because, as I aimed to show above, each
realized performative token sets the stage, i.e., temporally composes the conditions of
intelligibility, for the next. In a very loose Derridean framework, what I claim evokes the concept
of “citationality.” Old text becomes the next context for new text.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the translingual paradigm is methodologically
reductive in a sense strictly limited to Quine ontological commitment: whereas monolingualism
is committed to include named languages in its ontological inventory, translingualism has no
such commitments. In a sense, then, translingual theory is reductive: since it assumes fewer
entities that need to be real so that its theoretical statements might be true. This, once again, I
take as an explicitly articulated version of an assumption that has long been critical to theoretical
linguistics, that types and types alone are the study of linguistics proper.
Translingual talk’s low-cost ontology lights up the world as containing linguistic features
that freely circulate between the repertoires of speakers. In a sense, it assumes an ontology very
much in line with those of assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006) and ANT (Latour, 2005). Both
of these ontologies, I have argued, furthermore represent a drive towards methodological
symmetry: they aim to assume one entity and one entity alone in their ontological inventory, that
which is often to referred by a term of utmost generality, the “actant.”
I have tried to show that, although translingual theory is reductive in a drive towards
methodological symmetry, it is not reductive enough. Translingual theory is still, by and large,
committed to types and tokens, a two-tiered ontology that preserves the theoreticalmethodological antinomies embedded in the basic scientific paradigm of structural linguistics.
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Hence, my goal in this chapter has been to begin to elucidate a completely unified and
singularized linguistic ontology, one that is completely “levelled off” and makes no a priori
distinction between the linguistic and the non-linguistic, nor between types and tokens.
In this move towards a completely symmetrical ontology, I have relied heavily on my
reading Wittgenstein’s (1959) notion of the Sprachspiel and Butler’s (1988) theory of gender
performativity. Both of these philosophers provide a path for me to claim that the distinction that
I was at pains to make in Chapter I between the conventional-illocutionary and the
unconventional-perlocutionary is, ultimately, incoherent. This is due to the fact that, without
recourse to abstract types, a steadfast division between the conventional and the unconventional
cannot be maintained. I hope to have shown, at least provisionally, that all performatives evince
the type of temporality that I originally claimed to be the clinching characteristic of rhetoric. If
all perfromatives are continually setting the stage--constituting the conditions of intelligibility-for the the performatives that come next, then all performatives are also properly future tensed.
The point of all this to define a singular entity that will constitute the singular ontological
commitment of what I see as the “Translingual Reduction 2.0” and a completely ontologically
symmetrical methodology. This fully temporalized performative I see as the beginnings as a way
out of the cul-de-sac of antinomies in linguistics in which structure and agency, type and token,
theory and pragmatics go round and round and round. The work of Chapter III will be just this:
an attempt to i) flesh out more what a fully temporalized performative might look like; and ii) to
consider in a detailed fashion what the ramifications area of a theoretical-methodological
vocabulary that really does just assume one entity.
!
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Chapter III: Duplication and Incommensurability
1 Introduction
A translingual approach to language and linguistics is founded on the claim that
languages do not exist as discrete linguistic systems that can be referenced by words like
“English” and “Spanish,” for example. This is the big takeaway of Chapter II. If there are
languages in the plural, then a translingual view of language and linguistics cannot even get out
of the conceptual starting blocks. A la Otheguy et al. (2015 & 2018), on a purely “linguistic”
level languages just aren’t there: all that is to be found are linguistic features that circulate freely
without any necessary membership in bounded and self-contained linguistic systems of named
languages. A translingual paradigm bears zero ontological commitment to named languages. It is
only ontological committed to “linguistic features,” idiosyncratically organized by the idiolects
of unique speakers.
It goes without saying that how this claim is to be ultimately cashed out ultimately hinges
on what the terms of the claim are taken to signify. At the very least, the proposition, “languages
do not exist,” should be read as two-fold, both in terms of i) the direct argumentative content of
the claim; and ii) in a self-reflective sense regarding what is meant by “language” and what is
meant by “exist.”
This chapter’s first goal is to make sense of this claim by attempting to disambiguate and
define the multiple senses that are packed into the common use of the word “language.” Then, I
move on by elucidating what types of existence might be proper to an entity like “language.”
Finally, I discuss the valence of “to exist” is to be worked out, if the claim that language exist but
languages do not is to subtend all subsequent arguments within the translingual paradigm. In
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thinking through these questions, I present a detailed reading of Frege’s theory of sense (Sinn)
and reference (Bedeutung). I also once again rely heavily on the later philosophy of
Wittgenstein as both a method to think through what entities are taken as existent within
discourses about language and through Wittgenstein-esque examples and thought experiments
based on what I take as later Wittgenstein’s linguistic ontology.
Even if it is has yet to be formally codified as such, the translingual turn raises what is
fundamentally an ontological question regarding language and languages. How language
(singular) is to be defined as to what it is and what it is not will ultimately set the stage for
whether there are languages (plural) or there are not. Below, I will show that “language”
(singular) should be disambiguated into at least two senses: what I will provisionally call
language a) and language b). In a bit of foreshadowing: language a) will refer to the Sprachspiel
(Cf. Chapter I; Glock, 1996, p. 193; Hintikka & Hintikka, 2007) and the capacity of speakers to
play them. It will also refer to the logical structure of the “moves” generated by the constitutive
rules of Sprachspiele, their overlap inter se, and their “family resemblances” (Wittgenstein, 1953,
§67). Next, language b) will refer to the linguistic “packing” of such logical structure, that is,
how this structure can be expressed in manifold ways . In the exegesis that proceeds below, I
move in reverse order. First, I define language b). Then, I go on to language a). The distinction
that I make between language a) and language b) is not value-free. Sprachspiele, on my account,
constitute what is off-the-cuff taken as language and not vice versa. The labels a) and b) are
meant to assign priority: Sprachspiele are the ground floor of “language.” However, I move in
reverse order and describe language b) first, because I take this definition as the standard view of
what language is and languages are. From explicating the standard first, I hope my arguments
regarding the constitutive nature of Sprachspiele will be made clearer.
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Both of these senses, I believe, pick out a particular type of human activity or
understanding, which more often than not, are all crowded in under the umbrella term
“language.” This chapter wagers that each sense of language, although perhaps interrelated, has
is own distinctive ontological properties. These linguistic properties, in turn, will rest on whether
“language” in these different senses is made of up of internal or external relations (cf. section 3.2
below). One of the big takeaways of this chapter is the conclusion that language a) is defined by
and large by an incommensurability that obtains inter se Sprachspiele. Whereas language b) is
defined by and large by an arbitrariness and the possibility of what I will term linguistic
duplication. If these disambiguations of the term “language” end up bearing weight, the pay-off
will be that perhaps most of the methodological ambiguity circulating around “language’ will be
shown to be a product of using one theoretical-methodological vocabulary derived from one
sense of language in order to talk about another. My hope in displaying these different senses,
once again in an analytical move a la Wittgenstein, is not to solve the antinomies embedded in
translingual paradigm for language and linguistics, but rather dissolve them, that is, show them to
be the result of statements that are, at rock bottom, theoretically inconsistent.
2 Language b)
2.1 Preliminary Problems
Imagine this: I am crossing the street in Madrid; not paying complete attention, I stumble
upon what I take to be a two way stop, with no traffic light. I come to a full stop cautiously at the
curb before crossing. I look in both directions before stepping foot the street. That’s when I
notice it: a red octagon hung from a pole about two meters high on two opposing sides of the
intersection. “A stop-sign,” I tell myself, coding the the picked-out item within terms with which
I am already familiarized. I realize I don’t know the word for “stop-sign” in “Spanish,” so I take
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out my phone and look it up: “señal de stop,” “señal de pare,” “el stop.” None of which feel
satisfactory. I’ll have to ask someone. But, sure enough, cars do in fact come to a halt upon
seeing the sign, and, thus, my initial hypothesis is verified: it is, in fact, a two-way stop, like the
ones we have back home in New York. But, following hard upon this realization, I notice the
smallest difference: within the red octagon, it reads “pare” instead of reading “stop.” Well, I’m in
Spain, after all, right? They speak “Spanish,” here, right? And “English” is a different
“language” than “Spanish,” isn’t it? So it logically follows that here they say “pare” instead of
saying “stop” just as in New York they say “stop” instead of “pare.” What’s the big deal?
A red octagon in an intersection plays a role in a particular form of life. Without the
automotive industry, petroleum drilling, and places to be, there would be no such entities as stop
signs; it is a node in a network of cultural-historical significance that only makes sense in and
through that network. Dice, for example, in Backgammon tell its players how many spaces a
piece can move in a turn. The coin toss at the beginning of a football game (soccer or American)
tells us who will possess the ball first. And, like these examples, a stop sign is a function of a
rule of the legal-driving game. A skilled driver who only speaks “English” will stop at the red
octagon that reads “pare” in Madrid, just as much as the skilled driver who only speaks
“Spanish” will do the same at an intersection in New York. It would seem, then, that what is
most often isolated off-the-cuff as ‘language”--the linguistic features “pare” and “stop”--are
significantly the least important prop upon the stage.
As a counter-example picture this: in an alien culture that is neither Madrid nor New
York, there are a folk who play the legal-driving game, too. Just like our game, there are roads
and lanes and rules and fines. However, in this folk’s version of the game, at two-way stops
where a stop sign would be placed, they represent the “rule of stop” with a purple triangle instead
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of a red octagon. In this version of game, it would befall both the “English”-only speaking driver
and the “Spanish”-only speaking driver to perform a genuine act of translation this time around.
Perhaps both would think to themselves: “For this folk, purple triangle means red octagon which
means ‘Stop!’ or ‘¡Pare!’” Let’s complicate this hypothetical situation one step further: suppose
that in this game of stop-and-go that uses purple triangles instead of red octagons turns out to be
a “bilingual” one. All signs are written in “English” and “Spanish”: every purple triangle that
functions as a stop sign contains the words “stop” and “pare.” However, would it not still be the
case that the New Yorke driver would find it easier to drive in Madrid and our Madrid driver find
easier to drive in New York, while both of them would find it hard to drive in this culture, even if
our drivers do not speak the “language” of New York or Madrid respectively?
The above is a rather trivial example that I hope to use to illustrate a less trivial point.
Much like the illustration of rock-paper-scissors qua Sprachspiel in Chapter I, the example aims
to provoke the question: what is the “language” really being spoken here? In the Sprachspiel of
legal-driving it would seem that the “real” language in play is that of shapes and colors, not the
linguistic features tied to the named languages of “Spanish” and “English.” If a driver has
incorporated how these shapes and colors are related to the rules of the game, she now “speaks”
the language of the legal-driving Sprachspiel. In this restricted example, the verbal languages of
“English” and “Spanish” are profoundly demoted: they play an ancillary role, at best, to the more
fundamental legal-driving language of shapes and colors.
In this practical context, the words “pare” and “stop” seem to turn out to be utter
linguistic duplicates. It would take a highly sophisticated argument in order to claim that the
sense or perception or one’s take on the situation is in anyway changed or modified or altered by
painting the word “stop” in the red octagon instead of “pare” or vice versa. Nothing is here lost
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in “translation.” I defend this conclusion taken out one step further: replacing a red octagon for a
purple triangle and vice versa also affects no loss in the drivers’ feel for the game. Once the new
sign is slotted into the game-role-to-be-played and its web of constitutive rules, gameplay takes
once again over and resumes its normality, so to speak.
The point that the legal-driving Sprachspiele example illustrates is what I take to be one
of the basic intuitions packed into the term “language”: Languages (plural) are different systems
of signification or representation that are used to describe the same thing.
Let’s formulate this ideas as the “different word / same thing” thesis. This thesis codifies
the assumption that languages are discovered when it can be coherently maintained that two
different signs refer to the exact same thing and they do so in the exact same way (for a
clarification of what I mean “by in the exact same way” cf. the discussion of Frege’s notion of
sense and referent in section 2.2 below). Within the conceptual confines of this thesis, I know
that I am in the presence of two languages when I encounter a pair of linguistic duplicates that
pick out the same entity in the same way. Whether you call it a “martillo” or call it a “hammer,”
for example, I can only locate a “linguistic” difference here; I struggle to find a conceptual one.
Based on this thesis, multiple languages thus mean multiple signs for a single referent. Or
perhaps it is better said the other way around: multiple signs for a single referent leads to the
belief that multiple languages must exist, too. However, I show below that translingual thinking
proves this to be a fallacy. There can be multiple signs for a single referent without an ipso facto
methodological-ontological commitment to multiple languages.
The “different word / same thing” thesis leads one to think that inter-language translation
is made possible by virtue of there being a tall ontological brick wall between words and things.
(On the side of the world, there are things and facts about things, what Wittgenstein of the
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Tractatus would label as “all that is the case” [1921, §1]). On the side of language, there reside
the linguistic systems composed from the shattered pieces of the Tower of Babel—the so many
“languages” speakers use to refer themselves to the world. Translation, then, would be the act of
inter-correlating the respective features of respective linguistic systems by lining up the identical
referential relationships that obtain to the sames things inter-languages (cf. Chapter I’s
discussion on translation). “Pare” and “Stop” and a red octagon and a purple triangle all refer to
the same element in the legal-driving Sprachspiel. Perhaps they do so in unique ways, but,
superficially, the referential relationship appears identical or isomorphic throughout.
Without yet defending or critiquing this picture of a language, I continue illustrating it.
Languages in this sense are defined by a form of linguistic duplication that could be called interlanguage identity. To demonstrate this point, let’s assume that α, β, φm δ are all signs that refer
to the same thing X. If these signs all refer to the exact same aspect of the exact same X in the
exact same way, then all these signs are also, linguistically at least, identical to one another.
Therefore, the statement α = β is identical to the statement β = φ just as much as the statement φ
= δ is identical to δ = α and just as much as all four listed statements are identical with one
another or any other possible permutation.
In contrast, in a logically perfect language, precisely that which early Wittgenstein was
after in the Tractatus, each unique object would also have its own unique name. In this
linguistic-logical utopia, it would also follow that there would be no languages in the restricted
sense of the terms sketched out above, since no linguistic duplication would occur.
Again, the “different word / same thing” thesis appears to capture a basic intuition
regarding what language is in general and what a language is in particular. This account tracks a
basic premise in the philosophy of language: a sentence, an utterance, and a proposition are
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three distinct linguistic elements. Based on this premise, the proposition is the logical structure
that represents a state-of-affairs; the sentence is the combination of linguistic features that
package the proposition; and the utterance is the actual physical event of linguistic performance.
This provides a picture of language wherein the component parts are nested together like Russian
dolls: the proposition gets packed into the sentence and the sentence gets backed into the
performative verbal / written utterance (cf. Searle, 1969). Mcginn (2015) illustrates well this
common starting point for the philosophy of language. Taking the apparent propositional identity
“French” and “English” sentences “la neige est blanche” and “the snow is white” for granted, he
then concludes: “Despite the fact that these two different sentences are made up of different
words in two distinct languages, they still have the same meaning, and thus express the same
proposition” (p. 2). Mcginn’s view here is emblematic of the “different word / same thing”
thesis. Prima facie, these two sentences are clearly different linguistically but an extremely
sophistic argument would be required to argue that they express something different factually. In
this sense, then, a clear-cut case of “linguistic duplication” is presented: these sentences have an
identical “meaning” but are couched in the two distinct linguistic systems of “French” and
“English.”
This intuition regarding language makes sentences and the elements that compose them
more or less arbitrary: if and only if identical propositional meaning can be said to obtain
between different sentences, then how the proposition is linguistically packaged is a matter of
second order importance. If a speaker understands “French” and “English,” then the choice
between “la neige est blanche” and “the snow is white” becomes a matter of taste or social
propriety instead of a matter of logical or expressive necessity.
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However, let’s test out some sophistic lines of argument and see what counterexamples
begin to crop up. One could argue that, at least, the nouns and the adjectives in this examples
might refer to the same things, but they, in fact, have different senses. Perhaps, in the collective
French and English way of thing “neige” and “snow” and “blanche” and “white” evoke a
different affective response or pick out slightly different entities in ways that remain embedded
in the respective linguistic systems of “French” and “English.” An “English” person
fundamentally formed by “English” can map “snow” and “white” onto “neige” and “blanche”
but he will not incorporate all the associations and connections built into these “French” words.
And, vice versa, the same goes for the “French” person learning “English.” Or it could be even
worse. Perhaps it is the case that each individual speaker has her own set of associations build
into words like “snow” and “niege” and “white” and “blanche,” even if when they utter
propositions under the right circumstances they refer to the same logical state-of-affairs. A Texan
has a different relationship to “snow” than a New Yorker. “blanche” means something different
to a Parisian art student than it does to truck driver in Burgundy.
It seems like this sophistic argument is beginning to become, well, less sophisticated. If
these maximal accounts of linguistic difference are accepted, then all possible content in the
“different word / same thing” thesis seems to be evacuated. All words, even the “same” words in
the “same” languages are denied identity inter se, and are, thereby, converted into webs of
approximate synonyms.
“Snow” and “neige” and “white” and “blanche” are not the same for me as they are for
you, even if we easily use such words between each other to pick out and refer to actual things
and events. This maximal account seems to be from where such slogans as “all communication is
translation” comes. Speaker A is always “translating” her affective relationship with language to
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Speaker B, since, by definition, each individual has a stock idiosyncratic relations that link up
with a common set of words.
However, let’s take this line of thought out one step further. The above account would
argue that perhaps there is no linguistic duplication between “snow” and “neige” and “white”
and “blanche,” because i) particular cultures are deposited in the respective linguistic systems of
“English” and “French”; or ii) each speaker has her own idiosyncratic relationship with
linguistics features, and, thus, these example words mean different things for different speakers,
even if they refer to the same phenomenon.
In both cases, none of these above example words would demonstrate sufficient evidence
for the presence of distinct languages, if exact linguistic duplication is the clinching criterion for
having two languages (or three or four, etcetera). Once again, instead of being duplications, they
are converted into synonyms: “white” is to “blanche” what “purple” is to “mauve”; “snow” is to
“neige” what “blizzard” is to “nor’easter.”
Yet this line of argumentation, too, quickly trips over bumps in the road. Even if the
premise is granted that classes of linguistic features like nouns and adjectives never really pick
out the exact same aspect of the exact same thing in the exact same way, it seems nearly
impossible to sustain a similar belief when it comes to linguistic features that express logical
operations. Both the sentence “la neige est blanche” and the sentence “the snow is white” make
use of prediction by virtue of the copulative verbs “être” and “to be.” “est” and “is” are clearly
different linguistic features, but they seem to express the exact same logical function, and are
thereby clear candidates for linguistic duplication. What holds true for prediction, seems to hold
doubly true for other logical operations: “and / or” in “English” seems to express the same
singular logical functions that “ et / ou” in “French.” Thus, in the case of these logical operations,
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at least, it would appear that neither a putative linguistic system like “French” or “English” nor
the idiosyncratic linguistic system of individual speakers can contain different conceptions or
beliefs about “and-ness” or “or-ness.” These are, in fact, linguistic duplicates.
The goal of the next section is to deepen and perhaps clarify some of the questions raised
above. In order to achieve this, I now turn to Frege’s theory of sense (Sinn) and reference
(Bedeutung). This move is two-fold: i) it seeks to give formal names to the above ways of
looking at language and at “different” languages; and ii) it aims to explicate formally what
language is or must be for translingual approaches to theoretical linguistics.
2.2 Frege
2.2.1 Sense and Reference
In his canonical text “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” Frege (1948) systematically addresses
some of the basic problems adumbrated above. In this work, Ferege is initially concerned with
understanding how different signs can refer to the same thing. Using my language from above,
Frege wants to know when it can be said that signs are mere linguistic duplicates and when it can
be said that signs, although they refer to the same thing, disclose a different aspect of it. For
example, it could be maintained that the propositions “3+4” and “24÷2” before refer to the same
logical item of 12, but they clearly disclose this item it different ways. Thus, they are no exact
duplicates, but rather “synonyms” for one another. The difference in their linguistic features
maps onto their different expressive properties. Both lead the mind to 7 but they take different
different routes to get there (Cf. Morris, 2006, pg. 33).
The problem of possible linguistic duplications ratchet up a notch when propositions of
the type a=a and a=b are considered. The proposition a=a is, clearly, tautological. Furthermore,
as a tautology, it can also be considered an a priori truth. Following Kant, Frege labels this type
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of proposition as analytic, it needs no empirical content to validate its truth value. On the other
hand, Frege wants to maintain that the proposition a=b has the possibility of expressing synthetic
or a posteriori truth about the world (Frege, 1948, p. 209). Thus, a=b cannot not be merely a
propsisition that demonstrates the relationships between linguistic features, since such a
relationship could be asserted as an a priori fact.
Frege (1948) opens up this problem by examining what it would if a=b were just a
statement about the relations between linguistic features: “What is intended to be said by a=b
seems to be that the signs a and b designate the same thing, so that the signs themselves would
be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted” (p. 209). On this quasistrawman account, what is asserted by a=b is a just linguistic relationship; it does not report or
record any new information about the world. Frege, then, draws the conclusion that such
linguistic relationships are, in fact, arbitrary and need not be verified by empirical content:
“Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for
something” (ibid.). The cultural trope of coded messages--depicted often in spy movies--brings
this point home. When spy A cracks spy B’s code what is discovered is a purely linguistic
information: the linguistic features of a secret “language” are successfully correlated with
linguistic features that are publicly known.
Let’s hypothesize a Wittgenstein-esque Sprachspiel to illustrate further Frege’s first point
and develop that notion that I have called “linguistic duplication.” Let’s set up a simple
Sprachspiel, much like the builders that make a cameo appearance early on in the Investigations
(§6-9). In this scenario two workers are at a construction site. Worker A issues one word
commands to Worker B, so that worker B brings worker A the correct materials. However,
unlike Wittgenstein’s example where each one word order “Slab!” “Block!” “Pillar!” correspond
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exactly with one thing—slabs, blocks, and pillars—in this Sprachspiel each object has multiple
names. In this game, Worker A can use any of the first four letters of the Greek alphabet for slab;
any of the first four letters of the roman alphabet for block; and any number 1-4 for pillar.
Sometimes worker A shouts “1!” instead of “4!”. But a pillar arrives on a cue each and every
time. Within the confines of this simple Sprachspiel, identity statements like φ = β or A = C or 2
= 3 would, a la Frege, express only a linguistic fact. Or, in my terminology, they would indeed
be true linguistic duplicates. If someone unaware of the rules of the Sprachspiel were to find to
herself confused as to why different signs resulted in the same object, the above identity
statements would greatly clarify things for me: “Aha! φ = β!” would be a moment of linguistic
revelation.
However, learning that φ = β clearly does not generate new knowledge about the slab
itself. If the language / world division holds its ground, then a statement like φ = β in this
Sprachspiel only reports upon a fact on this side of language and not on that side of world. Frege,
though, is quick to point out that identity statements can, in fact, do more than show linguistic
relations. His now classical example is the proposition: “the morning star = the evening star.”
Both “the morning star and “the evening star” pick out or refer to the same object, that of Venus.
However, like the mathematical equations above, even though these names refer to the same
object, they do so in different ways. Thus, they demonstrate or reveal different aspects of the
same object.
In this case, the proposition “the morning star = the evening star” provides genuine
knowledge about the world since it joins together two significant aspects of the same object.
Outside of the limiting case of the simple Sprachspiel above, it would seem that different names
contain different means of expression that, although they ostensibly stand for the same thing,
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function as manifold ways to demonstrate different aspects of that object. To clarify this point
with another example, take for example the nom de plume of any given author: Samuel Clemens
and Mark Twain have the same ostensible referent but the former reveals or points to the
biographical person whereas as the latter reveals or points to the literary persona (Zalta, 2016).
Unlike the spy code example cited above, to learn the proposition “Mark Twain's = Samuel
Clemens” is to connect up significant facts about the world.
Frege accounts for this by claiming that every sign or name has both a sense (Sinn) and a
referent (Bedeutung). For example, in the simple Sprachspiel above it could be said that each
sign not only has the exact same referent but each sign also discloses this referent in the exact
same way. The only thing that differs between these signs is linguistic element that expresses the
sign, since their sense and referent are identical throughout. However, in the second set of
examples--those of the morning star and the evening star and those of Samuel Clemens and Mark
Twain--these signs or names have a different sense but the same referent. They pick out what is
ostensibly the exact same object but they do so in very different ways. Frege argues that there is
“connected with a sign (name, combination of words, letter), besides that to which a sign refers,
which be called the referent of the sign, what I would like to call the sense of the sign, wherein in
the mode of presentation is contained” (1948, p. 210). A sign’s sense is its “mode of
presentation,” which is the “how” of its referential disclosure. For example, the propositions
“Juan is a father,” “Juan is a sociolinguist” and “Juan is a registered Democrat,” if true, all have
the identical referent of Juan, but the sense or “mode of presentation” show very different aspects
of Juan.
By reading Frege, I build out criterion for how linguistic duplication emerges. If two
signs or names can be proven to refer to the exact same same object in the exact same way (like
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the above Sprachspiel), then they are linguistic duplicates. If it is the case that one could claim
that named languages are existent by lining up enough linguistic duplicates, then things like
“French” and “English” are taken as real entities because they seemingly refer to the same world
of things with different but equivalent linguistic features. However, such grounds seem to only
bear weight when the words of “French” and “English” are true linguistic duplicates. If they do
not refer the same aspect of the same thing in the same way, then all linguistic features are
synonymous with one another in the same “alcohol,” “booze,” and “liquor” are synonymous
within one another in “English.” “Alcohol,” “booze,” and “liquor,” even if they have the same
referent, are not grouped into different languages because the sense in each case is different.
A productive strategy, then, for the translingual paradigm to undermine the reality of
named languages rests on this difference between linguistic duplication and linguistic
approximation, i.e., synonyms. On a translingual account, linguistic approximation is par for the
course: linguistic features have the same referent but their sense, in nearly all cases, is at least
slightly different. On a monolingual account, linguistic duplication is par for the course:
linguistic features have the same referent and the same sense in a good deal of cases.
To come full circle: it would be incumbent that an account like Mcginn’s (2015)—if it is
to maintain that “la neige est blanche” and “the snow is white” come from two different
languages and express an identical meaning—to prove that each sentence here has both the same
referent and sense. Thus, coining the “different word / same thing” thesis above aimed to codify
what seems like a basic intuition regarding languages: the presence of what appear to be
linguistic duplicates are most often explained away by collating the duplicates into two or more
distinct linguistic systems often associated with named languages.
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The big picture is this: if the “different word / same thing” thesis is a clinching criterion
for maintaining that the world is populated by distinct linguistic systems, it thus needs to be
proven that these apparent linguistic systems are more or less sets of linguistic features that are
identical both in possible sense and possible referent inter languages. If this cannot be shown,
then the belief in distinct language systems begins to fall apart. All linguistic features are
converted into webs of synonyms that might very well have the same possible referents, but
possess distinct senses.
However, the opposing horn of this argument could also be readily taken up. Languages,
from being defined by linguistic duplication, are rather defined by the impossibility of linguistic
duplication. In other words, a language is a self-enclosed system that has its own particular form
of picking out the items in the world. “Spanish” has a different way of seeing the world than
“English” does, just as “Mandarin” has a different way of seeing the world than “Arabic” does.
If such “languages” relate to an identical world, then the only facet that can be said to be
different are the senses, the methods of disclosure. this counter-argument, though, does little to
establish the existence of independent linguistic systems. Instead, it corroborates the belief that
without an identical sense and referent, all signs and words that relate to the same thing are
converted into synonyms. “Blanche” is not equal to “white” but synonymous with it. Thus, in the
list: “ivory, egg shell, beige, blanche” there are not three “English” terms and single “French”
one. Instead, there four signs with four senses that might pick out the same referent. Linguistic
features, on a monolingual account, can be translated inter se, and, on a translingual account,
can be approximated inter se. However, this still assumes that linguistic features bespeak a set of
elements that is the common denominator between linguistic features. As I plan to show below
with my discussion regarding language a), neither translation nor approximation is possible when
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one considers the Sprachspiele that subtend linguistic features (Section 3). Language, in this
sense, is, in fact, defined by incommensurability.
2.2.2 Conception
It is important to note that, for Frege, a sign’s sense and its referent are wholly objective.
Frege points out the public nature of a sign’s sense with the tantalizing cryptic remark: “The
sense of a proper name is grasped by everyone who is sufficiently familiar with the language or
totality of designations to which it belongs” (1948, p. 210). A sign’s mode of presentation
discloses its referent in a way that hold for all folk who make correct use of the sign. However,
as outlined above, clearly it is also possible that each individual speaker possesses her own
affective and significant relationship with words: an upper-middle class teenager from an
affluent suburb has a very different relationship with the word “school,” then does a workingclass student from an impoverished neighborhood. Frege accounts for such idiosyncratic
differences by introducing the term “conception.” Whereas as a sign’s sense and its referent are
wholly public, a speaker’s conception of a sign is wholly private; it is how the sign fits into her
conceptual and affective repertoire: “If the referent of a sign is an object perceivable by the
senses, my conception of it is an internal image, arising from the memories of sense impression
which I have had and activities, both internal and external, which I have performed” (1948, p.
212). The Fregean use of “concept” helps illustrate the second point regarding the “variety /
singularity” thesis, outlined in the introduction of this section. Not only might linguistic
duplication not obtain inter language, but it might also not obtain intra language. That is, even if
a word’s sense and referent are public-facing my personal take on signs will always be different
than yours. When the affluent students says “school” she does not “mean” the same thing that
working class student does.
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Thus, in this Fregean picture, a sign is tripartite: sense, referent, and conception. Frege
illustrates this relationship through analogy with observing the moon through a telescope. In this
case, the moon is the referent, the concrete object that exists independent of its observation or
notation in language. The telescope is the sense, because it is an objective mode of presentation
that discloses the referent of the moon under a certain aspect, which can be used by several
different observers. Finally, the conception is the retinal image as it is projected onto the eye of
each individual observer (1948, p. 213). Extrapolating from this example, it would seem that
signs are like two-sided coins. On the public side, there is sense and referent, and on the private
side there is the speaker’s personalized conception of the sign.
2.2.3 Linguistic Expression
Both Frege himself in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” and his commentators seem to pay
little attention between the distinction sign and language or signs and their possible linguistic
expression. However, I contend that it is precisely this distinction that holds the key to
understanding the central translingual claim, that languages (plural) do not exist, but language
(singular) does.
Without keeping this distinction on the front burner, the terms like “word” and “sign”
easily get conflated. However, it would seem that for Frege signs and linguistic expression are
two very different things. The Fregean account of a sign holds that that a sign corresponds to a
definite sense, which, in turn, corresponds to a singular referent. Conversely, a referent can have
any number of signs ( 1948, p. 211). This means that each sign has a singular sense that, in turn,
picks out a singular object in a singular way. There is a one-to-one relationship between sign,
sense, and referent. A sign cannot have two senses, nor can a sense have two referents. However,
a referent can be picked out or disclosed by a perhaps infinite variety of signs. “The Morning
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Star,” “The Evening Star,” “Venus,” “The second planet from the sun,” are all signs whose
unique senses show the same object in a variety of ways. Really, it could be said that sign and
sense are identical with one another: a sign just is its sense, and vice versa, since in Frege’s
system it is impossible that a single sign has multiple senses.
However, a sign is not identical with its linguistic expression. A sign can express but one
sense, but multiple linguistic features can express one sign. Almost in passing, Frege remarks:
“The same sense has different expressions in different languages or even in the same language”
(ibid.). The relationship between a sign and its sense and sense and its referent cannot be
separated out. Again, a sign just is its sense and its sense solely picks out a unique referent.
However, the insoluble package of relations that make up a sign can, in fact, be disambiguated
from its linguistic expression.
This slight distinction provides a good deal of argumentative leverage to the translingual
paradigm. It is important because it isolates and thematizes languages as the expression of signs
and sense, instead of being the systems of signs and senses themselves. It also, in a certain light,
makes language (but not signs and sense) utterly arbitrary. A sense, by necessity, is its sign, but a
sign is not necessarily its linguistic expression. To highlight this idea, take the following three
examples “3+5=8,” “three plus five equals eight,” and “tres más cinco son ocho.” Here, the
same sign with same sense picking out the same logical referent is displayed with three different
sets of linguistic features. Whereas “the morning star,” “the evening star,” “Venus” and “the
second planet from the sun” are different signs for the same referent, these three example
sentences are assorted linguistic packagings for what I take to be the same sign, sense, and
referent. It follows that if this sharp delineation between sense and linguistic expression holds,
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then “language” in a restricted sense of the term is “downgraded” to a type of a delivery system
or some sort of “packaging.”
2.3 Translingualism and Linguistic Expression
In Chapter II, I labored to show that translingual theory a al Otheguy et al. (2015 & 2018)
is ontologically committed to linguistic types and linguistic types alone. To reiterate: in the
Otheguyean et al. picture languages qua self-inclosed linguistic systems just are not there. This
approach to theoretical linguistics does not account for them in their ontological stock of things
and furthermore utterly refuses to quantify over them. This is the bedrock sine qua non
ontological claim of “translanguaging.” It is not that language practitioners contribute to the rules
and conventions of languages (Lu & Horner, 2014); it is rather that at a “psycholinguistic” level
languages literally do not exist. To paraphrase once more what I heard Ofelia García in a
graduate seminar once remark: language exists, but languages do not.
This basic concept of the translingual paradigm, I believe, can be further elucidated by
my above discussion of Frege’s theory of sense of reference and its concomitant separation of a
sign from its linguistic expression. Again, if a single sign can be couched in a variety of
linguistic expressions—3+5=8 can be depicted in “English,” “Spanish”—or with groupings of
apples and pears, like the examples in children’s books—then linguistic expression is also
arbitrary. The word “arbitrary” often has a pejorative ring to it, suggesting something whimsical
or haphazard. However, this is not the intended connotation here. By “arbitrary,” I only claim
that the relationship between a sign and its linguistic expression is not a necessary one. Different
linguistic expressions can be slotted in to represent the same sign, without change in its sense nor
in its referent. I make this point regarding linguistic expression from a theoretical-linguistic
perspective. From a practical-linguistic perspective, the selection of linguistic features is
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anything but arbitrary, and, in fact, composes a fundamental role the the playing of the language
game. I take up this difference in detail in Chapter IV.
To illustrate this point, I turn to a real-life example taken from the writing of one of my
students. Describing daily types of bilingualism, the author writes: “So when I speak to my
parents they say ‘Tu tienes dinero,’ ‘I say si yo tengo five dollars’.” I have only modified the
punctuation here in order to fit conventions of quotations within quotations. All other
orthographical and typographical decisions are those of the student. Notice that there are no
italics here to be found—the author seemingly makes no distinction between the “English” and
“Spanish” words. In fact, the sentence hangs together so smoothly and reads so naturally that I
had to re-read it a few times to figure out where the “Spanish” begins and the “English” ends.
The linguistic expression “Yo tengo five dollars” represents a particular fact about the world in a
particular way, i.e., it has a sense and a referent, which, in turn, can turn out to be true or false.
Such quotidian expressions routinely uttered across the five boroughs show that language qua
linguistic expression does not need to be the expressions of a named language as well in order
for such expressions to mean. If such a linguistic expression can demonstrate successfully an
intended sign with its singular sense and referent, then, clearly, “communication” comes off
without a hitch, no matter how it is linguistically packaged. The clear-cut legibility of this
sentence provides a clue that linguistic expression is underpinned by structures or systems or
schemas that have nothing to do with named languages.
Such a “code-meshed” linguistic expression seems to beg the question as to whether the
sense would change if the proposition were linguistically expressed wholly in “English,” wholly
in “Spanish,” whether it were couched in a different permutation of “English” and “Spanish,” or
whether it were in a different “language” all together (“French,” “Urdu,” Mandarin,” etcetera) or
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if the author simply were to show the five dollars to the parents. I am prepared to accept that the
referent would be identical throughout all of these hypothetical linguistic expressions, but a
think-cramp sets in when I am forced to decide if the sense would change or remain constant
throughout. Jarringly, it seems that both the belief that the sense does not change in such an
example and that the sense does in fact change, even if it does so ever so slightly, seem to carry
weight. What horn of the argument you take up seems here to be a matter of preference.
The example of “yo tengo five dollars,” I believe, once again, illustrates that linguistic
expression is arbitrary—in the non-pejorative sense—if the sense and referent of the sign is made
evident in that linguistic expression. And, again, as quoted above, the Fregean account takes this
as in obvious point: “nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrary producible event or object as
a sign for something” (1948, p. 209). Extrapolating from this idea, it can be said that “language”
in this sense is the set or sets of linguistic features that can be used by speakers to package and
express signs. Thinking of language like this stands in sharp contrast with other common ways of
using the term. We talk about the language of law, the language of medicine, the language of
love, the language particle physics, the language of baseball, and, in doing so, we aim to signify
a particular world of values, rules, concepts, commitments, beliefs, values, teloi, methods, data,
and the like.

If the translingual paradigm is committed to the non-existence of languages or

closed language systems, then it must also be using the term “language” to talk about arbitrary
linguistic expression. Exempting the case of metaphorical talk, it seems obvious that the
concepts internal to language of baseball cannot be translated to the language of law and vice
versa. These “linguistic” systems certainly appear to be closed off (I will discuss this in greater
detail below).
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concept of “translanguaging” is committed to a unitary view language. This view
maintains that from a “psycholinguistic” point of view, all speakers—“monolinguals” or
“bilinguals”—have a single linguistic repertoire that, by no means, is subdivided into distinct
linguistic systems that map onto terms like “English” and “Spanish,” for example (Cf. García &
Li Wei, 2014; Otheguy et al. 2015 & 2018; Gracía & Otheguy, 2015). I take this claim to mean
that a linguistic feature need not have any membership in a linguistic system that is independent
of an individual speaker. The only system of linguistic expression that matters is that which is
constituted by the idiolect of the individual speaker. Juan, for example, does not speak “English”
and “Spanish.” Instead Juan speaks “Juan.” And Sofia speaks “Sofia.” And so on. If the
translingual paradigm wants to hold onto the idiolect as the lynchpin of its theory, it must also
make language arbitrary and at least implicitly demarcate the tripartite of sign-sense-referent
from its linguistic expression. If Juan speaks “Juan” and Sofia speaks “Sofia,” then these
idolectal collations of linguistic features are arbitrary or idiosyncratic. However, there remains a
theoretical elephant in the room: it is unclear if translingual theory’s claim that language qua
“psycholinguistic” entity is ultimately idiolectical and thereby utterly unique to every single
speaker (cf. Otheguy et al., 2015) is also committed to the belief that such idiosyncratic
collations of linguistic are tied to a collection of common and public signs and significations and
designations or if each individual speaker also has her own utterly unique stock of signs (with
their own senses and referents) as well. Below I will argue that the translingual paradigm is
theoretically coherent if and only if it takes language as the idiosyncratic linguistic expression of
sets of signs that are largely independent of individual speakers.
3 Language a)
3.1 Preliminary Questions
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In section 2 of this chapter, I intended to show through my reading of Frege’s theory of
sense and reference that language in at least one sense is an arbitrary system of expression that
“packages” signs. Signs, on the other hand, have an isomorphic relationship with their sense and
referent. Although referents can be referred to by multiple senses—multiple methods of
disclosure—every sense has but one sign and every sign but one sense. I claim this as the
unwritten yet basic premise of the translingual paradigm, if this approach to linguistics is to
maintain the idiolect as its conceptual centerpiece.
However, it seems like the translingual slogan: “languages does not exist (as at a purely
“linguistic” or at a “psycholinguistic” level)” provokes lots of knee-jerk reactions and criticisms.
I take this to be the case because, seemingly, one of the most handy uses of the term “language”
is precisely to signify closed-off and independent conceptual systems. While I defined
“language” in section 2 in a sense strictly limited to linguistic duplication and linguistic
arbitrariness, the goal of section 3 is to define language in a sense strictly limited to
incommensurability. Languages, in this sense and this sense alone, are in fact closed off
conceptual systems, something like a Kuhnian paradigm (1962), which, by definition, would not
allow for translation inter “languages.” In section 3, I relied heavily on Frege’s philosophy of
language. I once again turn to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in order illustrate how language
and languages could be defined in a sense strictly limited to incommensurability.
3.2 Games and Incommensurability
Both chess and checkers are played on the same game board: sixty-four squares with
alternating colors in each column and row. It goes without saying, however, that chess and
checkers are different games. In fact, not only are they different games, they are also
incommensurable with one another. Each respective game has its respective rules, goals, pieces,

101!
strategies, values, moves, objectives, possibilities, and so on. Both fall under the umbrella
heading, “boardgame,” but beyond this common denominator the games are worlds apart. Thus,
one might be tempted to say that chess and checkers are two different languages as well. This
possible claim is founded in the intuition that languages are logical totalities within which the
entities and concepts are wholly defined by internal relationships, interior to the language itself.
This picture of language stands in sharp contrast with the picture of language demanded by the
translingual paradigm that I sketched out in section 2, in which linguistic features circulate rather
freely among speakers as they continually incorporate them into idiosyncratic linguistic
repertoires.
Whereas languages qua incommensurability are defined by internal relationships, it
would seem, then, that languages in the section 2 are thus defined by external relationships. Both
of these senses prima facie look justifiable: language, on the one hand, feels like a closed-off
logical system independent of other closed-off logical systems, and it also is empirically evident
that speakers mix and match features which are putatively members of “different” languages, on
the other. If both senses carry weight, then it is imperative to theorize how these sets of internal
external relationships work together within the generalized entity that is often taken as
“language.”
The prior paragraph relied heavily on the distinction between internal and external
relations. The distinction that I want to make between these two senses of language hinges on
these two classes of relationships. Therefore, I pause here to illustrate them more clearly.
Internal relationships are a type of relations wherein the relata of the relationships are wholly
defined by these relationships. Conversely, external relations a type of relations that do not
wholly define the relata that these relations relate: “A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that
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its terms should not possess it, and it is external otherwise” (Mácha, p.i, 2015). A billiard ball,
for example, might be said to be simultaneously involved in both webs of internal and external
relationships. The very existence of the 9 ball as a spherical object with a certain shape and
weight, painted and with two yellow stripes and the number 9 stamped on it, only is due to the
fact that such physical parameters are inscribed in the rules of billiards. The 9 ball is its size and
weight and color due to the place it holds with the internal relations generated by the constitutive
rules of the game. In this aspect of its being, a 9 ball is wholly defined by relations internal to the
rules of billiards. Hypothetically, one could use a 9 ball as a paperweight or a projectile, but then
it would not “be” a 9 ball anymore.
Conversely, the spatial relations that obtain between billiard balls during any given
billiard game are accidental. A 9 ball continually changes its spatial relations with other billiard
balls during any given game, but it cannot be a 9 ball outside of the game of billiards. Hence, it
might be said that the spatial relations between billiard balls in a particular game are external.
The proposition “The 9 ball is 15 centimeters from the cue ball” bespeaks a relation between
these two entities, but is clearly not essential to either of these entities that this relation always be
the case. Hence, the above proposition express an external relation. Alternatively, the proposition
“All billiard balls have a diameter of 57.2 mm and weigh between 160-170g” expresses an
internal relation, since these properties of a billiard ball only obtain by virtue of how the billiard
ball is necessarily related with other essential game equipment (billiard tables, cues, racks,
etcetera) and the constitutive rules of the game (Cf. Delanda, 2006).
This distinction looks crucial for the ontological question that the translingual turn plants
in linguistics: Is a linguistic feature internally related to a language—a linguistic system of a
named language like “French” or “Arabic” or “Mandarin”—or are linguistic features by and
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large stable and independent entities that are externally related in a highly contingent fashion?
Clearly, a linguist who finds herself committed to the belief that named languages have no
“pyscholingualisic” reality, by the same hand, finds herself committed to belief that language in
general is composed of self-sufficient linguistic features that are externally related to other selfsufficient linguistic features.
However, this translingual belief runs afoul of one of the basic intuitions regarding the
uses of the term “language,” namely to represent systems of internal relations that define
completely the relata within these systems. This apparent tension can be resolved by making a
sharp semantic delineation between these two institutions of language. Language b), as I outlined
in section 2, is the arbitrary linguistic packaging of different possible signs. Language a) , as I
outline here in section 3, is the underlying system or scheme by virtue of which signs show up as
meaningful. The conclusion that I ultimately want to draw is that language in this first sense uses
stabilized linguistic features externally related to one another in order to represent or disclose the
meaningful elements internally related to one another in systems or schemas that are often offthe-cuff called “languages.” To illustrate this dialectic between the internal relationship of
Sprachspiele and the external relations of linguistic features, I return to the example of chess and
checkers.
In chess, a knight moves in a “L.” And, in a certain light, the proposition “In chess, a
knight moves in a “L” shape” is tautological, since a chess piece just is the role it plays in the
game of chess. A knight, like a billiard ball, is what it is entirely in virtue of the place it holds
within the web of internal relationships that make up the game of chess. To state the obvious: a
knight is not a bishop. Nor is it a pawn nor a rook nor a king nor a queen. The very instant that a
knight moves on a diagonal or on a straight line, it ceases to be a knight. And this goes for all the
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chess pieces and rules of the chess game. You cannot checkmate a queen. Nor can you castle
through check. All the pieces and all the plays are precisely what they are by virtue of the
internal relations that obtain within the game. A chess piece, in a certain sense, is ‘locked in” to
its definition.
However, even if a knight can never cease to move in a “L” and still be a knight, an
infinite variety of material and immaterial things can be used to depict the chess knight. Imagine,
for instance, that two players sit down for a game to realize that the white night has gone
missing. One of the players rummages in her pocket and pulls out a penny, places it on the board,
and baptizes it with the statement: “This is now the white night!” The game comes off without a
hitch: whether the white knight is represented by an actual chess piece of a penny is arbitrary.
However, what is precisely not arbitrary is that the penny that replaced the white knight still
moves in an “L” shape.
Chess can be played with all different types of pieces. In a pinch, one could rip up a
sheet of paper into 32 pieces and write the name of the pieces and their color on the shreds of
paper. Chess can be played on a computer digitally represented by binary code or it can be
played on a lawn with life sized pieces. In cases of desperation and ingenuity, chess can be
played with an adhoc mixture of sundry goods found around the house: bottle caps, playing
cards, cutlery, nails and bolts. It would seem that the only criterion for what can count as a chess
piece under the right circumstance is that i) sufficient structural differentiation obtains between
the pieces so that they can depict or stand in for the different pieces; and ii) that the parties of
game agree, tacitly or explicity, the conventions of the of the linguistic expression.
Linguistic expression can depict the anterior system of significance or schema of the
game, if and only if the structural differentiation that obtains between the linguistic features is
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sufficient enough to distinguish the meaning elements in the underlying system or schema. For
instance, I can imagine playing chess with a motley admixture of all sorts of different elements
that are not standardized chess pieces, but I cannot imagine playing chess with with an
unmodified set of checker pieces. This is because the checker pieces do not possess sufficient
structural differentiation inter se in order to depict the different roles that chess pieces play.
Hypothetically, chess players could play chess with checker pieces but it would require such a
feat of memory that it would essentially be a game of blindfold chess, and thus the checker
pieces would not truly be performing the linguistic work. Conversely, I can easily imagine
playing a game of checkers with chess pieces. This is because chess pieces qua simple game
pieces possesses sufficient structural differentiation inter se to depict the different roles that
checker pieces play.
These claims to a certain extent limit and justify the arbitrariness of “language” as
described in section 2. The hypothetical set of linguistic features that could hypothetically slot in
in order to depict the meaningful elements of an anterior system or schema of significance—like
chess or checkers—is circumscribed by the requisite structural differentiation necessary to
represent these meaningful elements. However, any linguistic feature is a candidate to be
included in this hypothetical set, if it satisfies the criteria set out in advance by the requisite
structural differentiation mandated by the system or schema. The hypothetical external
relationships that might obtain between linguistic elements in order to generate meaningful
linguistic expressions regarding certain anterior systems or schema of significance are
necessarily limited and justified by the internal relations generated by the constitutive rules of
those selfsame systems or schema.
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If this is the case, then the argument begins to take shape that a “translanguaging”
approach to theoretical linguistics qua the study of lexical and structural features (Otheguy et al.
2015 & 2018) is not the study of the internal relationships and the meaningful elements that are
the relata of these relationships contained in a system or schema, but rather it is the study of
structural differentiation of the external relationships that must needs obtain between linguistic
features of linguistic expression in order that said features can efficiently and successfully depict
the meaningful elements of the underlying system or schema. This premise, I believe, provides a
sharpened polemical ax to cut through the entrenched belief in named languages qua closed-off
and independent linguistic systems: The belief that “French” funds the significant content of the
linguistic feature “niege” is analogous to the belief that chess pieces gain their significance by
virtue of the carvings and colors that relate together the material pieces instead of their depiction
or representation of the roles and rules of the game of chess for which they stand.
Thinking through the possibilities of linguistic translation helps illustrate the distinctions
that I hope to sketch out above. “Languages,” it would seem, are only translatable inter se the
level of the arbitrary linguistic expression, and not at the level of incommensurable anterior
schemas or systems of significance. The respective rules of chess and the rules of checkers
enable respective types of gameplay and strategies. Not only can a player not play the Queen’s
Gambit in checkers, nor can a player “king” a piece upon reaching the back file in a game of
chess, such “translations” are literally nonsensical. To speak of the Queen’s Gambit beyond
metaphorical depiction within the system or schema of checkers is akin to speaking of a square
circle. It is at this level of paradigmatic incommensurability where translation is not merely
difficult but impossible. It could be said that only within these respective anterior systems or
schemas of signification is translation possible: chess theory, for instance, can be translated to
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“French,” “Spanish,” “German,” “Arabic,” and so on, but chess theory cannot be translated to
the theory of checkers. To illustrate this point with a different example: the philosophical works
of Descartes can be translated into any given “language” but Descartes cannot be “translated”
into Spinoza. Just as much as Spinoza can be “translated” to any “language” but cannot be
translated into Descartes. Jurisprudence cannot be translated into ornithology. Entomology
cannot be translated into the philosophy of language.
“Translation” at the level of arbitrary linguistic expression is thought to be possible
because language as such picks out or refers to a common world inter languages. As I hoped to
argue in detail above, it might very well be the case that in “natural languages” linguistic
duplication never really occurs. Thus, translation, in this sense is always a process of
interchanging approximate synonyms in lieu of re-coding the exact same sign within an
alternative linguistic packaging. Again, even if all named languages, say, are collapsed into webs
upon webs of approximate synonyms--signs whose senses discloses referents in ways just
slightly differently--these signs still, putatively, refer to the same things. However, language, in
this section 3 sense, does not mark out different sense for the same things. Instead, language here
picks out different entities all together. Propositions regarding chess refer to a different world of
entities than propositions regarding checkers do. The proposition “Bishops are worth more than
pawns” picks out entities that simply do not exist in checkers (and, it would seem, could never
exist). Thus, a general thesis begins to cohere: “translation,” it would appear, is possible between
signs with approximate sense for the same entities. However, “translation,” it would appear, is
impossible between propositions that pick out wholly different entities. “Translation” is always
expressive, never ontological.
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I take incommensurability to also be one of the defining properties of Sprachspiele, albeit
that the incommensurability that obtains between respective Sprachspiele comes about in ways
much less clear-cut than the above examples of chess and checkers and various scientific
paradigms.
Imagine, for example, that at a dinner party I lean over to you and whisper in a hushed
voice: “Did you know that the French Revolution began in 1789?” While I might have
successfully stated a fact unknown to you, but what I have not successfully done is spread a
rumor. Fact-stating and rumor-spreading are, by and large, Sprachspiele that are
incommensurable with one another. The “logics” of each game are of such kind that the pieces
and moves and strategies within each game cannot be “translated” to other. However, much like
the examples above, I can state facts in in any of named national languages or possible admixture
of linguistic features that cohere with the “rules” of fact-stating and rumor-spreading.
Sprachspiele, thus, are the requisite backdrop against which arregrates of linguistic
features gain their significance. This claim, I believe, sharply rebukes approaches to theoretical
linguistics that maps linguistic features onto to the closed logical systems of named languages. It
is indeed the case that “language” in the section 2 sense coheres within system or schema in
order to be meaningful. But these systems are not what are commonly associated with words like
“French,” “English,” and “Spanish.” Instead, it is the anterior systems or schemas of significance
of highly variegated and heterogeneous Sprachspiele that allow for linguistic features to signify
and not name languages.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I aimed to disambiguate the term language into two different senses.
Language b) is the largely arbitrary linguistic expression or “packaging” that represents or
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depicts the meaningful elements of the systems or schemas of language a). Language a), on the
other hand, are closed off Sprachspiele that, although they might bear a structural resemblance
to other Sprachspiele, are incommensurable inter se. In this endeavor, I sought to show that
language b) is composed of stabilized linguistics features that are connected with one another
through external relationships. Like the examples of different chess pieces, given the right
circumstances, any linguistic feature can be slotted into to represent a meaningful element of the
underlying Sprachspiel.
Conversely, the webs Sprachspiele that make up language a) are composed of internal
relationships. The moves, strategies, plays, pieces, outcomes, objectives, and the like are wholly
defined by relations internal to these respective games. I concluded that language a) and b) work
together dialectically to make up what is often just called “language,” though might be thought
of as a derivative relationship: language in sense a) sets the parameters for what linguistic
features of language b) can be used to represent the meaning elements of language a). Language
b) must demonstrate enough structural differentiation so that it can efficiently represent or depict
the structural differentiation that occurs between the meaningful elements in language a). Hence,
language b) is not wholly arbitrary, since expressive linguistic features are delimited in advance
by the “logical” parameters of underlying Sprachspiel.
This account of language that I have offered in this chapter suffers on two counts: i) at
points it is painfully realist: in my discussion of Frege, I talk as if the only Sprachspiel that is
ever played is the statement-making game; and ii) very much in light with possible critiques of
later Wittgenstein and Speech Act Theory in general, my discussion of the incommensurability
of Sprachspiele often imputes a fixity to Sprachspiele that denies both agency within the game
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itself and diachronic revision of Sprachspiele through successive iteration. In Chapter IV, I hope
to address both this possible critiques by picking up once again Chapter I’s emphasis on rhetoric.
To claim that Sprachspiele are incommensurable inter se and that linguistic expression is by and
large arbitrary sketches out a bland picture: it leaves little room for questions of performance,
temporality, power, and ludic alteration. “Translingual” or “code-meshed” sentences like the
student example cited above point to the possibility that the intelligibility of language has
nothing to do with named languages. Going forward, the goal of this project is to investigate
further what funds intelligible linguistic expression, once named national languages are fully
bracketed out of the picture. Chapter IV will wager that rhetoric, as defined in chapters I & II, is
what funds language, and not vice versa. Thus, in the following chapter, by using claims offered
here in Chapter III, I intend to show the Sprachspiel of language a) come before, so to speak, the
linguistic expression of language b). Thus, it will turn out that Sprachspiele are, perhaps
paradoxically, pre-linguistic. And this property is what funds the intelligibility of linguistic
expression.
!
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Chapter IV: Rules Rhetoric Language
1 Introduction
Chapter III presented a static picture of language. Whatever victories that this chapter
won for the translingual approach to theoretical linguistics came at a cost: in order to show that
linguistic systems qua named languages do not generate linguistic meaning, I postulated a web of
Sprachspiele, which, although they might demonstrate family resemblances inter se, are, at rock
bottom, incommensurable inter se.
The aim here was to account for intuition that language qua linguistic expression must
signify in light of something. In other words, if the “Spanish” sentence “Está lloviendo” does not
“mean” by virtue of its adherence to the rules and conventions of “Spanish,” then in must
“mean” by virtue of its ability to represent a particular move in a particular game, for example
the Sprachspiel of weather-talk that I described in Chapter I. In other words, “languages” do in
fact exist, but they exist as the meaning-giving social rituals and contexts in which they occur,
not as the putative entities that are picked out by titles of named national languages. At the risk
of sounding overly generic, hierarchies of different context are the ultimate background against
which speech is made intelligible.
Linguistic performance gains significant traction not by being the product of a putative
linguistic system such as “Spanish” or “English” or what have you, but rather linguistic
significance--at rock bottom--is the outcome of the legal plays of the social game. Those who
know how to play weather-talk or conduct marriage ceremonies or make a promise or place a bet
can be taught what words of a “different language” signify because such words map onto a
game already understood: in the same that the way that the chess players of Chapter III can
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substitute certain pieces for others—buttons, trinkets , bottle caps for knights, pawns, and
rooks—because they already know the rules of the chess game. This, of course, is not to say that
one cannot learn new language-games to the same extent that one can learn how to use new
linguistic pieces to play the ones they already know. However, it is to say, like the examples
given in the last chapter, that, whereas one can mix linguistic features inter-games to play and
describe different Sprachspiele, the conventionalized games themselves are incommensurate
with one another. A chess player can describe a successful gambit as “homerun,” but she could
never really hit a home run in chess. A baseball manager might play a “gambit,” when she puts
in a left-handed reliever in the top of the 7th, but this is not, in fact, a chess gambit.
Such rule talk of games, however, without qualification, runs the risk of marking rules
with the privileged ontological status that named languages once occupied: instead of the
synchronic grammar of named languages funding the meaning of legible utterances, it is now the
synchronic rules of Sprachspiele that power them. It seems like my argument in Chapter III
merely exchanged the fixed systems of named languages for the fixed systems of Sprachspiele,
installing language-in-context as the ultimate arbiter of meaning instead of linguistics.
Hence, the goal of Chapter IV is to revisit my findings in Chapter I regarding rhetoric as
a method in order to understand the rules of the game in ways that does not off-load them into a
decontextualized and static ontological realm. While in Chapter I focused heavily on the study of
speech acts in the analytical tradition ( Austin, 1962; Searle 1969, 1979), in Chapter IV I will
take up a more “continental” approach to speech acts (Bourdieu, 1990; Butler, 1997; Taylor,
1993; Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1993). This move can be generally described as a paradigm shift
from a static structural approach to understanding language towards a contextual and
performative lens.
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The goal here is to locate the rules of speech acts within the same temporal plane as the
act itself (Cf. my discussion of Butler in Chapter II). By doing this, two claims will be advanced:
i) that the constitutive rules of speech acts cannot be completely represented verbally: the players
of Sprachspiele, more or less, just have a “feel” for the game—like a skilled driver who shifts
gears and works the clutch without much to do about it--which has been internalized by an
existential pedagogy of the “rules”; and that ii) rules, once temporalized to the same plane as the
act instead, are subject to rapid-fire aleatory change and active agentive contestation.
Claim i) leads to a rather paradoxical ancillary claim: if the constitutive rules of
Sprachspiele are the background in light of which possible linguistic practices makes sense, and
if such rules cannot be cashed out as explicit representations—imagine IKEA-like instructions
for telling a tactful joke!—then, it would seem, that the basis of linguistic expression and
practice becomes pre-linguistic after a certain level of acculturation. What can be said is based
on what cannot be said.
On the other hand, the temporalization of rules that claim ii) represents is requisite for
understanding the role that agency plays in such rules. Prima facie, “Agency” feels like a loaded
term: within the modern epoch it feels unsalvageably burdened down with methodological
individualism. Without maximal qualification, “agency” shows up as the amalgam of choices
made by an independent actor in reaction to the imposition of societal norms. However, below, I
offer a detailed reading of Butler’s (1997) Speech Act Theory as a polemical rebuke of
unsituated agency. The rules of the game, for Butler, are the necessary grounds for the realization
of agency instead of being its antithesis.
Chapters II & III aimed at developing what I again take as the bedrock sine qua non
claim of the translingual turn: the non-existence of named languages. However, following hard
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upon this are the claims that the “translanguaging” and “translingualism” seek to make about
agency (cf. Lu & Horner 2013 & 2016). The lines of thought united under these coats of arms
share the common goal of understanding the speaker as an equal member of the pas de deux
which makes up the dialectic between rules and realization, convention and change. These
arguments for agency ultimately pay off in the study of education and the practical application of
pedagogy (cf. Chapter V). Clearly, how speakers are granted agency in light of conventions and
how conventions are seen in light of agency will ultimately determine what it means to teach
someone about language and literacy.
In working through the lines of inquiry embedded in speaker agency, I will, once again,
lean heavily on the definition of rhetoric that I developed in Chapter I and refined in Chapter II.
Specifically, in Chapter I, I was at pains to show that rhetoric is the realization of a conventional
speech act for the purpose of realizing unconventional ends. However, as I discussed Chapter II,
such a definition depends on a sharp demarcation between the conventional and the
unconventional. Below, I develop this line of thought in greater detail in relationship to my
discussion of agency.
Finally in this chapter, I hope to justify the title of this project, Translingual Rhetoric, by
illustrating how rhetoric is the foundation of translingual practices. Rhetoric’s “transcendental”
nature (cf. Chapter I) of pushing forward towards unrealized goals in light of present affordances
built out from past practices captures the essential aspect of what it means to translanguage.
Rhetorical temporality, I argue, best represents the “trans” prefix of “translanguaging,” in the
sense of pushing across or moving beyond or crossing through. In this way, I depart markedly
from Otheguy et al.’s (2015) definition of “translanguaging” as the uninhibited use of a speaker’s
idiolect without mindful adherence to established political, ideological, and social norms.
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2 Linguistic Practice and Pre-linguistic Foundations
In the opening of this chapter, I allowed myself to sloganize, writing: what can be said is
based in what cannot be said. This slogan is meant to be polemical. It has targeted in its sights
the analytical strand of SAT and its two most notable protagonists, Austin (1962) and Searle
(1969). The analytical interpretation of Sprachspiele (as noted in chapter I) aims to explicate the
rules of the game into codifered and repeatable procedures. For philosophers in this tradition, the
rules of linguistic practice are themselves, in a certain sense, linguistic, in so far that one could
map out thematically the rules of the game. Let’s take chess once again as a paradigm example in
order to explain this. In chess—and really any other board game—all the rules can be made
explicit. That is, I can easily tell you about the rules in language: “the knight moves in an ‘L’
shape” “pawns move vertically can but only take on the diagonal,” etcetera. But not only this:
what makes good chess is wholly amenable to language. I can talk in toto about the Queen’s
Gambit and the Sicilian Defense; I can argue you with about the pro’s and con’s of
hypermodernism; I can explain to a beginner why moving the rook’s pawn as an opening is
foolish. It is precisely this “linguistic” amenability or set of non-negotiable rules of chess that
makes computers so good at it: everything related to this game can be expressed and cataloged as
propositions that represent logical states-of-affairs, sets of options, and forms of algorithmic
processing. In fact, computers are so good at playing chess that human players—including the
world’s top grandmasters—do not stand the slightest chance against computer “players”
nowadays, to the point where the top chess programs only play once against one another in
computer only leagues (cf. Baraniuk, 2015).
Everything about chess is effable. Chess can be said. If chess were not utterly effable,
then, it could be assumed that at some point the world’s most advanced chess players would still
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have a competitive edge over computers. Yet, as a counter-example, consider that even if
intelligent robots are quickly replacing human cooks in restaurants throughout the world (Cf.
Oppenheimer, 2019), it is still difficult to imagine a robot excelling as a word-class French chef.
Being an expert cook requires an intuition for what a “dash” of salt is and a sixth-sense for just
how hot a copper-based pan needs to be: that visceral feel for an activity that experts build up
over time through successive engagements with the activity. This type of knowledge-how has
been shown to be extremely difficult to express in the types of representational linguistic codes
that computers process (Cf. Dreyfus, 1992).
With this distinction in sight, the rules of chess plus the theory internal to it are very
easily laid out as language in a more traditional sense of term wherein language is a
representational means to picture logical states-of-affairs (Cf. my discussion of early
Wittgenstein in Chapter I). Chess, thus, serves well as a paradigm case of a game. Thinking
through this game with its linguistic-propositional clarity shining forth provides a method to
think through the relations between rules, moves, pieces, strategies, values, goals, objectives, and
the like. It is precisely these properties of games--and precisely not their connotation of frivolity
or triviality (Cf. Chapter I)—that make the concept of game so useful for theorizing speech acts.
Games have “legal” and “illegal” moves in the same way that a speaker can make a
conventionalized promise in the future tense but not in the past tense. However, a paradigmatic
example like chess can turn out to be a bright red herring. It misleads speech act theorists to
postulate that due to the game like nature of speech acts all the “rules” of speech acts are ipso
facto amenable to propositional representation (Cf. Searle’s [1969] charts of promise-making).
The qualifications I want to make here rely on the difference between knowledge-that
and knowledge-how (cf. Ryle [2009]; Chapter I). Everything about chess is a species of
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knowledge-that instead of a knowledge-how. I take this to be the case, since even the oddsounding locution “I know how to move the knight” reduces in toto in the locution “I know that
the knight moves in a ‘L’ shape.” Such knowledge is ultimately propositional since it can be
expressed in declarative sentences, which, in turn, a la my claims in Chapter III, could be
couched in any number of a variety of linguistic features. The propositional knowledge of chess
can be spoken about aloud, written down with pencil and paper, or coded digitally: the
propositional knowledge is the same throughout. What changes in these cases is the linguistic
packaging.
However, there are lots of games and game-like activities that do not have the potential to
be cashed out without remainder as strings of propositions expressed by declarative sentences.
These types of games look more like a species of knowledge-how. For example, the basic steps
of kicking a soccer ball, at least, can be readily expressed propositionally and couched
linguistically in a variety of ways: instructions from a teacher, printed visual diagrams, animated
computer graphics, etcetera. However, clearly such propositions cannot capture in toto what it is
to play the game of soccer beyond its basic features. In this sense, skilled soccer players possess
a knowledge-how. That is, they have a knack, a“feel” for the game, an intuitive understanding,
what in Aristotelian terms would be called phronesis (φρόνησις).
In this picture I am sketching, past a very preliminary stage, soccer players cannot talk
about what they are doing. Soccer-playing as an activity—from wide-angle lens what I would
call a “game”—is pretty much pre-linguistic, since its play runs on circuits that circumvent
thematic representation. Of course, one could talk about the “corporeal language of movement,”
“muscle-memory,” “incorporated knowledge” or the like, metaphorically locating the game of
soccer within language-talk. However, within my definition of terms, this would refer to
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“language” of the game--those systems of activity and social rituals that are incommensurate
inter se—and not the “language” of linguistic expression (cf. my discussion of language b) and
language a) in Chapter III). As a side note, however, it strikes me as unnecessary to label any
structured activity a “language,” just because said activity exhibits rules and patterns like “a
language” does. Part of the systematic confusion often packed into methodologies of linguistic
study is due the fact that these two senses of language are often not adequately disambiguated. A
language, in one sense, is the background paradigm against which significances first come upon
the scene. Language, in a different sense, are the signs that serve to represent those significances.
The game of soccer is language in the first sense, but it is—on my account—decidedly not
language in the second sense: that which is significant in the game of soccer cannot be
represented without ultimately distorting its basic structures.
Once again, the game analogy embedded in the term Sprachspiel intends to show that
linguistic utterances and actions are “woven together” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §7) and that
“speaking a language is part of activity, or of a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §23). The
question, though, remains as to whether such activities and forms of life that make up the fabric
of Sprachspiele are examples of knowledge-that, like chess, or examples of knowledge-how, like
playing soccer
.
If it is believed that Sprachspiele are of a piece with games like chess, then linguistic
practice is also linguistic in and of itself, since the game runs on tracks amenable to propositional
representation and linguistic packaging. What we do with words, it would turn out, can be talked
about with words, what is often referred to as meta-linguistic explication. Language itself would,
then, be meta-linguistic all the way down. However, if it is believed that Sprachspiele are of a
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piece with games like playing soccer, then linguistic practice is pre-linguistic, to a large degree,
since the game does not run on tracks amenable to propositional knowledge and linguistic
packaging. What we do with words, it would turn, cannot be really talked about with words.
Language itself would, then, not be meta-linguistic all the way down. I take this second
possibility to be perhaps the essential insight of the Philosophical Investigations. I also take it as
the premise from which much more “continental”-minded thinkers ( Bourdieu, 1982; Butler,
1997) will construct their own theories of the speech act, to be discussed below. Of course, in
some sense rules can always be explicated. Grammars for learning a “language,” for example,
show how linguistic utterances could be mapped out as generative rules. However, it is one thing
to map language as structure post hoc and it is quite another thing to postulate that the rules are
there in medias res “with” the speaker in the act.
2.2 How to Follow a Rule
In elucidating speech acts in chapter I, I spent a lot of time puzzling over toy cases:
marriage ceremonies, ship-christenings, bet-makings, and the like. Such Sprachspiele, much like
chess, are paradigm examples: the “rules” of the game can be, more or less, talked about. A la
Austin (1962) these cases also demonstrate that language is not composed of representations of
logical propositions all the way down. What is called language is not just an elaborate manner of
pointing at things, like the Augustinian account of language that Wittgenstein rehearses in the
opening pages of the Philosophical Investigations (§1). Such clearly performative statements like
“I do!” in a marriage ceremony have no no truth value, viz., they cannot be true nor false,
because they do not refer to or pick out a state-of-affairs. Rather a performative like “I do!” caps
off a particular social ritual. Instead of representing a particular part of the world in a particular
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way--like Frege’s theory of sense and reference discussed in Chapter III section 2--such
performatives complete a move in a game.
The payoff here is to show that the performative seriously undermines the assumption
that language tout court is an array of propositions that depict states-of-affairs. Speech Act
Theory’s granular attention to and description of performatives functions as a methodology to
show that there are vast stretches of linguistic terrain in which language is performative and
ritualistic instead of propositional and declarative. I reiterate this difference because the above
claim that language is largely pre-linguistic only makes sense against the assumption that
language is ex vi termini--by the force of the term itself--propositional and declarative. Said
another way: my claim herein on probation can only be coherently developed against the
contrastive claim that maintains that language is by definition the storehouse of knowledge-that,
i.e., propositional knowledge.
I am claiming that language is by and large pre-linguistic because actors’ ability to
explain the games they play with it is rather shockingly limited. In the Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein illustrates this point with his discussion of “following the rules.” By
offering endless counter-examples, Wittgenstein intends to show that the rules of the game can
never be locked down in an ironclad, decontextualized fashion. For example, I can teach you the
rules of a number-adding game by which I show you a series of of numbers: “0, 2, 4, 6, 8” and
tell you to go on. You continue “10, 12, 14, 16” and I think to myself: “Ah! This person has
grasped the rules of the number-adding game!” But then much to my dismay, once you reach
1,000 you continue with “1,004, 1008, 1,0012.” Dumbfounded, I ask: “But didn’t you
understand the rule?” and you tell me: “Sure! I took the sample series that you gave as depicting
the rule to ‘add 2 up to 1,000, 4 up to 2,000, 6 up to 3,000 and so on.’” ( Wittgenstein, 1953,
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§185). My wires are crossed. I am confounded. But I also have no way to prove that you
followed the wrong rule. And, by the same hand, you had no way of knowing-that the rule that I
“taught” upon which you thought to have had a firm grip was not the right one.
Taylor (1993) explains Wittgenstein’s point here as such: “If in order to understand
directions or to know how to follow a rule, we have to know that all these deviant readings are
deviant, and if this means that we have to have formulated thoughts to this effect already, then
we need an infinite number of thoughts in our heads to follow even the simplest instructions“ (p.
46). Every rule is subject to an infinite number of mis-interpretations. It seems like it cannot
really be explained how one knows to follow an arrow in a road-sign from its feather to its tip
and not its tip to is feather (Wittgenstein, 1953, §85) or how one knows that when someone
points to something one should follow the direction from wrist to fingertip and not fingertip to
wrist (Wittgenstein, 1953, §185). If the only way I guard against such strange ways of following
the rules is by knowing-that everything single misapplication of the rule is, in fact, a
misapplication, i.e., by keeping them “stored” in my mind linguistically as propositional
knowledge, then I would have to know—and be able to say!—all possible misapplications in
advance. And this is clearly absurd. But the fact remains that do folk do follow successfully
pretty much each and every time.
In following the arrow from feather to tip on hiking trail and I go left instead of right.
When you point out a red cardinal perched on a tree branch “over yonder” my eyes trace your
hand from wrist to fingertip. From this perspective, it would follow that if rule-following is not a
matter of knowledge-that, it must then be a matter of knowledge-how. It would also follow that if
for every rule that exists an infinite number of possible misapplications, then rules cannot be
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wholly expressed linguistically, since this would entail enumerating the infinite number of
possible misapplications.
For the later Wittgenstein, following a rule is embedded in an intuitive cultural
understanding that lends intelligibility to social ritual and practice: “Is what we call ‘obeying a
rule’ something that it would be possible for only one man [sic] to do, and to do only once in his
[sic] life?—this is of course a note on the grammar of the expression ‘to obey a rule’”
(Wittgenstein, 1953, §199). Instead of universal metaphysical function applied to a local
circumstance, a rule is a social practice intuitively understood by those who have been
acculturated into the game. In this sense, the performative “I do!” in a marriage ceremony does
not so much express a proposition that shows knowledge about a state-of-affairs in the world as
it expresses the participant’s understanding of what it means to play a particular role in a
particular ceremony. And, as the Wittgensteinian account of rules makes clear, such
understanding in the key of knowledge-how cannot fully reduce to the key of knowledge-that
without also introducing a vicious epistemic regress. It is as if an interpretation of a rule “hangs
in the air along with what it interprets” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §198). The rules of the game cannot
be grounded in anything outside of the game itself.
2.3 The Habitus
What is off-the-cuff taken as language is deeply rooted within the Sprachspiele wherein
language is found. Within a maximal reading of the later Wittgenstein there is no language
without a game that underpins it. A speaker can learn new linguistic features, only if she is
already well-versed in the moves of the game for which the linguistic feature stands. An
explanation of a word’s meaning tells a speaker its use “because, as if we might say, the place for
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it was already prepared” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §31). One’s mastery of language presupposes
one’s mastery of Sprachspiele.
If, for example, a hypothetical researcher is parachuted into a hypothetical culture, in
order to to learn the hypothetical language, she must first learn the “language” of the
Sprachspiele. What such a researcher “has to witness in order to figure out the words of an
unknown language are the language-games in which the speakers of the language and through
which their basic language-world relations are revealed because that is wherein they consist”
(Hintikka & Hintikka, 2007, p. 34). To speak a language not only means to have an idolectical
stock of structural and lexical features. It also means becoming a skilled player in the language
game—that intuitive touch that allows speakers to rumor, threaten, promise, report, scam, warn,
bet, exclaim, insinuate, predict, and the like. As the above section sought to clarify, the rules of
Sprachspiele qua culturally bounded activities are off a different sort the rules of language qua
structural and lexical features. Language in the second sense can be well ordered as propositional
knowledge. Language in the first sense cannot. However, Sprachspiele are to a large degree
marked by their regularity and durability: the same games get played over and over and over
again without a hitch. As a hermeneutic for understanding this aspect of Sprachspiele, I move to
Bourdieu’s theory of language (1982) and his concept of habitus (1990).
In much of his writing on language, Bourdieu puts pressure on the Chomskyan
linguistics. Bourdieu argues that the most striking feature of linguistic practice is not the ability
of speakers to produce an infinite number of grammatical sentences, but rather their ability to
produce a single utterance precisely fitting to the social situation at hand. As Thompson
describes in his introduction to Bourdieu’s theory of language, “The kind of competence that
actual speakers possess is not a capacity to generate an infinite sequence of grammatically well-
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formed sentences, but rather a capacity to produce expressions which are appropriate for
particular situations, that is, the capacity to produce expressions à propos” (Bourdieu, 1991, p.
7). Unlike Chomsky who focuses on the possibilities of linguistic invention Bourdieu, thus,
focuses on the kairotic nature of linguistic practice: that speakers so often seem to “know” the
right thing to same at the right time to the right person.
The question, then, turns out to be quasi-epistemological. Even if speakers’ can readily
explain post hoc why they said what they said that does not ipso facto imply that speakers in
medias res can propositionally explain why certain utterances are fitting in certain circumstances:
such “knowledge” that enables successful performativity must run on different tracks. The
appropriate way of understanding the speech act of apology begins to look completely different
than the appropriate way of understanding the linguistic elements of the utterance: ”I’m sorry.”
Bourdieu accounts for these different types of knowledges—what I have called
knowledge-that and knowledge-how following Ryle (2009)—through recourse to his theory of
habitus. Mainly drawing on the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962), habitus
aims to describe the practical knowledge-how that social actors express in a variety of social
settings. Habitus aims to split epistemological-ontological difference: one’s ability to handle
one’s self in a culture neither cashes out in i) knowledge-that of interlocking propositions (what
Merleau-Ponty would call “rationalism”); nor in ii) a Skinner-eseque type of behaviorism,
wherein, stimuli and reactions are mapped onto one another in a strict 1-to-1 correspondence
(what Merleau-Ponty would call “empiricism”).
Instead, a la Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu hypothesizes that actors have an interpretive sense
for the game that neither functions as explicit of mapping of the game, nor as a conjunction of
knee-jerk reactions. Within familiar social milieux, actors cope with the exigencies of social life
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in the same way that skilled athletes comport themselves in a sport—through a type of
incorporated understanding that allows of rapid-fire interpretive decisions without the
intervention of thematic-linguistic reasoning. Humans-in-habitus command a “practical sense”
that:
is a quasi-bodily involvement in the world which presupposes no representation either of
the body or the world, still less of their relationship. It is an immanence in the world
through which the world imposes its imminence, things to be done or said, which directly
govern speech and action. It orients “choices” which, though not deliberate, are no less
systematic, and which, without being ordered and organized in relation to an end, are
nonetheless charged with with a kind of retrospective finality. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 66)
Habitus is the stage-setting against which social action makes sense. It is that which funds the
legibility and the credibility of the social field: “Human beings are socialized into this system of
dispositions that enable them produce on the appropriate occasion skillful social activity that
embodies, sustains, and reproduces the social field that in turn governs this very activity”
(Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1993, p. 37). Backtracking to my above discussion of rules, it could be
said that the rules of Sprachspiele are bound up in the habitus. To speak “a language” means to
incorporate a particular culture’s way of doing things--to viscerally understand the games this
culture plays—before or equiprimordial with the mental acquisition of a new linguistic sign:
Adapting a phrase of Proust’s, one might say that that arms and legs are full of numb
imperatives. One could endlessly enumerate the values given body, made body, by the
hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy which instill a whole cosmology, through
injunctions as insignificant as “sit up straight” or “don’t hold your knife in your left
hand,” and inscribe the most fundamental principles of the arbitrary constant of a culture
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in the seemingly innocuous details of bearing or physical or verbal manners, so putting
them beyond the reach of consciousness and explicit statement. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 69).
It is crucial to reiterate what Bourdieu here makes apparent that the “structures” of habitus and
its “cosmology” are beyond the reach of propositional knowledge and linguistic representation
and that such a claim does not a fortiori turn humans into automatons, solely mechanically
carrying out pre-packaged reactions to basic stimuli. The habitus is a realm of creative free play
that is never fully finished off or determined, filled with moves, strategies, interpretations,
judgements, goals, procedures and the like that require no thematic representation in order to be
executed. The habitus is the requisite background for à propos speech. If this is the case, then,
once again, i) pre-linguistic structures and dispositions are what subtend manifest linguistic
practice; and ii) the role of the body, and its allocation within a pre-linguistic and hierarchically
distributed social field, makes a significant contribution to linguistic practice. In taking up
conclusion ii) habitus as “incorporated belief” points to the body’s occupation of cultural
coordinates as the “invisible” locus of linguistic meaning. Or said differently: On Bourdieu's
account to interpret the legibility of speech is to interpret legibility of the body. Below, I turn to
Butler’s (1997) account of the speech act in order to better understand this conclusion.
2.4 Productive Censorship
Butler’s (1997) most explicit account of the speech act sets out to understand the
legibility of the performative through a hermeneutic that both accounts for the givenness of
social factivity and the possibility for radicalizing the speech act through the insurrection of
speaker agency. Butler’s end goal here--much like the rest of her work—is to develop a
conception of agency that allows of a revolutionary politics without recourse to a pre-cultural
agent. Butler argues repeatedly across her body of work that “freedom” is never simply a
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throwing-off the shackles of politics in order to discover the pre-discursive self, un-marked by
social inscription. Instead, “freedom”—a concept in Butler-talk that is better denominated as
“agency”—is a re-inscription of the body in a new kind of politics.
The body “is not an independent materiality that is invested by power relations external
to it, but is that for which materialization and investiture are coextensive” (Butler, 1993 p. 34).
The speaking-body is always already intermeshed within the politics and the culture and the
nexus of power relationship in which it is thrown. The habitus is not an optional social contract
that counterposes the state of nature against society. Without converting into a fait accompli, the
habitus is the sine qua non background against which social acts and ritual show up as
meaningful. Simply put: to be an agent is to perform through the habitus. There exists no escape
hatch. There are only revolutionary ways to re-articulate the habitus.
However, insofar that habitus is constrictive by that self same degree it is also productive.
The rules of the game are what make game-play possible. A political discourse that converts
subject and society into antonyms with the goal of developing a fuller picture of agency “falsely
presumes that (a) agency can only be established through recourse to a prediscursive ‘I,’ even if
that ‘I’ is found in the midst of a discursive convergences, and (b) that to be constituted by
discourse is to be determined by discourse, where determination forecloses the possibility of
agency” (Butler, 1990, p. 182). The cultural background which is the habitus makes agency
possible through the selfsame incorporated methodologies by which it limits it.
This walks a fine ontological line. The agent does not fully determine the habitus, nor
does the habitus fully determined the agent: “is there not also the case where we play--and make
up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them--as we go along”
(Wittgenstein, 1953, p. §83). Both exist in an open-ended dialectical relationship which is
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mutually constitutive yet which is never mutually exhaustive. The habitus does not fully constrict
what it constructs. The “rules” of the habitus can feel as fixed and solid as those of chess or as
opened-ended and plastic a as a rainy-day game made up on the spot: “It’s two points if the paper
ball goes into the wastebasket directly, one point if it bounces off the wall.” It is thus imperative
to understand the simultaneous rigidity and flexibility and the permanent state of incompleteness
of social ritual in order to understand how i) speech acts exist within social temporality (Cf. my
discussion of Butler in Chapter II); and ii) to understand how speech acts can be both legible and
transgressive--how a performative can signify without strictly adhering to already-established
rules and conventions.
As noted in Chapter I, SAT in its analytical iteration tends to hypostatize the speech act
as an atemporal set of rules, metaphysically locked up in an ideal realm. The act of illocution—
the successful realization of a speech act in light of conventions established before the act—
presupposes such airtight logics. On the analytical account, a speech act falls on the chess side of
the spectrum: “I do!” in a marriage ceremony realizes a universalized procedure just as much as
“Checkmate!” does in in chess. Butler (1997), however, is quick to point out the fallacy
embedded in such thinking. The moment of speech act realization is never singular, but rather it
“is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and
future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of the utterance” (p. 3). Butler's
opening play here is to fluctuate the speech act: the performative utterance, seemingly is never
wholly perlocutionary nor illocutionary. It makes sense in light of the conventions of past
invocations but iterates on them in aleatory and agentive ways.
Whereas an analytical approach to speech acts is primarily concerned with what
constitutes an appropriate utterance within the speech act, Butler, on the other hand, is primarily

129!
concerned with what constitutes an appropriate speaker within the speech act. Borrowing a
rhetorical term, Butler shifts analytical attention away from discourse and towards ethos of the
speaker. It is by understanding what constitutes a legible speaker that it can be understood what
counts as a legible performative. And not vice versa.
Such a move affects a reversal in the rhetorical temporality traditionally associated with
ethos. On the traditional account: a speaker’s credibility is granted as the effect of past credible
discourses accrued to the speaker. Call this a posteriori ethos. On the account on probation here:
the speaker’s instituted role conferred by the game and played out in the game is the cause of
whether their discourse is deemed credible or it. Call this a priori ethos. This, by and large, is an
insight garnered from Bourdieu. Bourdieu (1991) compares the authority embedded in the
speech act that permits speakers’ legible speech to the Homeric skeptron, which conferred
rhetors the right to speak. What I would call a priori ethos is granted to a speaker: “only under
certain conditions, namely those which define legitimate usage: it must be uttered by the person
legitimately licensed to do so, the holder of the skeptron, known and recognized as being being
able and enabled to produce this particular class of discourse” (p. 113). Once recognized that it is
not the case that legible speech confers the speaker with linguistic authority and that it is the case
institutional authority of the speaker confers speech legibility, the analytical task is to understand
i) precisely how such authority is conferred, and ii) by what means such authority can be
contested and redistributed.
3 Moving Back to Rhetoric
Extrapolating out from these claims, I hypothesize a pre-linguistic intuitive sense for the
language game is what arrays rhetorical situations for the speakers. Take for example a typical
college classroom: one large desk next to the action of the lectern and the chalkboard and rows
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and rows of small individual desks in front of it. Here, the rules of the Sprachspiel are inscribed
in the very architecture of of space. Students who have been acculturated by years of compulsory
schooling already “know” what their speaking-role will be in such a space: sit quietly, raise your
hand, and wait for the teacher to call on you. In the same way, an actor “becomes” Hamlet when
she enters the stage and the curtain rises, a student “becomes” a student when she crosses the
threshold of the classroom. The incorporated understanding made available by the habitus lays
out the groundwork for such performatives, without the need for explicit instruction.
Such possible examples abound. I “know” neither to talk louder nor more often than an
intermittent whisper in a library reading room. I “know” how much small talk with a colleague is
appropriate in a crowded elevator. Likewise, for a native New Yorker, there perhaps nothing
more jarring than a stranger who tries to strike up a conversation in the subway at rush-hour.
This commuter does not “know” the rules of the commuting-game, and the ways that New
Yorkers tend to value anonymity and privacy in public spaces. Like the last example of the
subway car, social actors do not often recognize such rules as rules until someone “breaks”
them. The student who “calls out,” the elevator chatter that goes deeper than the weather, the
talkative tourist on the 6 train--all expose what the implicit norms were all along through the
transgression of them.
Folk follow the rules, for the most part, as a routine. And folk can recognize when the
rules are “broken” by others and by ourselves. But it does not seem like folk can state the rules
before the fact or in medias res, even if folk can post hoc explain them. I often ask my students
how they knew which desks were theirs and how they knew to start taking notes. Normally, this
question gets no answer. Rightfully so: since there really isn’t one. The rules of the game inhabit
the body in a way out of reach to verbal language—what Bourdieu (1977) calls bodily hexis:
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“Bodily hexis speaks directly to motor function, in the form of a pattern of postures that is both
individual and systematic, because linked to a whole system of techniques involving the body
and tools, and charged with a host of social meanings and values” (p. 87). And elsewhere:
“Bodily hexis is a political mythology realized, em-bodied, turned in a permanent disposition, a
durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling, and thinking” (p. 94). To be an
appropriate student in a typified classroom means having incorporated the approbiate bodily
hexis for that setting. For example, in K-12 settings a good deal of teaching time is spent trying
to inculcate this appropriate bodily hexis. Imperatives like: “Raise your hand before you speak!”
“Don’t sit on top of your desk!” “Don’t chew gum in class!” bring the body into the fold of the
habitus and defines the playing field for appropriate classroom discourse just as much as (if not
more than) the official transmission of linguistic rules and conventions.
Flores & Rosa (2015) speak to this claim with their theory of racio-linguistic ideologies,
arguing that the racialized bodies of speakers are what mark their linguistic practices as “nonstandard,” rather than any objectively observable linguistic feature: “non racialized people are
able to deviate from[...] idealized linguistic practices and enjoy the embrace of mainstream
institutions, while racialized people can adhere to [...] idealized linguistic practices and still face
profound institutional exclusion” (p. 165). Language, in this sense, is coded from the “outside”
just as much from the “inside.” Language is issued from bodies that, in turn, are prelinguistically and hierarchically configured in the habitus.
The translingual turn, however, has focused nearly exclusively on spoken and written
language far more than on “hexis” or embodied discourse. Stemming largely from applied
linguistics, composition / rhetoric studies, and pedagogical theory, what is taken as language in
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this research literature is taken in its most off-the-cuff definition: utterances or textual discourse
constituted by sounds and written signs.
Throughout this project, I have intended to show that language can be isolated as sounds
and signs—or meaningful types of lexical and structural features—within only a limited set of
circumstances. In particular, in the opening sections of this chapter, I have tried to bear out the
slogan that what can be said is based on what cannot be said. The games speakers play with
language are based in social ceremonies and rituals and forms of incorporated understanding that
cannot be reduced without distortion to a nexus of explicitly articulated rules and regulations that
could be in turn represented within systems of representation that off-the-cuff referred to as
“languages.”
Below, I switch gears and begin to develop an account of “translanguaging,” based on the
claims thus far developed. Using the theory of rhetoric developed in Chapter I, I postulate that
translanguaging is fundamentally a perlocutionary speech act that pushes and redefines both
performative and linguistic conventions. As such, translanguaging is also a political act, since its
transgressive property has the capacity to challenge the status quo power relations.
The power of the term translanguaging lies in the emphasis that gives the speaker agency.
To translanguage is an act by which speakers authorize themselves to change the rules of the
game, even while the game itself is being played. In order to conceptualize how translanguaging
ex vi termini transgresses, below I turn to a reading of Muñoz’s (1999) concept of
disidentification. While my reading of Bourdieu and Butler above aimed to emphasize that actors
are always already embedded in a social field that they enact by cooperating with it or acting
against it, my reading of Muñoz will interpret how the habitus is challenged and even
revolutionized through acts of agentive performatives.
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Even though the possibility of performative transgression is present in the writing of
Bourdieu and Butler, Muñoz focuses on developing vocabulary for how particular performatives
can iterate on solidified norms, challenging their underlying structures. In this line of
investigation, I will also rely on Maffesoli & Gutiérrez’s (2005) use of the “anomic” and the
“nomic” as a tool to understand how the dominant logics of the habitus at the same time establish
the obverse possibility of subversion. This argument will track Foucault's (1978) aphoristic
quote: “where there is power there is resistance” (p. 95). Where there are “rules” there are also
deliberate “misapplications” of them.
3.2 Disidentification and Translanguaging
To understand disidentification, I back-track to Butler (1997). Borrowing from Lacan,
Butler describes a process of “foreclosure” that constitutes the subject as viable. Foreclosure is
the series of necessary prohibitions that one must follow in order to be successfully incorporated
in the habitus. One might think of Levi-Strauss’s early structuralist writings on the incest taboo
as a description of a paradigm case of foreclosure. Such a taboo generates a fundamental logic—
a baseline structure—in which a culture can take root. Much like the boundary lines on a tennis
court that establish “in” and “out,” and, thus, makes possible the game of tennis, foreclosure a la
Butler describes a cultural injunction of “in” and “out,” and, thus, makes possible the games of
the habitus. The grammar of “foreclosure” is instructive here; it suggests settling on one set of
possibilities and ruling out out another set. Vis-à-vis the speech act, foreclosure is an act of
censorship that bifurcates discourse into the sayable and the unsayable. It is, at one and the same
time, a restrictive and productive form of power:
The operation of foreclosure is tacitly referenced in those instances in which we ask:
what must remain unspeakable for contemporary regimes of discourse to continue to
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exercise their power? How is the “subject” before the law produced through the exclusion
of other possible sites of annunciation within the law? To the extent that such a
constitutive exclusion provides the condition of possibility for any act of speech, it
follows that “uncensoring a text is necessarily incomplete.” On the assumption that no
speech is permissible without other speech becoming impermissible, censorship is what
permits speech to inform the distinction between permissible and impermissible speech.
Understood as foreclosure, censorship produces discursive regimes through the
production of the unspeakable. (p. 139)
The constitutive act of censorship is a double-edged sword: foreclosure is an act of disclosure
just as much as disclosure is an act of foreclosure; the boundary line of a tennis court only has an
“in” if there is also an “out,” and only has an “out” if there is in an “in.” The same strike that
produces the sayable also produces the unsayable. Or, in other words, the demarcation of the
sayable cannot be realized without purposefully or inadvertently demarcating the unsayable.
Perhaps, paradoxically, the sayable is only actualized through the shadowy realm of the
unsayable: outlawed discourse is as necessary to lawful discourse as much as it is also a threat to
it.
The foreclosure / disclosure of the unsayable and the sayable that Butler describes above
can be further elucidated in light Maffesoli & Gutiérrez’s (2005) development of Durkheim’s use
of the anomic / nomic division. In a sociological account of presence of the representation of the
devil across Latin America, Maffesoli & Gutiérrez conceptualize the anomic, as the realm of
obverse possibility generated by the conventionalization of normative procedures and structures
within the realm of institutionalized ideology. The anomic counter-power is to status-quo power
as negative space is to positive space in a photograph or painting. It can be said that the
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“anomic” is co-extensive and co-temporal with the “nomic,” since The practices of counterpower exist alongside the practices of power. The presence of such “counter-practices”
furthermore provides dominant ideology with the requisite justification for its being. In the same
way that the church “needs” the devil to vouchsafe its existence, the nomic maintains its control
through the continual spectral presence of the anomic:
Like the devil, the informal aspect of anomic behavior is generally located in the margin
of a formal structure and in the constant interchange between actors, within a wide array
of factors. The phenomena of the anomic, in effect, represent a large part of the operation
of social and political richness. They are part of the underlying processes of individual
interactions where power-relations and the struggle for power is put into play; [the
anomic] is the potential contra power. The informal phenomena--the substratum of
anomic behavior--are nothing more than the mirror image of formal structures that
permits actors to activate the shock absorbers and mechanism of compensation [of
dominant culture], intrinsic to every society and human group [my translation]. (p. 16).
To use a bland term, the anomic is a “counterculture” made possible by the dominant culture.
This strikes me as an important point: the anomic does not come out of left field, but rather is the
unintended or aleatory possibilities generated by and through the intersections of the formal
structures of the dominant ideology. For example, Political graffiti in protest of government
policy on walls of state buildings is only possible because there are state buildings and because
reading and writing are learned in state-sponsored schools. Sit-ins in college campuses are only
possible because there are college campuses. Parody and satire are only possible because there is
something to parodize and and satirize. To standardize the rules of the game by definition
negatively defines a “deviant” way of doing things. The standard provides a warrant for its
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existence through the putative necessity to dominate the un-standard that it itself created.
Returning briefly to Wittgenstein’s account of rule following, any attempt to standardize
completely and fully one possible interpretation of a rule—paradoxically—credits the possible
existence of all potential misapplications of a rule.
I read Muñoz’s (1999) concept of disidentification as outlining a particular type of
rhetorical discourse that is implicitly based on my above discussion of “foreclosure” and the
“anomic.” In line with the habitus-based approach to performativity of Butler, Muñoz’s task is to
understand how new cultural practices can be constituted without recourse to a utopic framework
that posits a space of agentive freedom counterposed against the prohibitions of dominant
ideology. If, for example, a performative identification, say, lines up without remainder with the
perceived norms of said speech act, then a performative of disidentification repurposes the rules
of the game without entirely denying them. If the performative “I do!” completes the norms of a
marriage ceremony in an act of identification, then, it could be said, that a performative like “I
kind of perhaps maybe do!” puns on or repurposes the performative in a way that does not deny
utterly the “correct” institutional response. Muñoz writes: “Disidentification is the third mood of
dealing with dominant ideology, one that neither opts to assimilate within a structure nor strictly
oppose it; rather, disidentification is a strategy that works on and against dominant ideology” (p.
11). If the belief is accepted that actors are always already within productive and constructive
habitus--one which is enabling yet never totally rounded off and finished--then the generation of
new cultural practices must, in some, already be “there” within the already marked off social
fields of the habitus. Disidentification can account for such “already-there-ness” of subversive
cultural practices through understanding the realization and development of such practices as a
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consolidation of the anomic centrifugal behaviors generated by the continual stabilization of the
nomic centripetal status quo:
Instead of buckling under the pressures of dominant ideology (identification,
assimilation) or attempting to break free of its inescapable sphere (counter identification,
utopianism), this “working on and against” is a strategy that tries to transform a cultural
logic from within, always laboring to enact a permanent structural change while at the
same time valuing the importance of local or everyday struggles of resistance. (ibid.)
With this notion of disidentification up and running, a new working definition of rhetoric comes
into view. As argued in Chapter II, it seems that defining rhetoric as future-tensed perlocutionary
discourse might ultimately fail, if all invocation is at one and the same time a re-invocation of
past performatives and a stage setting for future ones. Such a definition “temporalizes” all
performatives and collapse Speech Act Theory distinction between illocutionary and
perlocutionary acts. However, rhetorical discourse can still be seen as “future-tensed” by
defining it as a type of disidentification discourse that centralizes, develops, and narrativizes the
anomic practices constituted at the fringes of and by virtue of the repetition of the formal
structures of the nomic, dominant discourse.
4 (Neo)liberal Agency and Translanguaging
The goal of chapter III was to show that the meaningful potential linguistic expression-or what I have called “linguistic packaging”—is not generated by the putative linguistic systems
of named national languages. Instead, it is the relation that a linguistic feature holds vis-à-vis a
meaningful element within a Sprachspiele that thus allows it to “signify.” In other words, if a
linguistic element can be correlated with a move in the language game, then the grammar of the
game, so to speak, takes over. Any sundry item can be a chess knight, if both players understand
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the role that the chess knight plays. This argument, to a certain extend, is intended to bear out the
translingual turn’s central claim, that named languages need not be postulated in order to
understand linguistic meaning. However, “language” is clearly more than linguistic features, just
as chess is clearly more than the particular pieces of any random chess set. In this section, I claim
that the narrow focus that translanguaging and / or translingualism gives to “language” as
idiosyncratic collations of linguistic features possessed by single speakers can inadvertently elide
important questions of power.
Sprachspiele can be played with an infinite variety of pieces. Again, I hope this is evident
from Chapter III. But, for my money, rather than asking after how games can be played with so
many different pieces, the more fundamental question is what are the games being played and to
what ends are they played. It is my contention that if “translanguaging” ends up just saying that
speakers can play the status quo Sprachspiele instituted in and through dominant ideology with
any variety of linguistic features, then the political and perhaps revolutionary potential of the
term is seriously undermined.
4.1 (Neo)-Liberal Agency
Translanguaging often seems to operate within an extremely “liberal” picture of agency,
in a sense strictly limited to political philosophy. Speakers have unique language resources that
they negotiate in light of societal constraints. Such an image is highly reminiscent of Locke’s
(1960 [1689]) basic conception of the liberal individual. Humans, by intrinsic nature, are “in
State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions [...] as they think fit [...] without asking leave, or
depending on the Will of any other Man” (p. 287). This premise is the basis of generic social
contract theory: the individual is properly pre-political and only relates to other individuals

139!
through various types of official or sanctioned relationships. The individual can enter and exit
the political sphere in the same way that a person can get on and off a bike.
The story of translanguaging often follows this liberal narrative: speakers must conform
to societal standards of named language or discursive conventions when in public, but in private
they can language authentically, as they see fit: “A translanguaging epistemology would be like
turning off the language-switch function on the iPhone and enabling bilinguals to select features
from their entire semiotic repertoire, and not solely from an inventory that is constrained by
societal definitions of what is an appropriate ‘language’.” (García & Li Wei, 2014, p. 23). Such a
claim tracks nearly step for step the Lockean picture above that, in a nutshell, claims that in presocietal state speakers have an acultural set of desires and rationality, which, in turn, is
lamentably constricted by societal expectations. Freedom is loosening those constricts on the
individuals whenever possible so that they might realize their “perfect state of freedom.” On this
account, a politics is the arrangement of so many individualistic desires and rationalities, instead
of being so many desires and rationalities being the result of a politics.
The political liberalism embedded in translanguaging is evident in other venues. Otheguy
et al. (2015) argue that translanguaging is “the deployment of a speaker’s full linguistic
repertoire without regard for watchful adherence to the socially and politically defined
boundaries of named (and usually national and state) languages” (p. 283). And elsewhere in a
different formulation: translanguaging is “using one’s idiolect, that is, one’s linguistic repertoire,
without regard for socially and politically defined language labels and boundaries” (p. 297).
Such claims prima facie have a political bent to them. The socio-political categories of “English”
and “Spanish,” say, impose a limitation on a speaker who would otherwise speak freely.
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Dismantling named languages lifts an unnecessary sanction imposed on the speaker by the
“Will” of another party.
However, I argue that even if the sanctions of named languages are lifted,
translanguaging as defined above, is still embedded in a web of Sprachspiele that are made
available in and through the habitus. To fully deconstruct the picture of named languages does
not ipso facto generate a linguistic utopia, wherein unfettered “communication” can occur.
Language is Sprachspiele all the way down. There is no escape-hatch from the game. I
defend this thesis fully: even a conversation with our dearest friends is still a language-game. It
is “rule” bound. The utterances, even in this game, are drawn out or harken forth by the
incorporated sense of the performative circumstances at hand. The deepest secrets told in
Catholic confession are circumscribed by the most intricate forms of pageantry: the material
architecture of the confessional expiates the sin just as much as the word of the supplicant. As I
am wont to ask my students: Would you pay attention to me if I approached you on a street
corner and started lecturing about rhetoric? The chalkboard and the lectern mark classroom
discourse “academic” just as much as the ideas do (Even if there were “pure communication,”
would it not be the case that “pure communication” would be the name of the Sprachspiel being
played?)
Challenging named languages and named languages alone will do little to bring about
political change, if the Sprachspiele that underpin all linguistic expressions are not also
contested. A working-class Latinx student from the South Bronx, stuck in a low-wage retail job
has to talk “white,” no matter if “English” and “Spanish,” really exist or do not. A child has to
answer an abusive parent with the correct performative—or suffer the consequences—even if she
can draw on her full range of linguistic resources in doing so. Multinationals are quick to
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translanguage in their advertisements when good profit is to be had. In these cases the linguistic
features are “liberalized” or “deregulated” but the underlying corrosive game remains the same.
In a word: it seems that the translingual turn is more concerned with the how of language
than the what. I take this, as more or less, unintentional. Uprooting the entrenched ideology of
monolingualism (Matsuda, 2006) is no small feat. But, without a concerted effort to the contrary,
translanguaging runs the risk of being co-opted within the fold of neoliberal ideology.
Flores (2013) examines in detail the possible symbiotic relationship between an ideal
neoliberal subject and the trending interest in fostering speakers with fluid, translingual semiotic
resources. Both the ideal neoliberal subject and the “plurilingual subject” are:
characterized as dynamic and ever changing, and able to adapt to the increasing diversity
of society through a lifelong development of cultural competence and lifelong expansion
of their linguistic repertoire. In addition, both subjects are depicted as emerging naturally
from the changing global political economy and as the inevitable and desired outcome for
all the world’s population. In the case of neoliberalism, the emergence of dynamic
subjects as flexible workers able to continually accumulate human capital is argued to be
necessary for economic development. In the case of plurilingualism, the emergence of
dynamic subjects as fluid language users able to continuously accumulate new language
competencies is argued to be necessary for the development of a new citizenship to fit a
new common communicative sphere. The many parallels between the two ideal subjects,
as well as the aura of inevitability of both discursive regimes, indicates a possibility of
their convergence in ways that are molding fluid linguistic practices in the service of the
neoliberal agenda. (p. 513).
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Translanguaging’s emphasis on a speaker’s ability to transcend the borders of named language
often surprisingly mirrors the types of post-national economic relationships engendered by a
global neoliberal market place. Just as much as the traditional confines and regulations of the
labor market are being pluralized by the gig economy, so too are the traditional boundaries and
rules of language. In fact, a translingual proficiency, and ability to command multiple linguistic
features associated with different “languages” along with different modalities—is precisely what
is demanded of the of neoliberal, gig worker. The uber-driver-cum-pastry-chef-cum-webprogrammer needs to manipulate multiple discursive registers and linguistic features and
modalities just to get by. Whereas the long-standing fixity of national languages mirror economic
nationalism, the flexibility of linguistic practices called for by translanguaging neatly mirrors the
flexibility called for by the neoliberal market.
4.2 Named Languages and the Idiolect: A New Political Ideology
Translanguaging a la Otheguy et al. (2015 & 2018), I have maintained, is fully committed
to the non-existence of named languages, and, in making this argument, this account of
translanguaging made the idiolect of individual speakers its conceptual center piece.
It seems to me that such a theoretical move can be simplified and exemplified in the
following way: Sofia, instead, of speaking “English” and “Spanish” and “Portuguese” and “a
little bit of German,” speaks Sofia. Juan, instead of speaking “Arabic” and “Urdu” and “French”
and “a little bit of Mandarin,” speaks Juan. In one sense, the shift towards the idiolect does, in
fact, get rid of named national languages, like “English” and “Spanish.” However, in a much
more important sense, this shift gets rid of named languages of nation-states by replacing them
with the named languages of individual speakers. Thus, if Sofia speaks Sofia and Juan speaks
Juan, the world is still populated by named languages, albeit at a different scale. This “scale,”
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furthermore, is wholly amenable to the worldview instituted by the discursive regime of
neoliberalism: a post-national epoch in which the individual herself is turned into a selfsufficient corporation of one and the primary donée of political life.
However, I do not seek to deny the possible validity of the idiolect. It strikes me as
ultimately tenable to argue that unique speakers bring idiosyncratic styles to the language
game—just imagine how many batting stances there are in baseball or how many ways there are
to shoot a free throw in basketball. Imagine a chess tournament, for instance, in which the
players, instead of using standardized pieces, bring their own motley assortment of pieces to play
the game, ad hoc mixtures of pieces collected over time, through playing the game with different
players in different parts of the globe.
These above analogies strike me as the best means to describe the best case version of a
idolectical approach to translanguaging: each speaker brings heteroglossic semiotic resources
idiosyncratically organized in light of her own subjective history to the common and mostly
objective language game. However, at this juncture, I register a strong disagreement with the
political neoliberalism of idiolectical translanguaging. It is not the case that the speaker’s
linguistic repertoire is essential and the language game is accidental. Rather, it is the case that the
language game is essential and the speaker’s linguistic repertoire is more or less accidental.
Sprachspiele are the sine qua non background of all idiosyncratic linguistic practices.
The realization that speakers could play the language game with a variety of pieces does
not ipso facto cash out in the actual possibility that speakers can—or, better yet, are allowed to—
play the game with non-standardized pieces. It is easy for me to picture the toy-case above in
which the chess players in a chess tournament are invited by the tournament organizers to bring
their own assortment of pieces. But it is even easier to imagine the more probable case in which
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the tournament demands that all pieces in play be “standard.” Again, chess could be played with
any hypothetical number of pieces. However, if in the game at hand the rules dictate that
standard pieces must be used, even if such a rule is not essential to the game play itself, it is still,
nevertheless, a foundational rule of that game at hand.
Even if a given Sprachspiel could be played with any number of linguistic features this
realization does not ipso facto cash out in the fact that the Sprachpsiel can or is allowed to be
played with all available linguistic features. A teacher’s callous injunction of “English only!” is a
rule of the language game played in that classroom even if it does not “have” to be. Named
languages from the sub-specie aeternitatis perspective of theoretical existence are not real, but as
the generative rules of Sprachspiele, they often turn out to be very real.
The ontological waters muddy here: If language is Sprachspiele all the way down, and
the injunction to use certain linguistic features and not others can be considered a constitutive
rule of the language game, it would then follow that the sets of linguistic features institutionally
marked as this or that named language can shape linguistic practice at a very basic ontological
level. To uproot named languages, in this sense, would require not only a reminder of the infinite
possibilities of linguistic expression, but it would also require deep revisions in basic rules of
dominant Sprachspiele. Thinking along with Bourdieu, it is not what speakers could do with
language that counts, but rather what speakers are allowed to do with it.
5 Conclusion
It is imperative not only change how speakers language, but also why speakers language
and with what goals in sight. Translanguaging and/or translingualism often seem not to be able to
see beyond, well, “language,” in a sense strictly limited to the types of arbitrary linguistic
expression outlined in Chapter III Section 2. The translingual turn, in general, has brought
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analytical and theoretical attention to linguistic practices that have been for a long time utterly
marginalized and considered aberrant from the norm. Understanding such practices from a
theoretical and practical perspective has, as I have argued in Chapter III Section 1, raised
essentially an ontological question regarding language and languages. It has thoroughly critiqued
the straw-man folk belief that linguistic expressions are meaningful because they are generated
in and through the rules of named languages (Cf. my reading of Mcginn [2015] in Chapter III
Section 2). However, applying pressure to the norms of linguistic expression alone, without
critiquing the Sprachspiele that underpin risks the possibility that the same old language game
continues to be played, albeit with different pieces. To see that named languages have nothing to
do with the significance of linguistic expression is to catch a glimpse of what does make
language mean.
I have thus outlined that to understand linguistic expression it is perhaps more productive
to look towards the conferred legibility of the speaker than towards the legibility of the
performative utterance. And to understand this “a priori ethos” it is necessary to understand the
pre-linguistic structures of the habitus that locate bodies hierarchically within a grid of status quo
power relations. Authority in language comes from the “outside” and that language is, “at best” a
representation of this extra-linguistic authority (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 109). Again, to understand
that speakers could translanguage—viz., use the full range of their linguistic repertoire to play
the language game—is not of the same order as understanding when they, in fact, can. As argued
above, Flores and Rosa (2015) issue a forceful reminder of this fact, that those granted racial
privilege from “outside” of language, so to speak, are given free reign to translanguage, and
those who are denied such privilege are not. Perhaps, then, translanguaging is best seen not as a
linguistic freedom independent of the language game, but rather as a transgressive performative
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within the game itself. Translanguaging, in this sense, is to take the skeptron, even though it has
not been granted.
Of course, taking the skeptron comes at a great cost. Many of the counter-arguments that
are endlessly rehearsed against any type translingual pedagogy runs along the tracks of: “well,
that’s all well and good perhaps in your classroom, but what about when these students need to
write a cover letter?” And there is a tinge of truth here: Sprachspiele are often very high stakes
games and failure to play the right piece at the right time can result in anything from economic
loss to physical harm. A translingual approach for me, then, would not entail emphasizing the
possibility of a neoliberal linguistic freedom, wherein speakers idiolects are counter-positioned
against accidental societal impositions, but rather it would be a thorough-going analysis of how
every linguistic feature is one and the same time a move in the language game. For example, to
convert a college classroom into a translanguaging space requires a lot more effort than overt
instruction by the instructor that such linguistic practices are valid and encouraged here. Instead,
it requires a type of exploration of the classroom Sprachspiele and what it means to hold
skeptron and to issue a performative utterance under the constraints of this game. In terms of
disidentification, it seems to me that translanguaging signals those linguistic-performative
practices that intend to re-inscribe the rules of the game without exiting it. A worker “cannot”
give an order to a boss. But, in a transgressive act of re-appropriation, if a worker does in fact
give an order to her boss, then the rules of the game—mid-gameplay—are contested, and not
only the linguistic features used to play it. Even if the rules of the game are constitutive, this does
not mean that they are also fixed.
Agency, in this sense, is not a freedom from “societal constraints” but rather a product of
them. Power is restrictive and productive. Foreclosure is at one and the same time disclosure.
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The rules prohibit and enable. A social actor is at all times made possible by the habitus, but the
habitus, in turn, can never finalize completely the actions and the choices and the performative
realizations of the actor. Translanguaging, I feel, would be much better off with this picture of
agency instead of the often-hinted-at picture of neoliberalism embedded in the picture that
locates the speaker here independent and self sufficient of arbitrary cultural norms and rules
there. All the rules of the game are always open for agentive contestation but they are not
optional.
Translanguaging as such would acknowledge that the majority of what makes “language”
possible is rooted in pre-linguistic incorporated knowledge-how—the bodily hexis that Bourdieu
describes. To rummage around in the Pandora’s Box opened up by the questions: “What is
language?” and “What are languages?” seems to lead to the realization that the practices and
rules and conventions crowded in under the term “language” all seem to hang “in the air,” as it
were. Colleagues small talk in elevators. Students raise their hands in classrooms to answer
teachers’ questions. Rumors are successfully spread, and all is this is skillfully and routinely
accomplished even if nothing seems to ground the rules of these Sprachspiele that exceeds the
confines of the game itself. Translanguaging is to go off script as much as it is to change around
the linguistic features—the pieces of the game. And this is where the “freedom” of
translanguaging lies: the ability to repeat the rules differently, to evoke the practice in a different
key. Translanguaging is when the performative changes over from rehearsal to premiere, when
the possibilities on “the other side” of the rule come back around to change the rule or create a
new game itself.
!
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Chapter V: Translingual Pedagogy
1 Introduction
The dominant definitions for what language “is” and what languages “are” will, no doubt,
dictate thinking, writing, reading, and speaking, as well as how they are taught in schools in
colleges. All pedagogy is rooted in ontology. And, ontology, in turn bespeaks the predominant
foundational understandings of the reality of experience. What educators take to be existent, in
turn, conditions inexorably what subjects should be taught and how to teach them. These
chapters have revolved around making sense of the “ontological” arguments of the translingual
turn. I have intended, from a variety of philosophical perspectives, to explicate possible
conclusions and consequences of what I take as the bedrock sine qua non translingual claim: that
languages (plural) do not exist, but language (singular) does.
In tracking the contours of this claim, I have both concurred and dissented. On the side of
concurrence: languages do not exist when language is assumed to be linguistic expression and
linguistic expression alone. If language “is” the arbitrary linguistic features contained inside the
practical envelope of the utterance, then I firmly hold with the theoretical linguistic account of
Otheguy et al. (2015 & 2018) that language qua named languages are nowhere to be found. The
word shines forth as the word. All there is is language. On the side of dissent: languages do,
indeed, exist, and are, in fact, incommensurable with one another, when language is assumed to
be the constitutive Sprachspiele—the social rituals and games that dictate what folk do with
words—that circumscribe and bring significant life to the utterance and its “linguistic” content.
This hypothesis of incommensurability is directed at the nexus of constitutive rules that define
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the language game through and through: a checkers player cannot play the queen’s gambit, just
as much as a public proclamation cannot be made in secret.
Reviewing: the rules of language qua linguistic expressions are sets of external
relationships. The rules of the language qua Sprachspiele are internal relationships. I take this
thesis as describing a rather basic empirical observation. I can rumor, for example, in an
admixture between “English” and “Spanish,” but I cannot rumor by stating a blatantly obvious
fact. I take this yes-and-no position as theoretically centrist. It splits the difference between a
linguistic utopia that translanguaging often seems to promise, founded in the political philosophy
of liberalism, and a rigid monolingual view, founded in the ideology of colonialism that fixes
languages as static, immutable systems (Pennycook & Makoni, 2006). My thesis, however, is
also intended to offer a critique. Limited attention to the linguistic features that play the role of
moves and strategies in the language game and not the rules of the language game itself can
often elide questions about why and to what end the language game is played.
The goal of this present chapter is to use the theory built in the prior chapters in order to
bear out two claims about composition-rhetoric pedagogy: i) that this pedagogy is primarily and
essentially concerned with understanding the constitutive relationship between linguistic features
and the moves in the language game; and that ii) composition-rhetoric pedagogy as such is
already translingual: the study of the language game—what speakers do with words—transfers
across all “languages” (and, for that matter, what one might call “modalities” as well). These
claims are founded in the premise that what I will call “linguistic-rhetorical metacognition”—or
a speaker-rhetor’s ability to reflect analytically over linguistic practice in the act of crafting
appropriate utterances or writing—typically precedes what might be called “language
acquisition.” If linguistic features are tied to the roles, intentions, and uses they perform, then it
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would seem to follow that in order for a student to incorporate new linguistic features, she must
be able to articulate or to clarify the rules of the language game first.
The straw-man critique of the translingual turn is that it wants to throw out the rule book,
and, thus, leave teachers with no singular language as the subject to teach. However, this could
not be further from the truth. The translingual turn, as I hope to have made clear, does not
abandon the belief that language is fundamentally rule-bound, but rather it locates the “rules”
differently. The constitutive rules are not “in” named languages but “in” the language game, the
situationality that brings forth the intelligibility of discourse. In fact, a translingual approach to
composition-rhetoric pedagogy requires an analytical attention to language that is far more
nuanced and attentive than that which can be captured in standard, skill-and-drill pedagogies. To
reject the belief that there are such entities in the world as “standard” named languages does not
cash out as the abandonment of grammar, but rather broadens it. This moves understands all
language use as grammatical and rhetorical, and it understands grammar and rhetoric it turn as
hermeneutics that locate linguistic practice as the dialectical effect of its practical conditions of
production and reception.
In Chapter IV, I argued that the game has always been going on and that to be a social
actor, in a certain sense, is to be through the habitus. Put differently: humans-in-habitus already
have a deep understanding of the social institutions that set the stage for meaningful social
activity, even if they can only explain the rules of the game as rules on occasion. To live through
the habitus makes no use of explicit instructions or thematic playbooks. However, the habitus
can be put on display, so to speak, by the means of clear-sighted description and critical
reflection. In this final chapter on pedagogy, I intend to develop dialogic pedagogy (Freire, 1968;
Shor, 1980) as a methodology which surfaces the existential structures of the habitus and which,
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in turn, thematizes these structures as the discursive context of the educational practices of
composition-rhetoric pedagogy.
By and large, what I describe below is meant for students’ whose average-everyday
linguistic practices are routinely stigmatized as “broken” or “non-standard.” The joint
interpretation of the language game already in play instead of the transmission of a fictional
linguistic code especially positions linguistically-minoritized students as expert linguistic
practitioners who are, perhaps, not well-versed in discussing critically and explaining
analytically their own expertise. Like a skilled driver who can use a manual transmission with
ease but cannot teach someone else how to do it or cannot say aloud how she knows when to
downshift, my students often lack ability to articulate their skillful practices as skillful practices.
They know the “rules” but they are hesitant to articulate the “rules” as rules. In this vein, the
pedagogy developed below uses the explicit hermeneutic of the habitus as a springboard for
linguistic-rhetorical metacognition: students’ development of meta-vocabularies derived from
and for the description and the analysis of the everyday language game fosters the critical skill of
theorization in general.
I take this as a fundamental element of linguistic-rhetorical transfer. That is, without the
ability to theorize a linguistic practice, the skills developed in one linguistic-rhetorical domain
will not be carried over to another. This claim about transfer and the translingual approach that I
outline also suggest a disciplinary claim about composition-rhetoric pedagogy. I aim to
disambiguate composition-rhetoric pedagogy from pedagogies premised on the incorporation of
new linguistic features, whether such pedagogies be “second-language” acquisition or “skill-anddrill” approaches to composition and rhetoric.

152!
The capacity for the invention of ad hoc meta-descriptive vocabularies for any number of
linguistic-rhetorical contexts is the domain of composition-rhetoric pedagogy, whereas the
ability to learn already-made vocabularies is the domain of linguistic acquisition vocabulary. To
learn the conjugation of the “French” verb “être” in the indicative and subjunctive tense is
distinct from learning how to describe and theorize the Sprachspiele in which this word might
play a role. Language acquisition pedagogy is concerned with the former, and composition and
rhetoric pedagogy is concerned with the latter. Furthermore, I argue that i) one cannot reduce to
another, that is, composition-rhetorical pedagogy cannot reduce to language-acquisition
pedagogy, nor vice versa; and that ii) while I consider them to be equally important, I maintain
that linguistic-rhetorical metacognition typically comes a step before linguistic acquisition. A
speaker-rhetor must already “have a place” for the new linguistic feature, before it can be learnt.
This place is realized through the development of linguistic-rhetorical metacognition.
However, I signal from the onset that my description of composition-rhetoric pedagogy is
not meant to demote language acquisition pedagogy. Folk learn new “languages” and new
linguistic features of “languages” they already know successfully and routinely. There is no
doubt about this. My argument is, instead, that composition-rhetoric pedagogy is a different
pedagogical category with a fundamentally different pedagogical scope, which often, mistakenly,
is pigeon-holed within the pedagogical practices and educational outcomes of languageacquisition pedagogy. I intend to “extract” composition-rhetoric pedagogy and show it to be
concerned with a different—yet equally important—type of language learning.
A translingual approach to composition-rhetoric pedagogy focuses on what speakerrhetors do with language (Lu & Horner, 2016) without fixating on any one set of linguistic
features. Said differently: what most interests this approach is the constitutive relationship
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between the exigency of the language game at hand and the linguistic features selected—
thematically or a-thematically—by the speaker-rhetor to accomplish that exigency. This premise,
again, is translingual since it goes beyond this or that “language.” The emphasis on the
relationship between exigency and elected linguistic feature is broad enough to capture anything
from punctuation marks to digital modalities to facial expressions to road signs to typeface
deployment. As I hope is apparent from the prior chapters, it is this “grammatical” relationship
that makes linguistic practice significant instead of the “grammatical” relationships that obtain
inter se within the putative linguistic systems of named languages.
A general translingual approach, thus, to composition-rhetoric pedagogy is interested in
this “vertical” grammatical relationship between linguistic feature and move in the language
game and relegates the “horizontal” grammatical relationship descriptive of internal relationships
of named languages to to sidelines. The translingual and dialogic approach for which I advocate
here begins to surface and explicate this “vertical” grammatical relationship through dialogic
inquiry into everyday linguistic practice. Once an understanding of this relationship is developed
through the study of such practices, it then can be applied in order to understand other linguisticrhetorical practices, including highly formalized and conventionalized academic discourse
conventions.
2 Moving “through” Discourse: Dialogue
The view of dialogue I want to develop begins with an etymological consideration.
Dialogue combines the prefix Greek “dia” (διά), meaning “through” (like the Latin “per”) with
“logos” (λόγος). Thus, one could understand the substantive “dialogue” as a movement through
the logos and the verbalization “to dialogue” as the indication of this movement. Immediately, I
bracket the millennia of commentary on the precise valence of logos and define its semantic
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content along the lines of what is nowadays generally defined as “discourse.” Following almost
step-for-step as what I take Butler to say about discourse (1990; 1993), logos qua discourse is
what articulates the habitus. Discourse makes intelligible the social word by providing it with a
hierarchical system of signification, constantly clarifying what is good, what is possible, and
what is real (Therbon 1980). Discourse, in this sense, is a “telling” that mediates being-insociety. It “tells” or “facilitates” social actors, enacting in social contexts what it means to be a
“man” or a “woman,” a “worker” or a “boss”, a “citizen” or a “stranger,” etcetera. Discourse is
performative through and through. Although it is the background that funds the significance of
social life, it is maintained in the foreground through its performative repetition. The reiterated
performative realized in the foreground is meaningful in light of the background that the
performative itself projects as an effect of its iterative temporality. Dialogue moves through
discourse, explores it, puts in on display. Dialogue is the intention to catch discourse in the act:
the hermeneutic procedure that explicates the background / foreground relationship of social
performativity without hypothesizing an exit from that relationship.
The goal of dialogue, then, is to understand the sedimented rules of the habitus generally
and for the purposes of composition-rhetoric pedagogy the rules of dominant Sprachspiele
specifically. Dialogue is, on this account, “analytical” in a loose Kantian sense of the term: it
looks for the grounds of intelligibility by seeking to articulate the conditions by which
“experience” itself becomes accessible. However, insofar that dialogue is analytical in this
philosophical sense, it is not restrictive in terms of its methodology. Dialogue requires no preexisting conceptual tools nor predetermined vocabularies. Dialogue is constituted by the
intention to move through the logos—to put discourse on display—and through this intention
alone. Any “language” or linguistic feature can be put to service of the dialogic intention. In fact,
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it is often in the most “ordinary” and off-the-cuff language that discourse is most clearly
revealed, since “the speaker’s participation in discourses pre-supposes the unthematized positing
of particular basic assumptions with respect to the domain of experience involved in the
discourse” (Kögler, 1999, p. 207).
In a metaphorical sense, to dialogue is to do philology in “real time”: instead of
attempting to understand the generative symbolic orders and the latent assumptions of the social
practices of a distant historical cultural, it is the attempt that the dialogue’s participants undertake
to understand these things in terms of their own cultural-historical moment. All can dialogue—all
can perform this analytic—since all are always intimately involved in discourse. I take this as the
ground floor premise of “critical pedagogy” (Freire, 2000; Shor, 1980; Berlin, 19996; hooks,
1994; Flores, 2013). The question, then, for a dialogic approach to pedagogy is not in the first
instance how to “transmit” the tools for dialogue to students, but rather how to inspire the
dialogic intention.
Critical or analytic dialogue, in a certain sense, begins when something “goes wrong.”
Inquiry sparks when actors experience a tension in day-to-day routines and rituals and “common
sense” beliefs. When something goes off script, all of a sudden, one can catch a glimmer of what
it meant to stay on script all along. Imagine, for example, walking down Park Avenue and almost
getting hit by a car, because it was driving on the left side of the road. In this moment of noncompliance with the rules of the legal-driving game, you realize (and, perhaps, viscerally) what
the rules of legal driving are: that, in the state of New York, drivers drive on the right side of the
road. However, even if clearly you “know” this rule—you can readily cite it upon prompting-you might not have “seen” the rule in a long time. In the moment of failure—when the game
breaks down before your eyes—the rules become apparent by which the game has always been
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played. It is also in this moment when the normalized rules become apparent that they also
become available for analysis and re-negotiation. “Perhaps, the driver is from London” you
wonder to yourself after unleashing a chain of expletives as the car speeds way. And, if you stay
with the tension, perhaps you finally ask yourself: “Why do drivers drive on the right side of the
road here in New York and on the left side of the road in London?” Here, perplexity begins:
realizing that the practices of the habitus that are routinized into oblivion are all that there is to
go on, while realizing at the same time these practices themselves are unfounded sub specie
aeternitatis.
Dialogue grips, so to speak, when beliefs go cross-wire and the subsequent tension
between beliefs cannot be easily or readily resolved. In more technical language dialogue is
generated by the discovery of aporia, in a sense of the term more or less restricted to its
etymology. An “aporia,” as the privation of “poros” (πόρος), ”a passageway or a means to get
across,” suggests a tension. In discovering aporias in doxic experience—in realizing that one
cannot go any further—social actors also realize that, in a certain sense, they “knew” where they
were going all along. Dialogue is generated by temporarily blocking up the well-worn paths of
doxic experience in order to see the trajectories of the paths. This “blocking up” also has the
potential to create new ones: in generating aporias dialogic pedagogy, at one and the same, time
hypothesizes alternating views of re-understanding the ordinary.
The linguistic-rhetorical metacognition described in this chapter’s introduction is rooted
in dialogue. The type of reflection and analysis sought after by composition-rhetoric pedagogy
begins in the analysis of everyday language practices. This is an insight that I have garnered
largely from Shor (1980; 1992): that dialogue always begins in medias res. Students begin to
exercise and develop the capacity for linguistic-rhetorical metacognition through an analysis of
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the linguistic practices already on hand. This, by no means, is a gimme: theorizing “on-theground” linguistic practices is often more difficult than explicit texts. To borrow a Freirean term,
daily experience must be captured—so to speak—through the process of “codifications.” To
dialogue about everyday experience, such experience must be isolated as structured or rulebound, in some sense, in order that that dialogue centers on a phenomenon that is accessible to
teachers and students, and, at the same time, so that the dialogue moves beyond the mere
interchange of opinions. Dialogue has in its sight the “unwritten rules” of the dominant
Sprachspiele always already in play. The more the dialogue can “grip” on to these “rules” the
more generative it becomes: through successive layers of joint discovery teachers and student
continue the archeology of sedimented linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-how.
Composition-rhetoric pedagogy begins by interpreting this social and linguistic
knowledge-how in dialogue but it is not solely concerned with it. The structures of doxic
experience are the preliminary content of dialogue, so that students’ reflexive-analytical capacity
might transfer to other domains, whether they be formalized linguistic practices of the university
or different realms of socio-political life. In reality, the goal here is not to make the analytic of
everyday experience the preparatory act for texts already codified and made explicit. Instead, the
goal is to establish students as capable of performing reflexive analysis on any and all speech
acts and social rituals. In one single strike the world becomes rhetorical--waiting to be read.
Clearly, though As Shor (1980) argues, the “skills developed through consideration of an
experiential problem will make education an ongoing process of life—a state of being rather than
a course in an institution” (p. 105). It is only when students locate this linguistic-rhetorical
analysis as a tool vital in and out of the class, that the world becomes rhetorical as such. Thus, it
might be said that composition-pedagogy as such is not only dialogical but also dialectical. It is
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always pushing into the most basic conditions of possibility for speech acts while at the same
time examining overly formalized texts.
In Chapter IV, I defended the claim that overt linguist practice is rooted in the prelinguistic structures of the habitus. Speaker-rhetors’ ability to rumor, say, is founded on their
sense for the language game, instead of being the result of explicit instructions (imagine, for
example, trying “to teach” someone how to rumor). The ability to play the language game is a
knowledge-how even if the linguistic expression that is used to play the language game can be
described as a knowledge-that. To drive this point home: how a speaker-rhetor rumors is a
question of knowledge-how and what linguistic content the rumor use is a question of
knowledge-that. In this sense, the utterance: “They are saying that Sofia is going to be the
associate provost” can be hypothetically individuated as a product of knowledge-how and
knowledge-that. It is a product of knowledge-how, in that, if it pulls off the speech act of
rumoring successfully, it has realized a particular bit of cultural savoir-faire that cannot be
thematically mapped out without distortion. It is a product of knowledge-that, in that the
linguistic expression of the utterance can be thematically mapped without distortion; the
syntactic and lexical elements of the utterance are captured fully by explicit, propositional metalanguage. Composition and rhetoric pedagogy is concerned with the knowledge-how. Linguistic
acquisition pedagogy is concerned with the knowledge-that. These need not by definition be
mutually exclusive. But the fact that they are not mutually exclusive does not mean that they are
ipso facto the same knowledge domain. On my account, this also means that composition and
rhetoric pedagogy is almost by definition translingual. It is not concerned with this or that
“language” or linguistic feature. It is concerned with the knowledge-how that speaker-rhetors
must possess in order to play the game.
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I want to formalize a thesis at the onset: the first move of composition and rhetoric
pedagogy is to bracket out the study of linguistic knowledge-that in order to isolate the
knowledge-how of speaker-rhetors as the primary inquired-after phenomenon. Composition and
rhetoric pedagogy should want to know about the game being played, not the arbitrary pieces
used to play it. However, this “bracketing-out” is routed through a study of linguistic features
themselves: it seeks to surface the game by ferreting out the strategy “behind” the deployment of
each linguistic feature, instead of seeking how such deployment fits “laterally” with the
conventions of named languages. Thus, again, a translingual composition-rhetoric pedagogy is
not at all a surrender of careful attention to linguistic features to an “anything goes” mentality,
but rather a linguistic focus that is so astute that it goes beyond the limited scope of named
languages and that of arbitrary linguistic expression.
This “bracketing-out” is both challenging and requisite, so that teachers and students can
“see” the game together, to “surface” it, to bring it to light. If the ability of humans-in-habitus to
play the language game is in the key of knowledge-how instead of knowledge-that, the
educational “content” of composition-rhetoric pedagogy cannot be taught through the
transmission of facts about things—what Freire (2000) would call the “banking” concept of
education (p. 71). Lots of things, however, can indeed be wholly learned through transmission:
conjugation tables of Latin verbs, the periodic table, the rules and strategy of chess, etcetera. An
argument for dialogic pedagogy is not necessarily an argument against fact-based transmission
pedagogy. Yet if one buys the account on probation here that linguistic knowledge-that is of a
different sort than language-game knowledge-how, then language-games—what speaker-rhetors
do with words—cannot be “taught,” in the sense of “teaching” restricted to the transmission of
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abstract rules of grammar, syntax, punctuation or style, that is, the “banking” concept of
transmission.
If linguistic skill cannot be thematized propositionally, then it should be understood
hermeneutically. Speaker-rhetors are already in the language game, and, thus, the question
becomes not how the “rules” of the game can be explained, but, rather, how they can be made
apparent. Furthermore, it is in this “making-apparent” that metacognition is developed and
refined. In interpreting language games already in play, teachers and students learn the processes
of interpretation instead of learning the fixed rules of any particular game. This, as well, is the
skill that transfers. It is not the particular skilled know-how of any old game nor the fixation and
transmission of its rules, but rather the ability to apprehend and to interpret explicitly the rules
that allows for the incorporation of new language games and the acquisition of new linguistic
features.
3 Changing Over
Composition-rhetoric can maintain its status as a “gateway” course in the university not
because it provides students with a “standardized language” that they can use in all their courses
(Matsuda, 2006), but rather because rhetoric is the metavocabulary through which all linguisticrhetorical practices in the university (and outside of it) is best understood. Composition-rhetoric
as a “subject matter” can maintain its position as a nearly universalized course and rid itself of
monolingual prejudices i) by fully decoupling itself from language-acquisition pedagogy; and ii)
articulating the possibilities of rhetoric as a the language requisite both for the understanding and
production of “language.”
This, of course, entails a change-over in learning outcomes and methodologies of
assessment, both at the localized level of individual courses and at the broader level of
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institution-wide writing programs. It is myopic to think that such a change over is out-of-hand or
impossible: with enough planning and development, students’ linguistic-rhetorical metacognition
can be articulated point-by-point as learning objectives and assessed in a manner just as robust-if not more so--than a narrow focus on “standardized language” or belletristic, monologic essay
structures.
Such a metacognitive approach is neither really “product”-based nor “process”-based.
This approach is not interested in creating finalized texts, nor is it interested in developing the
so-called “writing process” of students. Instead, this pedagogy is primarily interested in the
metastatements that students can make about their own rhetorical choices and the rhetorical
choices made in the world that surrounds them. Boldly: this approach is not interested in
composition and rhetoric at all, but rather statements about composition and rhetoric, as they
emerge in practical contexts. It is reflective, situated, and hermeneutic through and through. This
approach converts all teacher statements of the type “this is how it should be done” into teacher
interrogatives of the type: “why did you make that rhetorical choice here?”, and, furthermore,
looks to students’ responses—i.e., their skills for linguistic-rhetorical analysis—as the space for
pedagogical assessment and intervention.
This pedagogical coin has two faces. One side is practical. The other side is political. On
the coin’s practical side, I contend that all students benefit from a translingual, metacognitive
approach. The ability to explicate critically the relationship between the move in the language
game and the elected linguistic feature is simply a more useful skill than rote-mastery of any
mythical “standard” language. Again, even if one wants to teach said mythical standard, I would
still contend that it is best taught as a series of rhetorical choices that bear a “family
resemblance” to one another.
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On the coin’s political side, an unwavering focus on linguistic-rhetorical metacognition
and a thorough bracketing out of the “standard” / “non-standard” distinction brings an immense
amount of educational-institutional equity to linguistically minoritized students (I will outline
this in detail below). Linguistic-rhetorical metacognition anchored in daily linguistic-rhetorical
practices situates students as expert language-users who for years of their educational careers
have been systematically linguistically marginalized. Such students already have profoundly
dexterous linguistic-rhetorical skills. What they are “missing” is the metalanguage to explicate it
and analyze it. “Incorrect” and “correct” as the defining binary of current-traditional
composition-rhetoric pedagogy is replaced by the binary of “implicit” and “explicit.” The
essential movement of this education is not the movement from “incorrect” to “correct,” but
rather the movement from implicit linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-how to explicit—to degree by
which such explication is possible—articulation of that knowledge-how.
4 About and Aboutness: Discourse and Content
A translingual approach to composition-rhetoric builds language out from the ground
floor up. It starts with the conditions of speech in order to understand how speech is made
possible by those conditions. A composition-rhetoric pedagogy based in the explication of
linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-how requires a methodology for isolating and thematizing
quotidian experience so that it becomes “textual.” This approach requires that educators have a
tool set that can concretize run-of-the-mill experience—which usually goes un-interpreted—into
something which feels structured enough to warrant sophisticated interpretation. Educators need
to have a content “empty” set of concepts that can hypothetically be applied to any speech act or
social ritual in order to isolate the “rules” of the game as “rules.” This vocabulary is more or less
strictly formal, in the sense that its concepts are applicable across speech act and social ritual.
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Provisionally, I would mark this content “empty” formal network of concepts as rhetorical
theory. Rhetorical theory, in this provisional sense, is the stock of formal concepts that locate and
explicate the situationality of language praxis and the set of hypothetical vocabularies invented
ad hoc in order to understand the language game at hand; it is the metalanguage that both
generates and is generated through the dialogic reflection upon embodied linguistic-rhetorical
knowledge-how already in play.
In Corcoran & Wilkinson (2019), we describe what this pedagogy looks like,
materialized as a gateway assignment for an Accelerated Learning Placement developmental
writing course. Using the standardized vocabulary of the “rhetorical situation,” our assignment
asked students to think through several everyday “linguistic situations” using the concepts
grouped under the umbrella heading of the rhetorical situation. This means that students were
prompted to use “genre,” “audience,” “purpose,” and “medium” in order to locate and explicate
the structures of everyday linguistic practice, instead of an already codified text--whether it be
something plainly average like an advertisement on mass transit or a more “literary” text. This
assignment in particular and this approach in general looks to intervene a step before explicit
texts no matter what those texts are. Thus, this approach starts by bracketing “texts” fully and
nominating entirely “experience,” as the initial subject matter for dialogue through which
linguistic-rhetorical metacognition will be developed.
The educational outcome here is, once again, transfer. It is assumed that students who can
metacognate on daily linguistic-rhetorical practices will be better suited to do as such on
formalized texts. But, once again, I want to deny that this approach is teleological: first
experience, then academic texts. Dialogue on everyday linguistic practice is not solely a stepping
stone for studying formalized texts, even if it sometime fulfills this role. The goal of all
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metacognitive practices in the composition-rhetoric classroom is to frame linguistic-rhetorical
metacognition as the main learning outcome. To take up an earlier refrain: compositionrhetorical pedagogy, on my account, is translingual because it is not concerned with this or that
“language” or this or that “text.” It is instead concerned with the statements about this or that
“language” or this or that “text.” Texts are relevant insofar that they can generate incisive
reflection into the language game itself. Maximally: “texts” are the starting gun that sets off the
dialogic race. I stress that this is not an ipso facto renunciation of “objectivism” in favor of a
whirlwind exchange of individual points of view. If Chapter IV’s claims are accepted that social
actors are from the get-go “humans-in-habitus,” then the possibility of dialogue between agents
is always delimited in advance by the subtending structures of the habitus. A “text,” in this
maximal sense, is little more than the initial moment of strangeness that precipitates reflective
inquiry into the language game that is already in place.
Courses on 19th Century American Literature have to teach Melville and Hawthorne and
Dickinson. Courses on Early Modern Philosophy have to teach Leibniz and Descartes and
Spinoza. Here there is educational content. And rightfully so. To teach and to learn these
subjects is to engage with a set of theories and data and lines of inquiry already set out before the
particular student or the particular teacher has arrived on the scene. These subjects are contentfull. And that is good. However, composition-rhetoric pedagogy, as I am spinning it, is contentempty. There is no predetermined set of theories or data or lines of inquiry that are existent
before the particular teacher or the particular student arrive on the scene. All that exists from this
pedagogical perspective are the formal vocabularies of rhetoric that help surface the rules of the
language game and are thus refined and expanded in this process. Composition-rhetoric
pedagogy is “meta” through and through. It is not about anything. It is about the aboutness.
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This can be a tough idea to communicate to students. The vast majority of them have
become acculturated to content-full courses. The vast and intricate note-taking strategies often on
display in the library reading rooms—highlighting, sticky notes, different colors of inks for
different themes and ideas--attest to the default assumption that being a student just is ferreting
out and creating a hierarchy of the essential education content. Even in seminar-style classes that
encourage debate and discussion, the critical thinking that goes on is still rooted in the read text.
It is still about something. It is interested in this and it is not interested in that. Frequently, my
colleagues who teach literature courses often wonder out loud how to keep class discussion
“rooted” in the text.
Composition-rhetoric pedagogy in the translingual form that I describe is fully reductive,
in a strictly limited sense of that term: it continually strives to bracket out content altogether by
constantly developing and redefining the metavocabularies of aboutness, instead of focusing on
developing any specific claims about any particular content.
Clearly, to talk about aboutness ex vi termini is always at one and the same time to talk
about something. To be about is to be about something. This is to say that a pedagogy can only
arrive at the study of “aboutness” through the study of content. This is the tricky part: to trade in
content but not to investigate content. However, this is what once again makes compositionrhetoric pedagogy different than linguistic-acquisition pedagogy. If composition-rhetoric
pedagogy were about something, then it would seem to follow naturally the content that it is
about could be filled in the way that it most often it is: composition-pedagogy is about “standard
English,” “this or that genre,” “citation styles,” etcetera. But composition-rhetorical pedagogy
qua translingual composition-rhetoric pedagogy is not about something, and, therefore, cannot be
reduced to the transmission of a specific content. In order for composition-rhetoric pedagogy to
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be really composition-rhetoric pedagogy and not merely a different name for linguistic
acquisition pedagogy, it must be about the aboutness of discourse, and not about the content of
discourse itself. Instead of aboutness being the tool to get at content, content is the tool to get at
aboutness.
5 Linguistic-Rhetorical Metacognition and Linguistic-Rhetorical Educational Equity
For a site specific application of this pedagogy, cashed out as a series of assignments and
classroom activities that seeks to create educational-institutional equity, I present here my classes
for “basic writing” students whom I continue to teach in the SEEK program at John Jay College
of Criminal Justice, CUNY. In my SEEK composition-rhetoric classrooms, nearly one-hundred
percent of my students have daily contact with Languages Other Than English (LOTES) or
routinely employ linguistic features outside the parameters of “Standard English.” From the
knowledge-that perspective of monolingualism, these students possess linguistic capacities
profoundly “deficient”: they lack the “advanced” structural and grammatical acumen of
“Standard English” to perform well in the university. In other words, a monolingual pedagogy-as far as I can tell--would be primarily focused on developing students’ writing as a series of
finished, polished-off utterances. Students would be expected to command one code of “Standard
English” that is the medium of “professional” or “academic” rhetorical acts. This code,
furthermore, travels as a universal standard that is in no need of justification or explanatory
context.
In many ways, the translingual composition-pedagogy that I advocate is the mirror image
of this hypothetical monolingual approach. Whereas a monolingual approach is primarily
concerned with the form of the utterance, the translingual approach is primarily concerned with
the context of the utterance. Glossing metaphorically: monolingualism is concerned
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grammatically with the “text.” Translingualism is concerned grammatically with the “paratext.”
This reversal of priority, I feel, is called for given the types of students I frequently teach.
Constantly moving through multilingual ecologies, these students have a highly-nuanced and
dexterous linguistic knowledge-how: when to use a “Spanish” linguistic feature, when to use an
“English” linguistic feature, what to say to a boss, what to say to a friend, the multiple modes of
digital modalities. Ironically, these basic-writing students are language-rich: they are expert
speaker-rhetors. The problem is that their linguistic-rhetorical aptitudes go unrecognized by the
“Standard English” rubric. Thus, the goal of translingual composition-pedagogy is not to change
necessarily students’ linguistic-rhetorical practices, but instead to change the rubric of a
restrictive or singular “standard English.”
My CUNY students repeatedly self-report that they have “bad grammar” or that they
speak “broken” “English.” My “Spanish”-speaking students—most often from the Caribbean—
often self-report that they speak “Spanish” “slang” or “Spanglish.” These determinations have a
not-so-silent pejorative ring to them: so often my CUNY students have incorporated the toxic
narrative that their linguistic repertoires are a source of embarrassment and in dire need of
educational correction. As long as this narrative is operative in the classroom, students enter and
engage with classroom discourse trepidatiously: they do their best to copy the sets of linguistic
features that they have been told are appropriate for the “English” classroom, and—more often
than not—they silence their own voice in doing so.
The monolingual narrative turns the composition-rhetoric classroom into just another
hassle for these students: a routine composed of the daily grind of long delay-filed commutes,
family obligations, jobs in retail and food service, to which subordination in the writing
classroom to the “English” professor’s nit-picking red pen is added in. In this sense,
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composition-rhetoric as a required two semester course sequence at CUNY quickly becomes
analogous to Driver’s Ed: best to get over it quickly and get on with your life. Neither the large
class sizes nor the material conditions of most CUNY classrooms helps to change the general
Driver’s Ed vibe: the drab lighting and rows and rows of students in single, lonely desks
activates all the worst institutional memories of high school.
I propose here that the best counter-tactic to monolingualism is to signal overtly to
students in plain language that this composition-rhetoric class is about the skill of their alreadyexisting language uses and not their status as linguistic deficits in light of “Standard English.”
This is the requisite change-over for translingual composition-rhetoric founded in dialogue.
Unlike linguistic-rhetoric knowledge-that, all speaker-rhetor\s are already experts in this
knowledge-how. As Shor (1996) describes in detail, a lot of this linguistic-rhetorical knowledgehow is already activated by the material architecture of the standard classroom. Students’
frequent desire to sit in the row of desks furthest from the front of class represents a type of
cultural linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-how. It demonstrates a particular understanding of the
language game of the classroom and a particular strategy to cope effectively with it. The move
from knowledge-that to knowledge-how also requires a shift over in classroom discourse. If all
speakers have sharp linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-how, then the teacher is no longer the sole
expert in the room. What the teacher “has” that the students “do not” in this translingual scenario
is the meta-language of linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-how and the dialogic processes of
explicating the “rules” of the language game. This changeover also entails a role-reversal. In the
standard classroom, the teacher speaks in the indicative and the students speak in the
interrogative. The professor professes and the students, if permitted, ask clarifying questions. But
a translingual approach reverses the script: the teacher speaks in the “interrogative” and the
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students speak in the “indicative.” Students are prompted by the teacher to make statements
about their linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-how.
It takes a profound effort to counteract the monolingual ideology written into the walls of
the drab, institutional classroom. It is still the case that the monolingual narrative of the
composition-rhetoric classroom is already in place, whether an educator wants it to be there or
not. It is still very much the societal norm, keenly reflected when composition-rhetoric
professors tell strangers what they do for a living and they hear the shop-worn, eye-roll inducing
response: “I better watch my grammar around you!” For the public and for students alike,
teaching composition-rhetoric just is teaching “right” and “wrong” “grammar.” Cross the
threshold of the classroom and teachers become composition-rhetoric educators who must
choose what kind of pedagogues to become. Freire’s maxim (1985), “‘washing one’s hand’ of
the conflict between the powerful and the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be
neutral” (p. 122) applies here too: those in composition-rhetoric who do not work to challenge
the monolingual narrative are complicit in its continuation.
6 Moving to Problem-Posing
The dialogic approach is founded in problem-posing pedagogy (Freire, 1969; Shor,
1980). It is by “finding the seams,” so to speak, in what Bourdieu (1980) would call the “doxic
experiences” (p. 26) in the habitus that dialogue can begin. The processes of dialogic pedagogy
aim to de-naturalize the sedimented structures of routinized experience in order to make them
available to explicit apprehension and interpretation. One might say that it is through the “shock”
of the posed problem--the tension embedded in the linguistic encounter of dialogue--that the
rules of the game shift over from invisible to visible. Through dialogue, language becomes both
the content of and method of access to the selfsame investigation--a process of generating a self-
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reflexive discourse about discourse. I will group the meta-terms that compose this discourse
about discourse, after Shor (1992), under the terminological heading of “the third idiom.”
Problem-posing education converts the mundane world of average everydayness into an
endless series of texts to be interpreted. The parlor trick of a an educator well-versed in problemposing is her ability to generate dialogue starting with the most quotidian of objects: the size of
the teacher’s desk compared with the students’ in the classroom, the greasy food in the cafeteria,
an advertisement vaguely noticed on a student’s commute. The starting premise of problemposing is that all texts are, in a sense, equalized. Incisive critical dialogue can be achieved
whether reading “literary” texts like Shakespeare or reading a meme on Instagram or reading the
physical architecture of the classroom itself. The text does not matter. The dialogue does. Texts
are levelled off to the same plane of hermeneutic relevance, if and when a problem-posing
educator can awaken a profound sense of wonder in the face of the ordinary in students: the fact
that ordinary doxic experience is already, in some sense, understood along with the strangeness
of this understanding becomes the guiding light and central “content” of the problem-posing
classroom.
In terms of composition-rhetoric pedagogy this type of problem-posing takes root in the
fascination that folk can speak and write at all, that there is language instead of no language. It is
from the point of view of linguistic wonder, that the distinction between “correct / incorrect” or
“appropriate / inappropriate” or “standard / non standard” fades away into non-existence.
Language use decenters sets of “rules” or “conventions,” while foregrounding a phenomenon of
investigation. The composition-rhetoric educator based in problem-posing, as such, does not
transmit these putative linguistic “rules” or “conventions,” instead she leads the investigation
into language use as a dialogic mediation towards understanding experience.
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I want to emphasize that this is not an abandonment of linguistic “standards.” It is rather
the pedagogical realization of the fact that what lies behind what is called “standard” language
are moves in this or that language game. To put this bluntly: whereas a current-traditional
approach to composition-rhetoric pedagogy might assume that a “standard” language is existent
prior to or independent of the act, a translingual composition-rhetoric pedagogy only assumes
that the relationship between linguistic features and choice is existent. In a fully rhetorical model
of composition-rhetoric pedagogy not only do “standard” languages disappear but so do
“languages.” This is because what is studied is not the language qua linguistic expression of an
utterance or text, but rather the constitutive relationship between the utterance, the linguistic
expression contained in the utterance and the meaning of a situation. The former, once again,
would be the subject-matter of the knowledge-that pedagogies of language acquisition. If I want
to learn “Arabic,” say, then what I want to learn is how the linguistic features historically
grouped under the named language “Arabic” have traditionally worked together.
I am arguing, then, that translingual composition-rhetoric pedagogy does not deny the
existential possibility or efficacy of language acquisition pedagogies. People learn new linguistic
features successfully each day across the globe in their “native languages” and in “second
languages,” too. However, composition-rhetoric pedagogy (which, once again, on my account,
is, by my stipulation, translingual) is concerned with the unitary phenomenon of the rhetorical
act. Furthermore, I argue that even if an educator or an institution is preoccupied with teaching
the “standard,” this mythical linguistic entity itself is best taught as a series of rhetorical acts
realized always in response to a series of highly contextualized rhetorical exigencies. Where a
current-traditional pedagogy sees a “standard” a priori linguistic substance applied in the
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rhetorical act, a translingual pedagogy sees a “standard” as the a posteriori effect of so many
rhetorical acts that bear a family resemblance to one another.
Let me try this out with two claims: a student who has a nuanced acuity in interpreting
and analyzing the constitutive relationship between the move in the language game and the
linguistic feature played is better equipped to learn the “standard” and employ it, than the student
who merely learns by rote a set of rules to be followed or broken. It would follow, then, that if
composition-rhetoric focuses solely on the situationality of all speech acts, then, in a certain
sense, the “standard” is implicitly taught as well. If the learning outcomes of compositionrhetoric pedagogy remain sharply focused on the development of linguistic-rhetorical
metacognition, then students will, in effect, be able to recognize and deploy the “standard” on
their own accord, since they will have the capacity to analyze in detail the relationship between
the speech act and its practical conditions of production of reception. Standard usage will have
been demystified by its secondary placement into a meta-process that first foregrounds inquiry
into situated meaning.
These “meta” abilities exercise in an non-subordinating critical writing class can then
transfer across other speech acts and rhetorical situations, because they are the key to language
learning that goes beyond the limited confines of the classroom. It is through understanding the
why of a rhetorical act that students really learn the how and the what of linguistic expression.
The claim that I forward is that an education in critical-dialogic composition-rhetoric
pedagogy is one of the fundamental premises for language acquisition pedagogy. And not vice
versa. In order to learn a new linguistic feature, a student needs to have a place for it. Speakerrhetors can only map linguistic features to moves in the language game when they i) realize that
there is a game in play; and ii) when they can discourse about the game with sufficient explicit
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acuity. In sum: linguistic metacognition comes before linguistic skill acquisition. Even to learn a
simple conjugation chart of the “French” verb “être” is, in fact, to i) to understand, at some level
of explicitness, what it means to use a verb that signifies “to be”; and ii) it is to understand the
language game of language learning—a student has to have a grasp, at some level of
explicitness, what it means to use a textbook or what a conjugation chart “is.”
7 The Third Idiom
This “aboutness” can be elucidated through recourse to the concept of the “third idiom.”
Shor (1992) articulates the third idiom as the vocabulary that results when students and teachers
attempt to bracket out their pre-judgements as to what counts as fitting and unfitting discourse in
a classroom setting. Through dialogue, a class develops a “language” of terms and concepts
generated through the joint-effort of interpreting the joint-structures of doxic experience. The
third idiom, in this sense, is not necessarily composed of already formalized conceptual
language, but rather is the in-process, situated re-construction of prior language that teachers and
student reinvent during the class.
The belief here is that dialogic pedagogy can induce the creation of a meta-language,
without the teacher introducing formal meta-concepts. I (2017) describe the third idiom as “a
discursive amalgam” that “discovers a vocabulary of familiar words, rhetorics and ideas used to
understand these selfsame words, rhetorics, and ideas in unfamiliar ways” (p. 56). The third
idiom is founded on the premise that ordinary language is already suited to perform reflexive
analysis of ordinary language. Advanced linguistic-rhetorical metacognition can be generated
without out-of-hand barring students from using their authentic linguistic repertoires. In the third
idiom, everyday speech gets re-signified as analytical, instead of being solely practical.
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This is the starting point of the third idiom: mutual generation of critical dialogue and
writing using the linguistic resources already present in the classroom based on a social justice
orientation of the teacher that extant student linguistic capital is transformable into analytic tools.
However, herein, I would walk the third idiom out another step and relate it more directly to the
concept of linguistic-rhetorical metacognition and the study of aboutness that I continue
articulating. The third idiom, by definition, is not a static lexicon for discourse or a fixed network
of meta-terms. The third idiom itself is an empty space waiting to be filled in by a network of
meta-terms generated ad hoc from and for the existential reality of any given course. The third
idiom is an intentional medium to create and invent a network of meta-terms that highlight and
interpret the rules of the language game that has yet to come into existence.
As a discursive space that is an “empty” a priori that exists as a theoretical potential
realized in practice, the third idiom is also utterly self-reflexive. It bears no commitment to this
or that network of meta-terms. Instead, it is the commitment to the discovery of new meta-terms
and the analysis of the meta-terms already discovered. It is due to this structural feature that third
idiom becomes the pedagogical tool par excellence for investigating aboutness.
Educators generating the third idiom through dialogue look for and highlight the initial
spark when student discourse goes meta: the situational semantic inventions that students often
stumble upon in attempting to get abstract or nascent theoretical points across. For example, a
student once described the phenomenon that I think most would call “ideology” as “the dream”:
how the structures of society are both constitutive and contingent—both “real” and not “real”—
like the experiences one has while dreaming. Through critical dialogue seeking the emergence of
the third idiom, students not only have the chance to fill in meta-terms but to coin the meta-terms
themselves.
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This move fully centers aboutness as the main “subject matter” of the dialogic approach.
It moves one step beyond the plug-and-chug methods of discourse analysis that have the criticalconceptual framework prefabricated. Even if a composition-rhetoric pedagogy situates itself as
analytical instead of merely acquisitional, such a pedagogy runs the risk of inadvertently
codifying the meta-analysis as content for students to memorize and repeat. The formaldefinitional structure of meta-terms like “logos,” “pathos,” and “ethos” are just as easily reduced
to correct and incorrect answers on a multiple-choice exam as they are made available as lens for
hermeneutic interpretation of actual rhetoric.
The stress that the third idiom places on ad hoc invention of meta-terms guards against
the tendency for education to turn everything into product instead of process. The reification of
education into things-to-be-taught is the structural co-relative of the “banking concept” described
by Freire (2000). If, on an uncritical account, education is, by definition, transmission, then
education, by definition, needs something to transmit. And, if, on an uncritical account,
education is concerned with analysis, then, education must transmit analysis, as if it were
content, that is, the products of analysis--contents--are confused with the process of analysis-methods of inquiry. The third idiom, thus, attempts to preempt the “petrifying” tendency of
educational “narration” sickness ( Freire, 2000, p. 71) by bracketing out not only pre-set content
but prefabricated meta-terms as well. The third idiom is constituted by the discourse that results
from a fully “reductive” approach: nothing is left besides the language game already in play and
the linguistic features already in hand.
This is a maximal account of the third idiom in order to illustrate its constitutively
“empty” a priori structure. In the day-to-day run of things, the introduction of prefabricated
meta-terms can be highly productive for generating student linguistic-rhetorical meta-cognition.
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However, I will still stress that “teacher talk” always tacitly endorses what it speaks. If a third
idiom is not already in construction, then the teacher’s introduction of formal meta-terms runs
the risk of freezing in place students’ nascent development of their own critical idiom. The
teacher’s vocabulary should fall onto a continuum of possible lexicons, instead of installing itself
as a singular against which all others are the deviant.
The possibility of a “true” third idiom is, more or less, an ideal goal hypothesized in order
to outline the formal characteristics of a critical dialogue as a pedagogical process. In practical
articulation, a teacher is always introducing prefabricated meta-terms, typically with some idea
of where the dialogue should go. It would be myopic to claim that a strong emphasis on
linguistic-rhetorical metacognition does not direct the process of dialogue. It would also be
myopic to claim that even if I aim to achieve linguistic-rhetorical metacognition without recourse
to prefabricated meta-terms, by delineating the negative space of the third idiom be filled in by
dialogue, I, at one and the same time, do not outline a positive direction for discourse.
Thus, the pay-off of the third idiom is not necessarily a complete bracketing-off of all
prefabricated meta-terms. Instead, it is a clear-sighted commitment to said terms as purely formal
indicators of the embodied structures of doxic experience. In other words, the meta-terms that the
teacher introduces function as tool to thematize—or in Freirean terms “codify”—the structuring
elements of everyday linguistic practice that, more often than not, get overlooked due to
speakers’ profound familiarity with them. A meta-term that already has currency in academic
life, often, needs to be re-discovered—by teachers and students alike—in terms of everyday
experience in order for it to be authenticated, so to speak. In order to flesh out this point
regarding the third idiom in particular and the educational goal of linguistic-rhetorical
metacognition in general, I describe below a classroom activity that I often use with my students.
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8 A Dialogue on Genre
“Where do we come across ‘genres’ most often?” I ask the class, as I write the question
on the board. This, most often, receives rapid fire replies that I write on the board as a list:
movies, TV, books, music, etcetera. Having grown up with streaming video and music services,
genre, for first-year writing students, is a familiar, everyday word and concept. Next, I ask
students to list off the different genres that they know from one of the items on the list. Usually,
we end up talking about movies and I make another list: comedies, horror, action, drama,
etcetera. Students, at this point, have already made two classificatory moves: they have told me
where genres are daily encountered and what genres are daily encountered.
Still, the dialogue up to this point still remains highly structured on my part: students are
still filling in the pre-fixed discursive blanks. From the second list of movie genres, I can now
pose a more generative problem: How do you know the difference between a comedy and action
movie? And, once again, the responses are usually rapid fire: one makes you laugh, the other has
lots of special effects, etcetera. The trick, now, is to get students to abstract out a step further: I
am looking for students not only to describe a particular genre but to theorize what genres are in
general. It is at this juncture of the dialogue that the third idiom can begin to be constituted. This
is when students stop filling in the discursive blanks to which my talk has led them and when
they must begin to theorize a response. To move from what a concrete genre is to what genres
are in general is is also to shift statements about specific content to making statements about the
general structures that allow for content.
In a hypothetical literature class the concept of “genre” is to name and study comedies-specific examples of comic literature on a course reading list, for example. But in a composition-
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rhetoric class, comedy and other specific items under study are used to establish literate habits of
abstraction, that is to name a category, like genre as a meta-classificatory move.
Abstracting out from the analysis of a genre to the analysis of genre, students often offer
a wide array of meta-terms that differ from semester to semester. Genres have “component
parts,” “features,” and “characteristics,” to name a few. Genres “provoke” certain reactions—
comedies make you laugh, tragedies make you cry. Genres have similar “patterns” or “ways of
doing things”--think about when we call a movie’s plot generic. And the list goes on. Different
classes and different students express in their idiosyncratic linguistic repertoires that genres are
more or less typified or routinized or normalized ways of doing things, without me first writing
such defining words on the board. Instead of my teacher-talk setting first the definitional terms,
what Shor (1992) calls “front-loading teacher-talk,” students build the concept out of their own
everyday reality and extant language use.
In contrast, the educational advantage of the front-loading of student discourse here is
two-fold: on the one hand, an ad hoc, grounded approach to constructing meta-terms with
students generates more active student buy-in. Students begin to see themselves as genuine
stakeholders in the course content and trajectory. On the other hand, this approach emphasizes
active or participatory learning in linguistic-rhetorical metacognition. Clearly, an understanding
of genre alone can be an important educational goal. But an even more important educational
goal seems to be for students to generate meta-terms “out of the blue” and “on the spot”: that
students develop a conceptual habit of mind for creative invention of meta-terms.
Next in this lesson on genre, a third list takes over: the list of features that students
compose in order describe genre as opposed to a genre. This already is the start of a third idiom,
a network of student-generated meta-terms. But I look to push this dialogue out a step further.
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Usually, I summarize and thematize what strikes me as some of the more important concepts in
the third list of what genre is. From this summative list of student ideas, I pose another problem
aimed at developing further this nascent linguistic-rhetorical metacognition: Is this classroom
that we are in right now a genre? If this is the case, what makes it so? This problem prompts
students to re-apply the meta-terms generated through the study of genre in one context to
another context. In addition to the challenging task of decontextualizing one theoretical
vocabulary in order to use in a different domain, it also abstracts further the notion of genre by
applying to an unusual setting. Whatever vocabulary used in the meta-description will have to be
refined and negotiated through applying it to a different phenomenon.
Usually in this activity, students generate unique meta-terms from their linguistic
repertoire to describe what I would call “typified behaviors” or the “rules” of social ritual. With
these terms the new problem posed “Is this classroom itself a genre?” invites students to interpret
by making apparent the linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-how that is embedded in the fitting social
performatives of being a student or being a teacher. The introduction of the prefabricated metaterm on my part, through dialogic co-construction, now provides a framework for critical
dialogue by isolating and thematizing the structuring elements of an experience--being in class-that has been familiarized almost into oblivion. This is what Shor (1980) labels as
“Extraordinarily re-experiencing the ordinary” (p. 97).
Mostly, students, using their meta-terms, turn to the material architecture of the space.
Students report that classrooms typically have a large desk and a large comfortable chair for the
teacher, while students typically have small desks with uncomfortable chairs. Classrooms, almost
without exception, have a board—dry erase or chalk—and, as recently noted by some of my
students, nearly all have the same bland black white clock ticking away (which in many
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classrooms, peculiarly, does not give accurate time) in the background. The space itself is
normative and typified. It is a generic classroom that students have seen before. Our ad hoc meta
terms have allowed the dialogue to freeze frame the liquid flow of quotidian experience and put
in under review.
Students also generally comment that the material architecture of the space, walked out a
step, also reveals the power structures physically assumed in the space: the teacher is positioned
as the unilateral possessor of knowledge that is, nearly literally, broadcasted from the from of the
class towards the back. Students, upon prompting, are quick to make connections between
rhetorical space and rhetorical power: years of formation in the K-12 setting taught them that the
speaker-rhetor at the front speaks, while the speaker-rhetors at the back are supposed to remain
silent. To the extent that students’ meta-terms begin to pick out more and more the embedded
structures of the “genre” of the classroom, the third idiom continues to develop through a
dialectic: as the meta-terms catch and clarify more phenomena, these phenomena, in turn, expand
and extend the formal parameters of the meta-terms. It is through this type progressive dialogic
scaffolding that, if the moment strikes, I can begin to pose problems that require more profound
abstract thought. With the relationship of the rhetorical space to rhetorical power tabled, I can,
for instance, ask: Is the authority of teachers that grant them the use of the grand desk and chair
or is it the authority of the grand desk and chair that grants teachers their authority? Dialogue
that can reach this point begins to vibrate, in a certain sense. All of sudden, all things are up for
grabs. The ordinary is re-experienced as extra-ordinary.
It is clear, however, that this type of auto-deconstruction of a teacher’s authority is, in a
paradoxical sense, made possible if and only if such authority is already established. In a
classroom where students refuse subtly or overtly to comply with sedimented norms of
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classroom comportment, then dialogue cannot take root. This is evident in K-12 settings where
classroom practices are a methodology of physical control as much as they are of educational
content. Silently copying out answers from a textbook into worksheets inculcates students into
certain appropriate behaviors as much as transmits one subject matter or another. Aggressive,
institutional discipline in schooling or in work—as Foucault (1976) defined it—creates student
alienation from the formal sites of instruction called classrooms. This produces an effect that
clearly interferes with the overarching goals of student-centered critical pedagogy.
As Freire (2000) tells us: “dialogue cannot exist [...]without a profound love for the world
and for people” (p. 89). For Freire, “love” means a horizontal type of relating to one another,
wherein folk mutually construct their social relations--not one side imposing unilateral and often
arbitrary power on the other. From this premise, Freire proposes that the gateway problem of
dialogic pedagogy is to dissolve the student-teacher contradiction (Freire, 1968, pg. 60).
Students and teachers who resent the fact that the state has either overtly mandated or that the
culture has tacitly demanded that they are present in a classroom have to overcome that
resentment before entering into dialogue. In some classes, no doubt that that the resentment itself
can become a starting-point for problem-posing and the development of dialogue, as Shor well
describes in the opening pages of Empowering Education (1992). However, dialogue, as argued
above, is, more than anything, founded on mutual intention, or, to wax poetically, on the joint
wonder of teacher and students. Dialogue can be productively conducted with any and all
linguistic features. It requires no specialized idiom from the on-set. But without joint intention of
teachers and students there is no dialogue, only unidirectional transmission and passive, halfhearted reception.
9 Conclusion

182!
The overarching educational goal of the types of dialogue described in the above
classroom example is that, through repeated practice of generating the third idiom, students will
need less and less prompting in order to develop critical analytical idioms both in speech and in
writing--that students will learn how to theorize instead of only learning this or that theory. For
certain students, especially those who have been acculturated into dominating systems of
education, this requires a marked shift in attitude. Classroom discourse changes from being
merely a short answer activity, yes or no, right or wrong, or repeating what the teacher has
already said, to venturing ideas and creating meta-terms that require a high degree of creativity
and risk. To coin a term, in the midst of dialogue, signals that the dialogue’s participants also
trust one another, that the expansion of semantic significance will not be shut down out of hand.
Neither the value nor the correctness of the meta-terms of the third idiom can be known in
advance, and, in this sense, dialogue, is more or less, poetic: it makes experience, it names the
felt-but-unknown into existence. Such discourse requires that students exit, however briefly,
from the strategy of merely getting through the hassle of the course, of flying under the radar.
Dialogue asks students to own their own rhetorical ethos through inviting them to name the
world through their word, instead of receiving the world through the word of others. Dialogue,
thus, is always a gamble. It does not codify in advance where it is going but it distributes its
ability to get there through offering a profound faith in students’ authentic linguistic repertoires
to do the critical work.
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